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When Is an Amendment Not an
Amendment?: Modification of Arms Control
Agreements Without the Senate
David A. Koplowt
The tempest over the proposed "reinterpretation" of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty' has only barely been stilled,2 and the full
t Professor of Law, the Georgetown University Law Center. This article arises from a
panel discussion on "Executive Branch Implementation of Arms Control Treaties" at the
April 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law. See Proceedings
of the 85th Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law 483-506 (Apr 17-20,
1991). The author thanks John H. McNeill for his comments on an earlier draft of this
article, and Marc S. Martin for his research assistance.
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26,
1972, 23 UST 3435, TIAS No 7503 ("ABM Treaty").
2 See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of "Ex-
otic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 Harv L Rev
1956 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99
Harv L Rev 1972 (1986); Symposium, Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U Pa L
Rev 1351 (1989). This controversy surfaced in 1984-85 when the Reagan Administration
argued that the traditional interpretation of the coverage of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty was too restrictive and, more dramatically, that the President could alter it unilater-
ally to permit additional development and testing activities under the Strategic Defensive
Initiative. Congress then reacted strongly to reassert its shared role in the treaty process,
and the clash has bitterly divided its legislative and executive partisans. See The ABM
Treaty and the Constitution, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S Hrg 110, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987)
("ABM Treaty Hearings"); The ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution, S Rep No 164,
100th Cong, 1st Sess (1987).
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impact of the dissolution and reorganization of the Soviet Union is
far from clear.3 But already we can detect early warnings about the
next probable source of intense constitutional conflict between the
American executive branch and the Congress in their ongoing
struggle for primacy in the conduct of United States foreign rela-
tions. This imminent battle-again arising in the context of dis-
armament treaties, perhaps the most controversial and crucial as-
pect of America's international public policy-has not yet been
fully joined. But unless some creative, mutually acceptable solu-
tions can quickly be developed, this battle, too, threatens to be-
come bitter, protracted, and ultimately destructive for the coordi-
nated and consistent conduct of United States national security
efforts in an era of profound global instability.
The spark this time arises from the fact that several recent
international agreements limiting nuclear or other advanced weap-
onry purport to authorize the parties to modify some of their nego-
tiated terms through informal mechanisms other than the tradi-
tional treaty amendment, thereby cutting the United States
Congress out of the revision process. Initially, this novel approach
may seem like an expedient, practical response to the growing
modern problems of treaty complexity and over-specificity, al-
lowing for some quick adaptation to rapidly changing geo-political
circumstances. Moreover, its proponents affirm that the contem-
plated changes will be minor in nature, concerning only technical,
administrative, or procedural points, not the underlying substance
of the international obligations. Indeed, the limited experience to
date has not suggested presidential abuse or deliberate circumven-
tion of legitimate legislative processes. Nevertheless, the prospect
of informal revision of such important documents is daunting, rais-
ing fundamental issues of international law and posing another
troubling challenge to the constitutional framework of the separa-
tion of powers. As in the reinterpretation controversy, the issue is
blunt: How far may the President lawfully go in twisting the terms
of a ratified treaty without returning to the Senate for fresh advice
and consent?
This Article dissects the legal and policy issues raised by this
proposed avenue for creating new treaty terms. It offers a critique
of the practice and some recommendations for constraining the
danger before a constitutional crisis fully erupts. Section I presents
I See John B. Rhinelander and George Bunn, Who's Bound by the Former Soviet
Union's Arms Control Treaties?, 21 Arms Control Today 3 (Dec 1991) (principles of state
succession suggest coverage of breakaway republics).
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the background for the current controversy, describing a salient
emerging problem besetting modern arms control agreements: the
fastidious attention to verification procedures has led the negotia-
tors to draft treaties that are so long, complex, and detailed that
they are certain to become obsolete or simply erroneous in imple-
mentation. When dealing prospectively with such novel issues as
the regulation of future weapons and the inspection and disman-
tling of production facilities, diplomats are inherently unable to
foresee the future with perfect clarity. Yet their political masters
(in both the Congress and the executive branch) have instructed
them to leave no contingency untouched. The inevitable result is
that disarmament treaties contain meticulous provisions that just
don't work properly in practice and need to be modified, some-
times quickly.
Section II then describes the executive branch's recent efforts
to deal prospectively with this problem of creeping obsolescence,
through treaty terms that delegate to the President and the other
state party a power to incorporate subsequent corrections infor-
mally and quickly into the ratified text. Seeking to avoid the re-
quirement of returning to the Senate with "every little change" in
treaty operations, the executive has stretched to preserve some
flexibility to implement certain alterations unilaterally. In three
major recent arms control agreements, the Senate has cautiously
approved this novel experiment with "non-amendments, ' 4 and two
important additional test cases are now pending before the legisla-
ture. Section II presents these five agreements and summarizes the
initial practice under them.
Next, Section III of the Article considers the process of treaty
modification from the perspective of international law. It concludes
that on the sovereign-to-sovereign plane, countries may modify
treaties through a variety of rigorous or casual mechanisms, so long
as the parties manifest congruent intentions. International law
does not insist upon the adoption of any formal amendment pro-
cess, but rather permits states to create new law through routine
The term "non-amendment" is adapted from the colloquial arms control vocabulary,
in which negotiating delegations sometimes interact through devices designated "non-pa-
pers" or "non-ideas." Those terms were originally invented in order to preserve the author's
ability to retract or disavow the proposal quickly. Now, however, frequent usage has given
the non-paper a more formal, recognized status. See, for example, Thomas Bernauer, The
Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Negotiations in the Conference
on Disarmament 9 (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1990) ("Chemical
Weapons Convention").
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diplomatic procedures or even through unspoken behavior and
tacit acquiescence.
Section IV turns to U.S. constitutional law, where the real
constraints upon the treaty modification power will emerge. This
analysis concludes that, despite executive branch assurances, and
even assuming good faith on all sides, this new process cannot suc-
ceed. Ultimately, the executive branch's verbal guarantees are in-
sufficient. A more reliable structure will have to be created to draw
more clearly a tolerable boundary line between permissible modifi-
cation and usurpation of a vital congressional role. Even if the in-
formal revision process could, just barely, survive constitutional
challenge, it incorporates a degree of untrammeled delegation of
legislative powers that is unwise and dysfunctional.
Section V begins the process of constructing a more durable
solution to the problems of imperfect arms control treaties, by sug-
gesting a range of remedies that could be exercised. While no one
of these mechanisms will suffice for all the problems of complexity
and change in disarmament, together they may help deal with real
problems as they arise, without unduly straining the constitutional
scheme.
Finally, the Conclusion attempts to place this controversy into
a larger context, comparing it to a country's occasional efforts to
transfer to international institutions a bit of erstwhile national
decisionmaking autonomy-to surrender a portion of national sov-
ereignty in the name of advancing world order. That globalization
process is generally a salutary step toward the creation of interna-
tional stability and harmony, and domestic legal doctrines should
not unduly constrain it.
In sum, the thesis of this Article is that executive branch ef-
forts to wrest additional treaty-related powers from the Con-
gress-whether undertaken in the blatant manner of the reinter-
pretation escapade or in the seemingly more benign, indirect style
of the current non-amendment question-are dangerous and un-
warranted. We should strive to create a viable solution to the
emerging problem of treaty modification that inflicts less violence
upon the constitutional scheme. Whether we are dealing with the
U.S.S.R., the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia, or
some new conglomeration of other entities, the United States must
remain true to its own legal institutions, even in times of global
uncertainty and stress. Shared power over treaty creation and im-
plementation has served us well for over two centuries; we should
not quickly abandon the Constitution's plan.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF OVERLY-PRECISE TREATIES
A. The Expansion of Arms Control Documents
Arms control used to be a fairly simple and straightforward
process-at least for the drafters, if not for their political mentors.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol-still the single most important legal
bulwark against the use of chemical weapons in international hos-
tilities-is barely one page long.6  The 1959 Antarctic
Treaty7-demilitarizing an entire continent and establishing a
broad inspection scheme to verify compliance with its substantive
obligations-runs to six pages.' Both the Limited Test Ban
Treaty9 (prohibiting all nuclear explosions except those conducted
deep underground) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty10
(creating the international regime retarding the spread of weapons
of mass destruction) were likewise able to perform their tasks in
only three and five pages, respectively.:1 Other early arms control
agreements were similarly succinct.12 Even the 1972 SALT I Agree-
' Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jun 17, 1925, 26 UST 571, TIAS No 8061
("Geneva Protocol"). Under the treaty, 130 countries have agreed not to use (or not to be
the first to use) poison gas in war. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotia-
tions 10, 16-19 (1990) ("ACDA Treaty Book").
6 ACDA Treaty Book at 15.
The Antarctic Treaty, Dec 1, 1959, 12 UST 794, TIAS No 4780 ("Antarctic Treaty").
The treaty provides among other things that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for peace-
ful purposes and it requires that all areas of the continent, including stations, equipment,
and aircraft, be open for inspection by designated observers. Arts I, VII. The treaty has 37
parties. ACDA Treaty Book at 29-30.
s ACDA Treaty Book at 23-28.
o Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug 5, 1963, 14 UST 1313, TIAS No 5433 ("LTBT"). The treaty confines nuclear
explosions to deep underground locations where the released radioactive debris will not vent
to the surface and pollute another nation's territory. The treaty has 116 parties. ACDA
Treaty Book at 37-44, 48-51.
10 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, TIAS
No 6839 ("NPT"). The treaty prohibits any state that already possesses nuclear weapons
from sharing them or the relevant technology and equipment with other states, and prohib-
its any state that does not yet have the weapons from seeking to develop or acquire them.
The NPT is the cornerstone of the international effort to retard the proliferation of nuclear
arms, and it has spawned a series of implementing agreements containing the details of
inspection procedures. ACDA Treaty Book at 89-97, 223-27.
1 ACDA Treaty Book at 45-47 (LTBT), 98-102 (NPT).
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan 27, 1967, 18 UST
2410, TIAS No 6347 ("Outer Space Treaty"); Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplace-
ment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS No 7337 ("Sea-
beds Arms Control Treaty"); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
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ments (the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty" and the Interim Agree-
ment on Strategic Offensive Arms1'4) were relatively brief and to
the point, without volumes of details in the text or reams of fine-
grained annexes-although one can begin to see the seeds of mod-
ern practice in the "agreed statements, common understandings,
and unilateral statements" affixed to those two documents.1 5
By the mid-1970s, however, something had changed. Arms
control treaties were no longer terse statements of agreed general
policies; they were becoming instead detailed international codes
tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De-
struction, Apr 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, TIAS No 8062 ("BWC"). The Outer Space Treaty is
the basic international law document regarding human activities outside the earth's atmo-
sphere, establishing principles that are adhered to by 98 countries. It is five pages long.
ACDA Treaty Book at 52-63 (cited in note 5). The Seabeds Arms Control Treaty seeks to
preempt possible arms races under the ocean, consistent with the novel technology being
applied to the region and the territorial and economic interests that its 86 parties represent.
It runs four pages. Id at 107-17. The BWC contains the basic international obligations to
prevent biological warfare and to destroy existing stockpiles of biological agents and weap-
ons. It has 107 parties and is five pages long. Id at 129-41. But see Treaty for the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb 14, 1967, 634 UNTS 281 ("Treaty of
Tlatelolco"). This treaty, seeking to preserve the entirety of Latin America as a region free
of nuclear weapons, is substantially longer and more complicated than most of its contem-
porary arms control agreements. It is sixteen pages long, including two protocols. ACDA
Treaty Book at 64-88.
13 The ABM Treaty starkly regulated the superpowers' defensive systems, forestalling
what would otherwise have become an expensive and destabilizing arms race. It defines the
systems to be regulated and the activities that are prohibited. It is ten pages long. ACDA
Treaty Book at 155-66 (cited in note 5).
1' Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3462, TIAS No 7504 ("SALT I Interim Agreement"). The
Interim Agreement prohibited each party from initiating the construction of additional new
fixed, land-based launchers for intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and regu-
lated the number of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It also
prohibited the parties from upgrading launchers for older or smaller missiles into the most
modem, threatening types. It is eight pages long. ACDA Treaty Book at 167-76 (cited in
note 5).
5 See ACDA Treaty Book at 162-66 (ABM Treaty had seven agreed statements, five
common understandings, and four unilateral statements), 173-76 (Interim Agreement had
five agreed statements, three common understandings, and four unilateral statements).
One can also see, in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys-
tems, Jul 3, 1974, 27 UST 1645, TIAS No 8276 ("ABM Protocol"), the precursor to another
modem inconvenience: the necessity to amend a treaty relatively soon after it enters into
force, when the parties quickly discover that their newly-negotiated document does not
serve their common purposes as completely as they had anticipated. In the ABM Treaty
case the parties agreed, only two years after concluding the original treaty, that they wanted
to further reduce, from two to only one, the number of anti-ballistic missile sites that each
would be authorized to retain. They then negotiated a protocol to that effect and
shepherded it through their respective domestic ratification processes. ACDA Treaty Book
at 181 (cited in note 5).
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of conduct, specifying the precise obligations of the parties and
nailing down in text all the ambiguities that had previously been
left unexplored. Particularly in their procedures regarding mecha-
nisms for verifying compliance with the substantive obligations,
the newer treaties undertook to anticipate the wide range of future
contingencies and to resolve the parties' respective rights and re-
sponsibilities prospectively, in order to forestall controversies
before they actually emerged.
The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),16 and espe-
cially its companion, the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET),17 were the vanguard of this new approach. The TTBT
was four pages long,"" including a protocol that specified the pre-
cise types of geophysical and weapons-related data that the parties
were to exchange.1 9 The PNET covered seventeen pages."0 It in-
cluded a technical appendix which specified, for the first time in an
international disarmament agreement, details of the contemplated
inspection algorithm: not only the mathematical formula for calcu-
lating the permissible number of inspecting personnel, 21 but also
matters as narrow as the scale of the maps that the inspectors
could use ("1:24,000 or 1:25,000 with a contour interval of 10 me-
ters or less"),22 the types of hand tools they could use (geologist's
" Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, Jul 3, 1974, 13 ILM 906
("TTBT"). The treaty regulated the superpowers' conduct of underground nuclear weapons
testing by confining each explosion to no more than the equivalent yield of 150 kilotons of
TNT. The United States and the Soviet Union had specified that the TTBT would not
enter into force until the companion PNET (see note 17) was also concluded. See ACDA
Treaty Book at 184-90 (cited in note 5).
17 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 15 ILM 891 ("PNET"). The treaty applies
to nuclear explosions undertaken for purposes of civil engineering (to excavate a mine or
harbor, to re-route a river, etc.), rather than for weapons development. It provides for recip-
rocal inspection of these "peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)," to ensure that no weapons-
related activities are undertaken under civilian guise. ACDA Treaty Book at 191-210 (cited
in note 5).
ACDA Treaty Book at 187-90.
" These data included the geographic coordinates of each country's nuclear weapons
testing sites and of two specified previous test explosions; the geology of each testing area
within each site (including rock characteristics and the density, seismic velocity, water satu-
ration, and porosity of the transmission media); and the yield, date, time, depth and geo-
graphic coordinates for two calibrating test explosions. TTBT, Protocol, % 1.
10 ACDA Treaty Book at 194-210.
'1 PNET, Protocol, Art V, 6 (formula includes subcategories such as "the number of
emplacement holes plus three" and "the number of explosives plus seven").
22 Id, Art II, 4(c).
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tools, kits of note-taking equipment, and field glasses),"3 and the
step-by-step procedures for taking and sharing dual-print Polar-
oid-type photographs of the inspection area.24
With that predicate, the 1979 SALT II Treaty 5 rose (or sank)
to an even more punctilious degree of precision, weighing in at
thirty-four pages.2 6 It included ninety-eight agreed statements and
common understandings, and explicitly noted that those interpre-
tative details were to be considered-in close conjunction with the
main treaty-as were a shorter-duration protocol, a joint statement
of principles on future negotiations, a memorandum of under-
standing establishing an agreed "data base" documenting each
side's initial arsenal of strategic weaponry, and a separate Soviet
assurance regarding the production rate of the Backfire bomber.2 7
The hypertrophy of treaty drafting has continued, and even
accelerated, since SALT H. The 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces28 (abolishing the superpowers' arsenals of
selected categories of nuclear missiles) is 105 pages long.29 It is
crammed with technical and operational details,30 and its associ-
ated protocols and memoranda regarding inspection, dismantling,
2. Id, Art IV, T1 1(b), 2 (defining the types of equipment that the inspectors could bring
with them and the types that would be supplied to them by the host party).
2.4 Id, Art I1, 5 (detailing what types of cameras may be used, who will take the
pictures, what subjects may be photographed, and who receives copies of the photographs).
"' Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Treaty on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Jun 18, 1979, 18 ILM 1112 ("SALT II Treaty") (not in force). The
treaty would have required the superpowers to reduce their arsenals of long-range nuclear
weapons to a common ceiling, with sub-limits on various categories of arms. ACDA Treaty
Book at 261-66 (cited in note 5).
'6 ACDA Treaty Book at 267-300.
27 Id. See John H. McNeill, U.S.-USSR Nuclear Arms Negotiations: The Process and
the Lawyer, 79 Am J Intl L 52, 58 (1985) (describing the process of negotiating and drafting
the various components of the SALT II package of documents).
21 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Treaty on the Elimination of
Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec 8, 1987, 27 ILM 84 ("INF
Treaty"). The treaty applies to ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. Id, Art II, U7 5-6. It has required thorough dismantling of the existing
stockpiles of both countries, under a verification regime of unprecedented intrusiveness.
Daniel Sneider, Soviets Destroy Last Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles, Christian Sci
Mon 5 (May 14, 1991).
" ACDA Treaty Book at 350-454 (cited in note 5).
30 See, for example, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of Missile Sys-
tems Subject to the INF Treaty (the "Elimination Protocol"), Art II, T 10, which detailed
the particular steps for dismantling each type of weapon and support system covered by the
treaty. For example, the document specified six exacting procedures f6r destroying a
launcher for a Soviet SS-12 missile, including the requirements that "launcher leveling sup-
ports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately
equal size" and "a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut
off aft of the rear axle." Id.
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and data reporting procedures could fill a small book.31 The 1990
Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement 2 (reducing the NATO
and Warsaw Pact deployments of tanks, aircraft and other equip-
ment throughout Europe) does, in fact, fill a small book, and the
initial data exchange prompted by it has generated several more.3
The Chemical Weapons Convention, 5 now under development in
the Conference on Disarmament (a Geneva-based forty nation ne-
gotiating body affiliated with the United Nations), promises to
dwarf all its predecessors. As of August, 1991, it was 154 pages
long, with reams of technical details still to be agreed upon and
reduced to text.36 Just as dramatically, when the United States and
1 See Elimination Protocol, Protocol Regarding Inspections Related to the INF Treaty,
and Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the
INF Treaty. The parties also exchanged large-scale photographs of all the relevant types of
weapons, as well as site diagrams of the facilities where they were located. In addition, the
INF Treaty required the negotiation and effectuation of a series of other international
agreements, to provide American and Soviet inspectors ready access to military installations
inside the territories of European allies. Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, U.S., Agreement Regarding Inspections Relating to the
Treaty Between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec 11, 1987, 27 ILM 58.
3 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov 19, 1990, 30 ILM 1 ("CFE
Treaty") (not in force).
3 The CFE Treaty and subsequent accords have not yet been printed in the same for-
mat cited earlier, so it is impossible to make exact comparisons of the numbers of pages. It
is clear, however, that the CFE Treaty is much longer and more detailed than even the INF
Treaty, the previous record-holder.
3, CFE Treaty, Art XIII and Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information
(cited in note 32); Lee Feinstein, The Case for CFE, 21 Arms Control Today CFE Supp 2, 3
(Jan/Feb 1991) (describing the series of data exchanges to occur annually and at other
points during the treaty's life).
31 Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weap-
ons, Appendix I (Aug. 27, 1991) (current "rolling text" of draft chemical weapons conven-
tion now under negotiation) ("CW Convention Rolling Text").
38 Id. The Chemical Weapons Convention would be a comprehensive, global agreement
to abolish chemical weapons agents and delivery systems, as well as the facilities designed to
produce and store them. It would entail inspections of unprecedented depth and frequency,
with foreign personnel licensed to enter and study private chemical-related factories in the
United States and around the world, to verify that no impermissible weapons-related activi-
ties were underway. Bernauer, Chemical Weapons Convention (cited in note 4); Edward A.
Tanzman and Barry Kellman, Legal Implications of the Multilateral Chemical Weapons
Convention: Integrating International Security with the Constitution, 22 Intl L & Politics
475 (1990).
Also relevant in this context is the bilateral United States-Soviet Union chemical weap-
ons agreement, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Mea-
sures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, Jun 1, 1990,
29 ILM 932. It provides for dismantling of the bulk of the two nations' chemical arsenals,
cooperative inspections, and other joint efforts to spur the multilateral negotiations. The
agreement was signed on June 1, 1990, but has not entered into force, in part because the
1992]
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the Soviet Union agreed in 1990 on two protocols to modify the
TTBT and PNET 3 7-a relatively modest effort to augment the al-
ready-impressive verification provisions of those earlier agree-
ments3s-the new protocols expanded to consume far more pages
than either of the basic treaties had originally contained.39 The
new START agreement 0 is the most monstrous agreement yet fi-
nalized. It, too, is laden with technical minutiae and novel, guaran-
teed-to-be-obsolete verification details.' 1
B. Rationales for Proliferating Details
Why has this explosion occurred? What are the drafters of
modern treaties attempting to do that the earlier generations of
arms control negotiators found unnecessary? How has arms control
parties were still working on a detailed verification protocol to attach to it. See Jozef Gold-
blat and Thomas Bernauer, The US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement of June 1990:
Its Advantages and Shortcomings, 21 Bull Peace Proposals 355 (1990).
"' Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Verification Protocol to the
Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, Jun 1, 1990, 29 ILM 969
("1990 TTBT Protocol"); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States: Verification
Protocol to the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, Jun 1,
1990, 29 ILM 1025 ("1990 PNET Protocol").
38 The TTBT and PNET had not previously entered into force because the Carter Ad-
ministration had hoped to supersede them with a comprehensive test ban treaty (abolishing
all nuclear explosions in all environments) and because the Reagan Administration had con-
sidered the treaties' existing verification provisions to be inadequate. David A. Koplow and
Philip G. Schrag, rapporteurs, Phasing Out Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Belmont Confer-
ence on Nuclear Test Ban Policy, 26 Stan J Intl L 205, 210-11 (1989).
39 The 1990 protocols do not contain any additional substantive restrictions on the con-
duct of nuclear tests. Instead, they augment the verification arrangements by providing for
closer, more exacting on-site inspection of the locations where nuclear explosions are sched-
uled to occur, and by permitting the inspecting party to utilize advanced seismic and hydro-
dynamic monitoring apparatus at short range. Verifying Testing Treaties-Old and New,
20 Arms Control Today 3 (Jul/Aug 1990) (interview with Ambassador C. Paul Robinson);
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Verification of the Threshold Test Ban, 20 Arms Control Today
3, 5-6 (Sep 1990).
40 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jul 31, 1991 (on file
with U Chi L Rev) ("START Agreement") (not in force).
41 The START Agreement will require the United States and the former Soviet Union
to reduce their stockpiles of strategic nuclear forces to equal, greatly-reduced ceilings. Un-
like the INF Treaty-in which the regulated weapons were banned altogether, so a party
detecting even one residual missile would have certain knowledge of a violation-the
START accord will permit each side to retain substantial quantities of the regulated arms.
The task of verifying compliance, therefore, will include the more difficult challenge of
counting, locating, and reliably identifying the "legal" missiles, to ensure that each is ac-
counted for at all times. James R. Blackwell, Contributions and Limitations of On-Site
Inspection in INF and START, in Lewis A. Dunn, ed, Arms Control Verification and the
New Role of On-Site Inspection 95, 106-19 (Lexington, 1990).
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progressed (or fallen) into a situation where the parties are com-
pelled to spell out so many of the details in the treaty text?
The collision of two intractably opposing factors has created
this untenable situation. First, Congress and the Reagan and Bush
administrations have repeatedly exhibited a preternatural fascina-
tion with treaty detail. They have insisted that the basic accord
itself spell out with precision all the operational mechanics of
treaty operation and verification, as a bulwark against Soviet or
other treachery through the exploitation of loopholes. Second, the
treaty negotiators have simply been unable to anticipate accurately
every nuance of future practice and every potential spin of advanc-
ing technology. This leaves them to make little more than edu-
cated guesses about what sorts of inspection mechanisms will
prove to be feasible and effective. In this situation, er-
ror-sometimes quite important error-is inevitable.
It is difficult to trace with certainty the roots and the sponsors
of the current fastidious attention to the details of disarmament,
and of the necessity for writing those details into the treaty itself.
Prominent among the originators of the trend was Senator Henry
"Scoop" Jackson (D-Wash), who became the leading congressional
critic of the SALT I accords and the most prominent legislative
force influencing the SALT II negotiations. 2 Jackson complained
about ambiguities and omissions in the 1972 Interim Agreement,
often with telling political clout. For example, he and others noted
that one key goal of the Interim Agreement was to establish a spe-
cial regime for limiting the largest and most powerful category of
"heavy" ICBMs in the Soviet missile fleet.4 To that end, the docu-
ments prohibited existing missile silos from being "significantly in-
creased" in size.44 A formal "common understanding" reflected the
parties' concurrence that this term meant that any growth could be
"not greater than 10-15% of the present dimensions" of the silos. 45
42 Michael Krepon, The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification 13-14 (Henry L.
Stimson Center, Jan 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The
Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control 215-16 (Knopf, 1984).
Senator Jackson ultimately voted for the SALT I accords, but only after inserting the
"Jackson Amendment," mandating that future arms control negotiations should ensure
equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in key strategic weaponry. Pub L
No 92-448 § 3, 86 Stat 746, 747 (1972).
"' John B. Rhinelander, The SALT I Agreements, in Mason Willrich and John B.
Rhinelander, eds, SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond 125, 145 (Free Press, 1974);
Gerard Smith, Double Talk: The Story of SALT 1 359, 388, 413 (University, 1985); Talbott,
Deadly Gambits at 215.
SALT I Interim Agreement, Agreed Statement C, 23 UST at 3478 (cited in note 14).
,s Id, Common Understanding A.
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As Jackson noted, however, even this specification was inadequate,
because if a three-dimensional structure could be increased 10-
15% in each dimension, then the resulting increase in the total
volume of the silo would be much larger, and the provisions would
not effectively bar significant upgrades in silo size and missile
capability.46
Even more telling, Jackson pointed out that the negotiators of
the Interim Agreement had never succeeded in securing Soviet
agreement on the fundamental definition of a "heavy" missile, and
that only a United States unilateral statement expressed a view
about the prohibited sizes.47 When the U.S.S.R. later manufac-
tured a new type of middle-sized missile, larger than any previous
"light" missile, but smaller than any previous "heavy" missile, the
United States was unable to mount a serious legal challenge. 48
Jackson and other critics concluded that details of these sorts
could not be left dangling, but must be resolved explicitly and
comprehensively through the text of the treaty.49
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) subsequently picked up much of
the Jackson legacy in this area, subjecting recent arms control
agreements to a painstaking, point-by-point review.50 For example,
although in the final analysis he was able to marshall only four
41 Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys-
tems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearing before
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 341-43, 432-33 (1972); John B.
Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age, in John N. Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, and
Robert F. Turner, eds, National Security Law 551, 608-09 (Carolina Academic, 1990); So-
viet Compliance with Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 94th Cong,
1st Sess 6-19 (1975) ("Soviet Compliance Hearing").
47 In SALT I, a unilateral statement was used to record one side's position or interpre-
tation, where the other side did not concur. In Unilateral Statement D, the United States
noted that it would consider as a heavy missile any new type of missile that had a volume
significantly greater than the largest type of light missile then operational. The U.S.S.R. did
not accept that interpretation. Interim Agreement, Unilateral Statement D (cited in note
14); Smith, Double Talk at 388-90 (cited in note 43), 400. See Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 301, Comment c (1986) (unilateral statement may
have legal consequences under international law).
'8 Smith, Double Talk at 460 (cited in note 43); ABM Treaty Hearings at 469 (cited in
note 2); Soviet Compliance Hearing at 6-9 (cited in note 46).
"' Smith, Double Talk at 460-61; Soviet Compliance Hearing at 6-19; ABM Treaty
Hearings at 469.
0 When Senator Helms announced, in April 1991, that he was prepared to support the
CFE Treaty, his endorsement was seen as a major boost for the ratification effort, providing
"a respite from the spectacle of Helms's previous flamboyant public allusions at hearings of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to secret government information proving the folly
of arms control deals with communists." R. Jeffrey Smith, Helms, Soviets See Eyeball to
Eyeball, Wash Post A17 (Apr 23, 1991).
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allies in his opposition to the INF Treaty,51 his efforts (along with
those of others) did result in significant delay. 2 His tenacity also
posed a credible threat of "killer amendments" that might have
scuttled the accord.53 And they required the executive branch to
return to the Soviets, even after the treaty was signed, to clarify at
least ten additional points that the negotiators had left obscure,
such as the treaty's coverage of possible future types of INF tech-
nology and selected details of the inspection and dismantling
procedures.5
Ronald Reagan is also a key part of the story. His instinctual
distrust of the Soviet Union led him to insist upon iron-clad in-
spection provisions. 5 His famous refrain, "trust, but verify, '56 be-
came the working motto of the bureaucracy. Many skeptical ob-
servers have suggested that the penchant for exactitude in
verification-demonstrated not only by Reagan, but even more by
his senior staff and other key policy makers57-was driven not so
much by a sincere desire to conclude workable disarmament trea-
ties, but by the cynical calculation that the Soviet Union would
51 100th Cong, 2d Sess, in 134 Cong Rec 6937 (May 27, 1988).
" Paul Bedard, Senate Prohibits Reinterpretations, Nears Treaty OK, Wash Times
A6 (May 27, 1988); Warren Strobel, Nunn, Byrd Pressure Shultz with INF Delays, Wash
Times A4 (Feb 10, 1988). The Senate voted its consent to the INF Treaty only after Presi-
dent Reagan had already flown to Moscow for the start of the summit meeting at which the
instruments of ratification were formally exchanged, a source of some embarrassment for
Reagan. David C. Morrison, A Slow Lift-Off for the INF Pact, Natl J 1136 (Apr 30, 1988).
11 Jesse James, Senate Approves Ratification of Historic INF Treaty, 18 Arms Control
Today 22 (Jul/Aug 1988); R. Jeffrey Smith, Senate Panel Backs INF Report, Wash Post A4
(Apr 18, 1988).
" ACDA Treaty Book at 447-52 (cited in note 5) (text of May 12, 1988 "agreed min-
utes" and diplomatic notes); Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Soviets Say Missile Pact Issue
Has Been Resolved, NY Times Al (May 13, 1988); Helen Dewar, Senate Nears Debate on
INE Treaty, Wash Post Al (May 14, 1988). See also INF Missile Treaty Wins Senate Ap-
proval, 44 Cong Q Almanac 379, 387 (1988) (describing INF Treaty modification proposals
by Richard N. Perle, former aide to Senator Jackson, and later Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, who argued that the treaty contained unacceptable loopholes permitting Soviet
exploitation).
" See Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress (Feb 1, 1985), reprinted in U.S. De-
partment of State, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, Special Rep No
122, 1-2 (Feb 1, 1985) (stressing the importance of strict compliance with all provisions of
arms control agreements and noting that American objectives in ongoing negotiations focus
on verification demands); Joseph G. Whelan, Andropov and Reagan as Negotiators: Con-
texts and Styles in Contrast, Cong Res Service Rep No 83-141S, 93 (Jun 30, 1983) (Reagan
stressed patience in negotiations with the Soviet Union, and precision in drafting
agreements).
56 David Braaten, Reagan Describes Arms Talks, Wash Times A4 (Jan 12, 1990); Bruce
Van Voorst, Arms Control: An Exercise in Trust, Time 24 (Jul 31, 1989).
'7 Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age at 624-26 (cited in note 46); Talbott,
Deadly Gambits at 66, 272 (cited in note 42).
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continue to resist, as it traditionally had, any American demands
for significant arms reductions and intrusive inspection.5 8 In that
minuet, some concluded, the United States could appear to the
world community to be actively pursuing arms control, the blame
for any failures would be attributed to the closed nature of Soviet
society, and the Reagan program of massive defense buildups
could continue unimpeded."'
In any event, the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev and the
promulgation of glasnost and perestroika signaled a new era in
arms control, initiating a phase in which previously unimagined
verification schemes suddenly became plausible.6 Whether or not
the Reagan lieutenants were nonplussed by Moscow's acceptance
of their hard-line terms, they instructed negotiators to craft docu-
ments of surpassing detail and precision, to put newfound Soviet
openness to the test. 1
Beyond the impact of these personalities, Congress has by leg-
islation directed more concerted attention to the details of treaty
drafting. The 1972 Case-Zablocki Act,62 requiring the Secretary of
State promptly to transmit to the Congress a copy of every inter-
national agreement signed on behalf of the United States,6 3 reflects
a concern that secret agreements might otherwise escape legislative
scrutiny.6 Also, Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
58 Thomas Risse-Kappen, The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control
168-69 (Westview, 1988); Talbott, Deadly Gambits at 272 (cited in note 42).
59 See generally Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and
Russia Run the Arms Race (Pantheon, 1976) (arguing that the superpowers have tradition-
ally merely feigned an interest in arms control, while they continue their weapons buildups).
60 Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age at 627 (cited in note 46).
8! Kenneth L. Adelman, Verification in an Age of Mobile Missiles (address before the
City Club in San Diego, Jun 26, 1987), reprinted in 87 Dept State Bull 27, 30 (Sep 1987)
(Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, predicted
that "[o]ne test of openness will be whether the Soviets are willing to accept the verification
provisions we are proposing in the agreement on [INF]"); Statement by President Reagan
on the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, May 7, 1986, reprinted in U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 225, 226 (Public Affairs Office, 1986)
("We are seeking to put these Soviet pronouncements [about the value of effective verifica-
tion] to the test at the negotiating table.").
82 Pub L No 92-403, codified at 1 USC § 112b (1988). See 22 CFR § 181 (1991) (estab-
lishing internal executive branch procedures to ensure compliance with statutory reporting
requirements).
" Treaties, of course, were already being sent to the Senate for its consideration for
advice and consent prior to ratification, but international agreements other than treaties
(commonly referred to as "executive agreements") were not always provided to either
chamber.
International Agreements-Transmission to Congress, HR Rep No 92-1301, 92d
Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1972) (to accompany S 596), in 1972 USCCAN 3067, 3068. See State
Department Airgram to All Diplomatic Posts Concerning Criteria for Deciding What Con-
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Acts" asserts that any agreement that "will obligate the United
States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or
armaments of the United States" could be effectuated only pursu-
ant to the treaty-making power or through bicameral legislation.6
Congress thereby attempted to exclude "sole executive agree-
ments" as a major tool of arms control, and to preserve a funda-
mental role for the legislature in reviewing the terms of an ac-
cord.87 In addition, the Derwinski Amendment 8 inserts Congress
still further into the pre-signature negotiation of disarmament
pacts. It mandates that the Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency report promptly to the Congress about "each el-
ement of any significant arms control proposal made to a foreign
country by the United States, or made to the United States by a
foreign country," together with an assessment of the verifiability of
the proposal. 9
Today, at least some experts have wistfully suggested turning
back the clock on this degree of detail in treaty drafting, and au-
stitutes an International Agreement (Mar 9, 1976), reprinted in Thomas M. Franck and
Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and
Simulations 389 (West, 1987) (specifying types of detailed international agreements re-
quired to be reported to Congress). See also Treaties and Other International Agreements:
The Role of the United States Senate, S Rpt No 98-205, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 22 (Congres-
sional Research Service, 1984) ("Role of the Senate"); David J. Kuchenbecker, Agency-
Level Executive Agreements: A New Era in U.S. Treaty Practice, 18 Colum J Transnatl L
1, 64-69 (1979); Loch K. Johnson, The Making of International Agreements: Congress Con-
fronts the Executive 127-29 (NYU, 1984) (describing so-called "agency agreements", inter-
national agreements concluded on behalf of the United States by non-diplomatic personnel).
" Pub L 87-297 § 33, codified at 22 USC § 2573 (1988).
"Id.
" See text accompanying note 278; Restatement at § 303 (cited in note 47) (defining
three types of international agreements other than treaties, and noting congressional at-
tempts to limit their use); Note, Legal Implications of Deferring Ratification of SALT II,
21 Va J Intl L 747, 778-82 (1981) (applying § 33 to a major arms control agreement); Ken-
neth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 Ohio St L J 1089, 1116 (1990) (assessing the consti-
tutionality of the provision).
" Pub L No 95-108 § 4, codified at 22 USC § 2577 (1988).
" Id. See HR Conf Rep No 95-563, 95th Cong, 1st Sess (Aug 3, 1977) (to accompany
HR 6179), in 1977 USCCAN 1684, 1692. In adopting the new provision, the Conference
Committee noted "that the provision is not intended to interfere with the President's ability
to conduct arms control negotiations but is intended to emphasize the responsibility of
ACDA and other executive branch agencies to keep the Congress informed with respect to
the verifiability of significant arms control proposals." Id at 1693.
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thorities both inside 0 and outside71 of government have called for
a simpler, more expeditious negotiation and agreement process,
unencumbered by this welter of specificity.7 2 The government bu-
reaucracy, however, has not been stayed from its assigned task. It
continues to work the arms control issues with a passion for detail
and a fear that congressional or other critics will comb the negoti-
ated document for omissions or latent ambiguities. 7 Negotiators
who get blamed for loopholes quickly discern the advantages of at-
tending to each possible nuance, even at significant cost and
delay.74
70 See Kenneth L. Adelman, Arms Control With and Without Agreements, 63 Foreign
Affairs 240, 258-60 (Winter 1984/85) (proposing that arms control might progress more ex-
peditiously through the use of informal, even unwritten agreements on broad principles,
unencumbered by the welter of specificity); Robert Einhorn, Revising the START Process,
32 Survival 497 (Nov/Dec 1990) (favoring smaller, more frequent arms control agreements);
Paul Bedard, Soviet Leader's Ability to Slash Arms Doubted, Wash Times A3 (Oct 8, 1991)
(American officials are not eager to try to convert into written treaties the recent US and
Soviet exchanges of unilateral arms reductions; attempting to do so might slow down the
pace of reform.).
7' Michael Krepon and Sidney N. Graybeal, Dealing with Future Treaty Implementa-
tion and Compliance Questions, in Elizabeth Kirk, ed, Technology, Security and Arms
Control for the 1990s 239, 240 (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1988)
("The growth in complexity, Congressional involvement and bureaucracy does not bode well
for those who approve of arms reductions but also believe in Murphy's Law."). David A.
Koplow, rapporteur, Conference Report: Executive-Congressional Relations and the Treaty
Ratification Process 11, 21 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Henry
L. Stimson Center, Jan 17-18, 1991); Michael Nacht, Jay Winik and Alan Platt, What
About Arms Control?, Wash Post C3 (Sep 22, 1991) (Middle East peace process should not
be dependent upon formal arms reduction treaty); Sharon A. Squassoni, Workshop Report:
The Future of Arms Control 9 (Science Applications International Corporation, Sep 13,
1991) (detailed inspection rights are not always necessary or desirable).
72 There have been important recent applications of the concept of pursuing arms con-
trol without formal, written treaties. Gerald Segal, Informal Arms Control: The Asian Road
to Conventional Reductions, 19 Arms Control Today 16 (May, 1989). See text accompany-
ing notes 119-32.
7' Note, Constitutional Limits on the President's Power to Interpret Treaties: The
Sofaer Doctrine, the Biden Condition, and the Doctrine of Binding Authoritative Repre-
sentations, 78 Georgetown L J 1983, 2024 n 154 (1990) (Senate gave the INF Treaty more
attention than any previous arms control agreement).
7 In discussing the delays resulting from the Senate's detailed evaluation of the INF
Treaty, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W Va) commented:
If there is a hole in this treaty, it is not my fault; that is the fault of the Administration
and its negotiators who failed to do their homework. If there is a problem there, that is
their problem ....
Morrison, Natl J at 1136 (cited in note 52). See also The INF Treaty, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, Part 1 at 166-67 (Jan 25-28,
1988) (Ambassador Kampelman testifying that, after observing the Senate debates on the
ABM Treaty reinterpretation, the United States delegation to the INF Treaty talks resolved




Congressional participants, too, apparently continue to see a
premium in developing a reputation for keen-eyed mastery of the
technical interstices in arms control debates. Leaders such as Sen-
ators Sam Nunn (D-Ga),75 Joseph Biden (D-Del), 8  and John
Glenn (D-Ohio)77 have emerged with a consistent orientation to-
ward careful inspection of the details of a proffered agreement.
Arms control documents excite frequent, searching review and ap-
praisal within the House of Representatives, too.7 8 A plethora of
committees now operates in the arms control arena, and a signifi-
cant new disarmament agreement would normally be vetted
through at least six panels (plus subcommittee consideration): For-
eign Relations/Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence in each
chamber.79 A standing informal "Arms Control Observer Group"
also allows members to organize for informational briefings and to
visit the negotiating delegations overseas.80
Moreover, other countries seem recently to have adopted a
similar bias toward detail in arms control drafting. For example,
although earlier generations of Soviet diplomats had consistently
resisted American efforts to import additional precision into the
treaty text,"' at least one veteran U.S. negotiator reports that after
75 Krepon, Treaty Ratification at 13-14 (cited in note 42) (Senator Nunn plays a piv-
otal role in contemporary defense debates).
76 Senator Biden emerged as a key player in the debates on the reinterpretation of the
ABM Treaty and on the ratification of the INF Treaty, sponsoring Senate resolutions or
conditions that addressed the separation of powers issues directly. See Joseph R. Biden and
John B. Ritch, The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitutional Partnership, 137 U Pa L
Rev 1529 (1989).
7 See Robert L. Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control of
Peaceful Nuclear Activities 252, 287 (Westview, 1985) (describing Senator Glenn's role in
developing new legislation related to nuclear non-proliferation).
78 Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 Mich J Intl L 406, 408
(1989) (House members consistently resent their exclusion from the treaty-making process
and attempt to involve themselves in international issues).
79 In 1988, senior officials of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
appeared before Congress on twenty-seven occasions for hearings or briefings. These in-
cluded presentations before members or staff of all six committees, covering a wide range of
arms control questions. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988 Annual Report,
S Prt No 101-67, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 143-44 (1989).
"o Arms Control: Negotiations but No Accords, 41 Cong Q Almanac 175 (1985). See
also McNeill, 79 Am J Intl L at 63-64 (cited in note 27) (Congressional participation in the
arms control process has grown, with members frequently visiting the negotiating delega-
tions and helping to shape positions adopted by the United States). Senators were not al-
lowed to participate, even as observers, in the SALT I negotiations. Treaty on Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Exec Rep No 28, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1972).
" The traditional dynamic of superpower arms control negotiations had usually seen
the United States pushing for inclusion in the document of additional details of the verifica-
tion regime, with the Soviet Union generally resisting those demands. Warren Heckrotte, A
Soviet View of Verification, 42 Bull Atomic Scientists 12 (Oct 1986).
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the various ABM Treaty episodes, the Soviets apparently decided
to follow the American lead about the value of specificity.8 2
The basic rationale for this attention to precision-especially
for belaboring the treaty text with so many of the details-can be
stated succinctly. First is the argument that sound, effective verifi-
cation is essential to the arms control process. No country would
prudently reduce its own level of armaments unless it was confi-
dent that its potential adversaries were honoring the reciprocal re-
straints.83 Adequate verification, therefore, intends to deter poten-
tial cheaters, to deny them the anticipated value of any
surreptitious violations, and to uphold the international rule of law
demanding point-by-point fealty to agreed obligations.8 4
Second, the early arms control agreements were too lax. They
invited exploitation by the Soviet Union or others, and left the
United States without effective legal recourse for vindicating na-
tional legal rights.8 5 The loopholes in the SALT I Interim Agree-
ment, 6 the lack of verification rigor in the Biological Weapons
82 The American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 85th Annual Meeting
496-97 (Apr 17-20, 1991) ("1991 ASIL Proceedings") (remarks of Thomas Graham, Jr.). See
also Roland M. Timerbaev, A Soviet Official on Verification, 40 Bull Atomic Scientists 8, 8
(Jan/Feb 1987) (leading Soviet arms control delegate asserted that "the Soviet Union is
open to verification and that we are interested in it no less than others"). Even more re-
cently, some Soviet experts seemed to have come full circle, suggesting that the exquisite
drafting of recent arms control agreements had become dysfunctional. See David C. Morri-
son, Back on Course, Natl J 2074, 2077 (Aug 31, 1991) (then-Soviet Foreign Minister Alex-
ander A. Bessmertnykh described the START agreement as "fantastically complex" and
mused that it might be "the last treaty of its kind").
83 See Arms Control and Disarmament Act § 37 (The Derwinski Amendment) (cited in
note 68) ("It is the sense of the Congress that adequate verification of compliance should be
an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement."); Arms Control and
National Security: An Introduction 139 (Arms Control Association, 1989).
84 See Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, U.S. Government report
to Congress (Feb 6, 1991) ("Soviet Noncompliance Report") (on file with U Chi L Rev);
Philip J. Farley, How to Negotiate a Treaty, 43 Bull Atomic Scientists 33, 34 (Oct 1987);
Manfred Eimer and Edward J. Lacey, Arms Control Verification Demands Resources, Re-
solve, Signal 29 (Dec 1991).
85 Critiques of American arms control negotiators often included the allegation that
Soviet diplomats were more patient, firm, and focused, permitting them significant advan-
tages in working the text toward their national objectives. Warren Strobel, Mistakes Feared
as Arms Negotiators Rush To Summit, Wash Times A3 (Apr 6, 1988); Kenneth L. Adelman,
Negotiating Arms Reductions-Six Principles, ACDA Occasional Papers (Jan 21, 1987); Ar-
thur J. Goldberg, Negotiating with the Kremlin, Christian Sci Mon 22 (Oct 7, 1985).
88 See text accompanying notes 42-49.
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Convention,87 and the potential evasion scenarios of the TTBT8 s
were all seen as failures of the negotiators, who should have dealt
more carefully and comprehensively with the sources of the later
problems.
Finally, supporters of finely detailed treaties argued that the
Soviet Union and other rogue states were consistently willing to
violate arms control accords 89 and, more subtlely, to exploit them
by seizing upon every possible vagary or imprecision. 0 A special
argument in this respect was the allegation that Soviet negotiators
were adept at drafting vague "agreements in principle" that
sounded fine, but did not include the operational details necessary
to make them truly effective. If the United States nibbled at this
type of ephemeral accord, in the hope that the necessary details
could later be derived in practice consistent with the "spirit" of
the agreement, it would eventually discover that the anticipated
follow-up consensus was never forthcoming. Therefore, unless the
United States insisted at the outset on nailing down sufficient de-
tails to elaborate any agreement in principle, the Soviets would
evade meaningful commitments on the intricacies of the verifica-
tion functions.9 1
87 The Biological Weapons Convention contains no provisions on verification; the im-
plicit understanding is that each party will utilize its own monitoring mechanisms. This
posture was initially acceptable to the United States because biological weapons were con-
sidered not to have appreciable military utility, and the United States had unilaterally dis-
posed of its entire arsenal even before the BWC was concluded. ACDA Treaty Book at 130
(cited in note 5). Since 1972, however, certain controversies have arisen regarding compli-
ance with the treaty, see Elisa D. Harris, Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet
Noncompliance?, 11 Intl Security 41 (Spring 1987), and some have called for amendment of
the BWC to elaborate its verification and dispute-resolution provisions. Graham S. Pearson,
Strengthening the BTWC Regime: A Defense View, Chemical Weapons Convention Bull 2
(Jun 1991); Jozef Goldblat and Thomas Bernauer, Proposals for Strengthening the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention, 22 Bull Peace Proposals 235 (1991).
88 Efforts to implement the TTBT, to reduce the size of nuclear explosions it permits,
or to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty have been plagued by controversy over hy-
pothetical "evasion scenarios." Treaty opponents suggested that despite the proposed
treaty, clandestine nuclear testing could still be accomplished inside enormous underground
cavities, in the midst of an earthquake that muffles the seismic signals, or deep in outer
space where the existing monitoring mechanisms might be inadequate. Treaty supporters
were then compelled to develop language and technology to cover those imagined gaps in
the verification arrangements. Koplow and Schrag, 26 Stan J Intl L at 236-38 (cited in note
38); 20 Arms Control Today at 4-5 (cited in note 39).
" See Soviet Noncompliance Report (cited in note 84) (detailing official allegations
about Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties).
" Richard N. Perle, What is Adequate Verification?, in Gordon J. Humphrey, et al,
eds, SALT II and American Security 53, 54-56 (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980).
,1 Edward L. Rowny, Negotiating with the Soviets, 18 Atlantic Community Q 300, 304
(1980); Whelan, Cong Res Service Rep No 83-141S at 82 (cited in note 55); Thomas W.
Wolfe, The SALT Experience 9 (Ballinger, 1979).
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C. The Difficulties of Treaty Detail
Only more recently has the converse case been developed, as
national leaders belatedly recognize some of the inherent costs of
the current detail-oriented strategy in treaty drafting. First, even
the most gifted negotiators are patently unable to foresee every-
thing that might become relevant in the treaty's lifespan. Many
modern accords truly break new ground, writing substantive and
procedural provisions that have no close precedents in the world of
disarmament or elsewhere. The INF Treaty, for example, was the
first to require destruction of an entire category of deployed nu-
clear arms, and the first to mandate on-site inspection of weapons
facilities inside the U.S.S.R."2 The forthcoming chemical weapons
convention will require even more invasive verification, injecting
foreign personnel into the innermost operations of privately owned
chemical, plastics, and fertilizer factories.93 The START agreement
will result in a permanent foreign official presence around the pe-
rimeter of major U.S. defense facilities to provide monitoring of
incoming and outgoing cargos.9 4 In all of this, there is precious lit-
tle previous experience for negotiators to draw upon. Despite their
efforts to be careful,95 to experiment before making a commit-
ment,9 6 to simulate activities wherever possible 97 and to think cre-
92 Blackwell, On-Site Inspection in INF and START at 95-106 (cited in note 41).
93 Tanzman and Keliman, 22 Intl L & Politics 475 (cited in note 36).
9' Blackwell, On-Site Inspection in INF and START at 106-19.
"' Despite all the time and attention devoted to the preparation of the text of the INF
Treaty, the parties discovered, shortly after signing it, that a number of technical mistakes,
akin to typographical errors, had crept into the documents, especially in the Memorandum
of Understanding establishing the treaty's database. Many of these errors were corrected via
an exchange of diplomatic notes on May 21, 1988. ACDA Treaty Book at 445 (cited in note
5). See also R. Jeffrey Smith, Rush Job on Nuclear Pact Produces Delaying Glitches, Wash
Post A20 (Aug 16, 1991) (series of errors in newly-signed START agreement prevented its
prompt release to public, allowing negotiators to correct mistakes).
91 For example, before the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the 1990 pro-
tocols amplifying the verification provisions of the TTBT and PNET, they engaged in a
sustained bilateral Joint Verification Experiment, to test the relative merits of seismic and
hydrodynamic monitoring systems. Agreement on the Conduct of a Joint Verification Ex-
periment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 31, 1988, 88 Dept State Bull (Aug 1988). Reportedly, the ex-
periment "was very valuable" in the process of deriving suitable inspection equipment and
procedures. 20 Arms Control Today at 5 (cited in note 39).
'7 In support of the ongoing negotiations toward a chemical weapons convention, sev-
eral states have conducted "trial inspections" to explore the types of monitoring equipment
and routines that would be necessary to detect violations of the treaty without unduly com-
promising industrial privacy. See S.J. Lundin, ed, Non-Production by Industry of Chemi-




atively about the variations that may arise,95 there will doubtless
be glitches.
Second, the negotiators are aiming at a moving target, as the
relevant technology advances with breathtaking speed. New weap-
ons are designed and evaluated continuously, and sequential gener-
ations of arms are often deliberately made smaller, more mobile,
and more difficult to track and identify.99 No longer are fixed,
land-based ICBM silos the critical issue in arms control; the cut-
ting edge of verification continuously moves toward more elusive
objectives. 10
At the same time, the technology of verification also advances
rapidly. 101 Mechanisms such as the "national technical means of
verification"1 02 that sufficed to monitor compliance with SALT I
and other agreements, are now often relegated to secondary impor-
tance in an era where on-site inspection and short-range electronic
imaging devices are technically and legally feasible.103 Future
" Arms control advocates have explored a variety of novel suggestions that could pro-
mote greater confidence in compliance with disarmament accords. See, for example,
Jonathan B. Tucker, Back to the Future: The Open Skies Talks, 20 Arms Control Today 20
(Oct 1990) (describing the feasibility and desirability of an Open Skies agreement permit-
ting aerial reconnaksance of other states' territories and military structures).
"' Adelman, 87 Dept State Bull at 27 (cited in note 61).
100 As the agenda of international disarmament efforts progresses toward controls on
conventional forces (tanks, aircraft, troops, etc.), chemical weaponry, and other smaller,
more portable items, the task of verifying compliance becomes more challenging and the
corresponding treaty language often becomes more complex and detailed. Thomas J. Hirsch-
feld, The Toughest Verification Challenge: Conventional Forces in Europe, 19 Arms Con-
trol Today 16 (Mar 1989).
'0 John A. Adam, Ways to Verify the U.S.-Soviet Arms Pact, 25 IEEE Spectrum 30,
31-34 (Feb 1988) (surveying the growth of technology in arms control verification).
.0. In the SALT I negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union coined the term
"national technical means of verification" ("NTM") to refer to the array of photo-reconnais-
sance satellites, over-the-horizon radars, long-range seismometers, and the like that enabled
them to keep tabs on each other from afar. These devices were sufficient to monitor the
relatively large, conspicuous, immobile items limited by SALT I, obviating the need for on-
site inspection. Arms Control and National Security at 142-43 (cited in note 83). Many
agreements have adopted virtually identical language ensuring the parties' rights to use
NTM, the obligation to refrain from actions that would interfere with the operation of
NTM, and the obligation to refrain from "deliberate concealment measures" that impede
the functioning of NTM. See ABM Treaty, Art XII (cited in note 1); SALT I Interim Agree-
ment, Art V (cited in note 14); INF Treaty, Art XII (cited in note 28).
101 The INF Treaty broke new ground in providing for frequent, in-depth inspection of
previously-inaccessible military facilities inside the Soviet Union. The treaty permits Ameri-
can observers to visit some 130 sites (missile bases, assembly plants, etc.) over a period of
thirteen years to verify the levels of the initial stockpiles, the progress on dismantling, and
compliance with the ban on remanufacture. INF Treaty, Protocol on Inspections (cited in
note 28); United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Understanding the INF
Treaty 1 (Office of Public Affairs, 1988).
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breakthroughs may ease the verification burden in dazzling
ways,104 and new types of sensors may become available, 105 but cur-
rent negotiators can hardly predict the next spin in remote sensing
apparatus or non-invasive imaging equipment.
Perhaps most importantly, the politics of arms control contin-
uously changes, too. The unpredictable ups and downs of glasnost
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have reverberated through-
out international diplomacy as the uncertainties in internal Soviet,
Commonwealth, and Russian politics generated inconsistencies in
Moscow's approach to disarmament negotiations. 06 At some points
it has appeared that the world was poised on the brink of truly
staggering advances in arms control; 07 at other times, the old ri-
gidity has reappeared and progress has ground to a halt. 08 For
negotiators attempting to fashion a treaty regime that will endure
for many years-some treaties have fixed terms, but most are of
unlimited duration' 09-the political uncertainty complicates every-
104 1985 Arms Control Rptr 611.B.246 (Jul 26) (describing laboratory work on device to
count warheads on a missile without opening it); Russell Maxfield and Arend J. Meerburg,
Two Techniques for Verifying Conventional Reductions, 19 Arms Control Today 18, 20-21
(Aug 1989) (describing development of unique "tags" that could be permanently affixed to
weaponry, allowing inspectors reliably to count permitted numbers); H.O. Newsham, De-
tecting Underground Nuclear Explosions Using Neutrinos, 11 Arms Control, No 3, 232
(1990) (proposing a new, remote method for supplementing the traditional seismic systems
in verifying compliance with nuclear test ban treaties).
105 The Open Skies Treaty, for example, contemplates additions to the list of sensors
that could be used on overflights, as the cost of the sensors declines and as their political
acceptability increases. Open Skies Treaty, Arts IV, § 3; X, § 5 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
100 David Hoffman, U.S. Officials See Signs of Cooperation by Soviets, Wash Post A42
(May 23, 1991) (linking erratic Soviet behavior on arms issues to the continuing tumult in
internal Soviet economic and political life); Rhinelander and Bunn, 21 Arms Control Today
at 3 (cited in note 3) (discussing succession problems provoked by dissolution of the
U.S.S.R.).
107 At their 1986 summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, for example, Reagan and
Gorbachev reportedly reached a contingent agreement to eliminate all their nuclear ballistic
missiles within ten years. However, no such treaty was negotiated. Lou Cannon, Reagan-
Gorbachev Summit Talks Collapse as Deadlock on SDI Wipes Out Other Gains, Wash Post
Al (Oct 13, 1986).
118 See David Hoffman, U.S., Soviets Again Fail to Settle Treaty Dispute, Wash Post
A6 (May 22, 1991) (describing obstructionist efforts by Soviet military officials to exclude
four naval infantry units from the coverage of the CFE Treaty); Gist: Open Skies Treaty, 3
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, No 13, 258 (on file with U Chi L Rev) (political turmoil
inside U.S.S.R. delayed conclusion of Open Skies Treaty).
109 The Interim Agreement had a term of five years. Id, Art VIII, § 2 (cited in note 14).
Treaties of unlimited or renewable duration include: the BWC, Art XIII, § 1 (cited in note
12); the ABM Treaty, Art XV, § I (cited in note 1); the TTBT, Art V, § 1 (cited in note 16);
the INF Treaty, Art XV (cited in note 28); the START Agreement, Art XVII, § 2 (cited in
note 40); and the Open Skies Treaty, Art XV, § 1 (cited in note 105). The NPT has an
initial term of twenty-five years and there has been uncertainty about procedures for contin-
uing it beyond that period. Id, Art X, § 2 (cited in note 10). See Thomas Graham, Jr., The
1002 [59:981
Arms Control Agreements
thing. Without some confidence about the future political milieu, it
is difficult to craft verification measures that are sufficiently pre-
cise and not procrustean."0
The political ambiguity is exacerbated when the arms control
negotiations become multilateral."' Dealings between the two su-
perpowers have been complicated enough; the process threatens to
bog down entirely when the interests of forty or more other
states-each with its own aspirations, fears, weapons stockpiles
and verification sensitivities-are included." 2 Rapid changes of
government, or even of entire systems of government, 1 3 make it
difficult to design a verification system that can withstand diverse
challenges in the long run. Moreover, changing a multilateral
treaty regime once sufficient countries have adhered in order to
bring it into force, can be a massive undertaking, involving fresh
Duration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Sudden Death or New Lease on Life?,
29 Va J Intl L 661 (1989) (describing options for 1995 Review Conference).
"' No plausible treaty regime could provide 100% certainty of compliance; there will
always be some room for error and some danger that a determined state could frustrate even
the most exacting inspection provisions. On the other hand, carefully crafted treaty terms
can deter violations and substantially increase the parties' confidence in reciprocal compli-
ance. Krepon and Graybeal, Future Treaty Implementation at 239 (cited in note 71); Eimer
and Lacey, Signal 29 (cited in note 84).
. Among the disarmament agreements discussed in this Article, the Geneva Protocol
(cited in note 5); the Antarctic Treaty (cited in note 7); the LTBT (cited in note 9); the
NPT (cited in note 10); the Outer Space Treaty (cited in note 12); the Seabeds Arms Con-
trol Treaty (cited in note 12); the BWC (cited in note 12); the Treaty of Tlatelolco (cited in
note 12); the CFE Treaty (cited in note 32); the Open Skies Treaty (cited in note 105); and
the future Chemical Weapons Convention (cited in note 35) are all multilateral agreements.
The ABM Treaty (cited in note 1); the SALT I Interim Agreement (cited in note 14);
the SALT II Treaty (cited in note 25); the INF Treaty (cited in note 28); the 1990 Chemical
Weapons agreement (cited in note 36); and the START Agreement (cited in note 40) have
been bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union.
"1 In the 1977-80 negotiations toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the
three participating states (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom)
were developing a two-tiered structure, in which some parts of the treaty (the basic prohibi-
tion on nuclear tests, as well as some rudimentary multilateral verification mechanisms)
would be open for signature by all states, while other parts (including the most detailed and
intrusive verification arrangements) would be operable only among the three negotiating
states. Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hi-
roshima to Geneva 301 (Basic, 1987).
"' The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, for example, significantly altered the dynamics
of multilateral arms control negotiations regarding conventional forces in Europe. The for-
mer "satellite" states of Eastern Europe emerged as full participants in the disarmament
process, often pursuing their own agendas independently of Moscow. Thomas Graham, Jr.,
The CFE Story: Tales from the Negotiating Table, 21 Arms Control Today 9, 10-11 (Jan/
Feb 1991).
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ratification efforts or other time-consuming domestic processes in
many countries.114
Finally, there is often a significant problem in the internal dy-
namics shaping a country's domestic negotiations process. That is,
when the international bargaining does progress far enough to raise
a new question about some previously unaddressed detail of a pro-
spective arms control treaty, the American bureaucracy is forced to
respond, with each affected Washington, D.C. agency developing
its own tentative position and with the leadership hammering out
inter-agency consensus on new instructions to the delegation. 115
That Byzantine clearance process consumes time and political cap-
ital, often generating intense internal and international discord." 6
If more issues could be ignored or finessed, or if they could be de-
ferred for later resolution outside the glare of public scrutiny,
many potential controversies might remain amicably latent and
the bargaining process would be appreciably easier and faster. But
under current conditions, the agenda of issues to be resolved is
massive, and each item receives a thorough work-up.
D. Alternative Strategies
In this situation-pressed for details, yet unable to foresee a
perfect solution-arms control negotiators have attempted a vari-
ety of procedural ploys. Three maneuvers are especially
noteworthy.
The first approach is simply to take the onrushing bull by the
horns and accept the obligation to negotiate treaties of massive de-
tail. In SALT II, for example, the negotiators wrapped into one
package substantive agreements on long-range ballistic missiles,
bombers and cruise missiles, and spun out a verification grid that
covered each of the systems. This process consumed almost seven
years of talks.'" In the INF Treaty, the United States and the So-
14 Goldblat and Bernauer, 22 Bull Peace Proposals at 239 (cited in note 87) (attempt-
ing to amend the BWC could lead to an unraveling of the treaty text).
"' McNeill, 79 Am J Intl L at 61-62 (cited in note 27); Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The
National Security Process, in John N. Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, and Robert F. Turner,
eds, National Security Law 893 (Carolina Academic, 1990); Einhom, 32 Survival 497 (cited
in note 70).
I" York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace at 282-323 (cited in note 112); Krepon and
Graybeal, Dealing with Future Treaty Implementation (cited in note 71); Phillip R. Trim-
ble, Arms Control and International Negotiation Theory, 25 Stan J Intl L 543, 553-58
(1989).
11 The SALT II negotiations were in session from November 1972 through June 1979.
ACDA Treaty Book at 261-63 (cited in note 5).
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viet Union first groped toward an agreement limited to medium-
range missiles. But when it appeared that the retention of their
shorter-range systems could pose a troubling danger of circumven-
tion, the parties stayed at the bargaining table until they were able
to fashion an agreement to reduce that category of weapons to
zero, too.1 8 In the negotiations over chemical weapons, it has like-
wise appeared possible that the delegations might be able rela-
tively quickly to reach a partial or temporary agreement dealing
with at least a part of the overall problem. But the partici-
pants-perhaps fearing that interim measures would be critiqued
as insufficient-have elected to pursue a single, massive document
that resolves all the outstanding issues simultaneously." 9
If that first approach means that the executive branch, saving
up the pieces for a comprehensive solution, does not go to the Sen-
ate very often with an arms control agreement, a second approach
suggests that the President might not go to the Senate at all, when
dealing with an accord that is merely partial or temporary. That is,
on occasion the executive has avoided treaty formalities altogether,
by making policy through a non-binding "political agreement"'' 20
or through the exchange of unilateral-but-parallel "statements of
intention" that are revocable and create no legal commitment, but
nonetheless guide expectations and generate reciprocal behav-
iors.121 The SALT I Interim Agreement, for example, was "ex-
tended" far beyond its original five year duration via the exchange
18 Id at 347-48; Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age at 625-28 (cited in note
46).
11 Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical and Biological Warfare Developments: 1985 45-52
(Oxford, 1986) (detailing proposals for a relatively limited treaty to ban the spread of chem-
ical weaponry).
120 See, for example, the "Helsinki process," through which the United States and the
other participants in the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe have been able to develop sets of agreed measures to enhance the
"transparency" of military establishments on the continent, reducing the potential for, and
the fears about, surprise attack. ACDA Treaty Book at 319-35 (cited in note 5). These im-
portant documents are described as being "politically binding." They are not treaties con-
taining legal obligations, but they have already played an important role in easing interna-
tional tensions. Id at 319. See also Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding
International Agreements, 71 Am J Intl L 296 (1977) (discussing legal import of political
accords).
121 Restatement at § 301, Reporters' Note 2 (cited in note 47) (describing non-binding
agreements); Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law at 412-18
(cited in note 64). See also 22 CFR § 181.2 at 562 (1991) (differentiating true international
agreements from accords that are de minimis or only politically binding and therefore need
not be reported to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act, 1 USC § 112(b)).
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of executive statements.122 The SALT II Treaty was honored for
seven years, even without ratification, based simply on the parties'
mutual expression of intentions not to "undercut" it while they de-
cided what to do next.123 The Congress held hearings relevant to
these declarations and debated their implications, but never re-
corded a formal vote.
More recently, President Bush's dramatic September 1991 dis-
armament initiatives (dismantling short-range nuclear missiles,
withdrawing nuclear arms from surface naval vessels, etc.) were in-
itially cast as unilateral American acts, but there was a clear inten-
tion to elicit reciprocal Soviet cuts. That response did, in fact, oc-
cur, but the package was not framed as an explicit "agreement," so
Congress was never brought into the exchange. 24 Since then, this
informal process has accelerated, with additional weapons reduc-
tions being secured, all without any written, ratified documents. 125
These types of informal understandings have also been influ-
ential in multilateral arms control. For example, their appeal and
success have been evidenced by the United States' ongoing partici-
pation in the "Australia Group" of developed countries that seek
voluntarily to coordinate their export controls regarding chemical
weapons-related goods and technology, 126 even without a treaty.
Similar informal arrangements obtain among cognate organizations
that pursue nuclear non-proliferation and other objectives through
non-treaty alignment of national policies. 2
122 Note, 21 Va J Intl L at 756 (cited in note 67); Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role
in Treaty Ratification, 77 Am J Intl L 257, 267 (1983) (discussing and reprinting United
States and Soviet coordinated statements prolonging their adherence to Interim
Agreement).
123 ACDA Treaty Book at 263 (cited in note 5).
12 Arms Control: U.S. and Soviet Announcements and Proposals of Major Reductions
in Nuclear Weapons, 2 Foreign Pol Bull 47 (Sep/Oct 1991); Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. to Give
Up Short-Range Nuclear Arms; Bush Seeks Soviet Cuts and Further Talks, NY Times AI"
(Sep 28, 1991).
125 David Hoffman, U.S., Russia Seek to Create Missile Warning Site, Wash Post A24
(Feb 19, 1992); Ken Adelman, Taking a Short Cut, Wash Times F1 (Feb 5, 1992).
128 Lois R. Ember, Worldwide Spread of Chemical Arms Receiving Increased Atten-
tion, Chemical & Engineering News 8 (Apr 14, 1986).
"I' See Jozef Goldblat, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Balance Sheet of Conflicting
Trends, 20 Bull Peace Proposals 369, 374 (1989) (states that supply nuclear fuel, technology
and equipment have attempted to coordinate their export policies through the "London
Suppliers Group" and the "Zangger Committee"); Bruce Stokes, Monitoring U.S. Exports:
Why Bother?, Natl J 2487 (Oct 12, 1991); Stuart Auerbach, High-Tech Export Curbs to Be
Reexamined, Wash Post F1 (Oct 11, 1991) (United States and allies are now engaged in
modifying the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom), established in 1949 to curtail the flow of military-related technology to the Soviet
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In the same vein, traditional international law obligates par-
ties to refrain from actions that would "defeat the object and pur-
pose" of a treaty in the interval between signature and ratifica-
tion.128 In some instances-notably, the TTBT and PNET-that
hiatus has been extended. 129 This process, too, creates and sustains
arms control limitations through unilateral presidential action,
with no congressional participation. 30
Overall, this informal avenue offers appreciable benefits in
flexibility (the parties can experiment with a partial regime on a
topic, even if they cannot yet agree on all aspects of the problem),
immediacy (the President need not wait for the Congress to ap-
prove an international bargain), and revocability (the policies are
subject to reversal at any time, without any legal recourse by the
other side). However, the practice also carries the simultaneous
dangers of imprecision (exactly what have the parties, in their vari-
ous statements, undertaken to do?)' 31 and unreliability (since the
policies are revocable unilaterally, they hardly constitute a durable
basis for international relations). 132
Finally, several modern arms control agreements have at-
tempted to deal with the emerging problem of creeping obsoles-
cence through a third mechanism, the creation of new legal institu-
tions. These have generally taken the form of permanent
international commissions or consultative organizations, author-
Union); U.N.'s Big Five Agree on Arms-Export Rules, Wash Times A6 (Oct 19, 1991) (infor-
mal international accord on controlling conventional arms sales).
128 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 18 (May 23, 1969), S Ex Rep 92-L,
92d Cong, 1st Sess (1970) (in force, US not a party) ("Vienna Convention"); Restatement at
§ 312, comment i (cited in note 47). The Vienna Convention is not in force for the United
States, but the State Department has determined that most portions of it are binding any-
way, as an expression of customary international law. Restatement at 144-45 (introductory
note). See also Note, 21 Va J Intl L 747 (cited in note 67); Glennon, 77 Am J Intl L at 272-
78 (cited in note 122) (analyzing the constitutionality of the Vienna Convention's Article 18
in imposing legal restraints upon the United States prior to Senate consent to the treaty).
12 The TTBT (cited in note 16) was signed in 1974 and the PNET (cited in note 17)
was signed in 1976. They entered into force in 1990, after the negotiation of the additional
verification protocols. 1990 Arms Control Rptr 605.B.114 (Dec 10).
120 Glennon, 77 Am J Intl L at 272-78 (cited in note 122).
121 Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law at 412-18 (cited
in note 64).
12 Some would argue, however, that informal, unwritten arms control agreements are
just as reliable-or just as unreliable-as official treaties, because in neither case does inter-
national law provide a comprehensive, satisfactory mechanism for resolving controversies or
enforcing compliance. Phillip R. Trimble, Beyond Verification: The Next Step in Arms
Control, 102 Harv L Rev 885, 889-91 (1989). See also Nuclear Tests Cases: Australia v.
France and New Zealand v. France, 1973 ICJ Reports 99, 135; 1974 ICJ Reports 253, 457
(unilateral declaration of policy by French government held to be a binding commitment).
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ized, in varying terms, to consider controversies that might arise
under the treaty, to develop necessary implementation measures,
and to examine other avenues for enhancing the treaty's ability to
serve the parties' disarmament interests. 133 The SALT Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC)'.' was the initial prototype for
this vehicle,13 5 and others have proliferated: the INF Treaty elic-
ited a Special Verification Commission (SVC),3 6 the PNET creates
a Joint Consultative Commission, 37 the 1990 TTBT Protocol has a
Bilateral Consultative Commission, 3 the CFE Treaty authorizes a
Joint Consultative Group, 39 the START agreement establishes a
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission,"1 0 the Open Skies
Treaty creates an Open Skies Consultative Commission,"41 and the
future Chemical Weapons Convention will bring forth a multilat-
eral organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons."42
Political controversy has long raged inside the United States
regarding the efficacy of the SCC as a dispute resolution mecha-
nism,"4  but there is no doubt about its success in developing
agreements (typically cast as executive agreements, rather than as
treaties, and often classified secret) to implement the SALT I pro-
133 Despite their titles, these bodies are not impartial, independent judicial or arbitral
tribunals endowed with the power to issue their own orders to the parties as, say, the Inter-
national Court of Justice might. Instead, the arms control groups are more properly thought
of as fora for ongoing negotiations between the participating countries, where the United
States and the Soviet Union each have been represented by their diplomatic agents, and
where they strive to develop areas of consensus.
'3' The SCC was established pursuant to the ABM Treaty, Art XIII (cited in note 1).
The Interim Agreement, Art VI (cited in note 14), and the SALT II Treaty, Art XVII (cited
in note 25), also referred selected issues to the SCC.
... See R. Jeffrey Smith, Arms Agreement Breathes New Life into SCC, 229 Science
535 (Aug 9, 1985); Sidney N. Graybeal and Michael Krepon, SCC: Neglected Arms Control
Tool, 41 Bull Atomic Scientists 30 (Nov 1985) (describing the purposes and operations of
the SCC).
136 INF Treaty, Art XIII (cited in note 28).
137 PNET, Art V (cited in note 17).
"' 1990 TTBT Protocol, § XI (cited in note 37).
... CFE Treaty, Art XVI (cited in note 32).
"0 START Agreement, Art XV and Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (cited in note 40).
141 Open Skies Treaty, Art X and Annex L (cited in note 105). As with most of the
other implementation bodies, the proceedings of the Open Skies Commission are designed
to be confidential, unless otherwise agreed. Id at Annex L, § 1.8.
142 CW Convention, Art VIII (cited in note 35).
143 The Reagan Administration criticized the SCC as a tribunal that merely covered up,
instead of confronting or resolving, Soviet violations of disarmament accords, but other ex-
pert observers have concluded that the SCC was effective in settling compliance controver-
sies and in negotiating implementing agreements to promote disarmament. Graybeal and
Krepon, 41 Bull Atomic Scientists 30 (cited in note 135).
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visions.' The operation of some of the other bodies is discussed in
the next Section of the Article.
II. THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT STRATEGY
In the effort to deal with the emerging problems noted in Sec-
tion I, the executive branch has recently devised a new strategy.
Under this approach, the freshly negotiated arms control agree-
ment, laden as it is with details, also includes a provision stating
that some of the terms are subject to future change through nego-
tiations between the parties, and affirming that these changes are
not to be considered "amendments to the treaty." In this way, it is
argued, the necessary alterations may be implemented via a subse-
quent executive agreement, a simple exchange of notes, or other
diplomatic means. The executive branch will informally consult
Congress after the modifications are agreed upon, but the legisla-
ture has no voice and no opportunity to vote. Five recent treaties
provide case studies, and there is the real prospect of more to
come.
A. The INF Treaty
The non-amendment procedure was first developed late in the
INF Treaty negotiating process,145 and the various INF Treaty
documents incorporated three provisions designed to ease the pro-
cess of implementing subsequent modifications to its negotiated
terms. First, the Inspections Protocol, governing the rights and
functions of the personnel responsible for on-site monitoring, pro-
vides that in the SVC146 the parties "may agree upon such mea-
sures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effective-
ness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed
amendments to the Treaty.' 1 47 Second, the Elimination Protocol,
144 Most of the products of the SCC are not available to the public, but discussions
have revealed the existence of a few, such as two 1974 protocols on procedures for the de-
struction or dismantling of offensive and defensive systems pursuant to the ABM Treaty
and the Interim Agreement. Graybeal and Krepon, 41 Bull Atomic Scientists at 31-32 (cited
in note 135).
14 Interview with Karen Look, Chief, Theater Affairs Division, United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (Nov 25, 1991) ("Look Interview"); American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the 84th Annual Meeting 411 (Mar 28-31, 1990) (remarks
by George Look) ("1990 ASIL Proceedings").
14 The treaty charges the SVC with responsibility, inter alia, for developing agreement
"upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this
Treaty." INF Treaty, Art XIII, § 1(b) (cited in note 28).
147 Id, Inspections Protocol, Art XI, § 4.
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which prescribes the methods for disposing of excess weapons, con-
tains an identical provision.14 Finally, the Elimination Protocol
also provides, just prior to its lengthy and exacting listing of the
specific steps necessary to demolish, crush, burn, or otherwise de-
stroy each type of banned equipment, that its specifications shall
be followed, "unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to
achieve the same result. ' 149
The twin "viability and effectiveness" provisions of the two
protocols attracted senatorial attention during the INF Treaty rat-
ification debate. The Secretary of State's formal article-by-article
analysis, submitting the treaty to the Senate, had stated that
"while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed
amendment to the Treaty, minor matters relating to the detailed
elimination procedures may be altered through agreement of the
Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty
regime. '15 0
During hearings before the Armed Services Committee, Sena-
tor Nunn inquired whether the viability and effectiveness changes
would be "subject to ratification in accordance with the constitu-
tional procedures of each party."'15 Testifying on behalf of the ad-
ministration, Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser to the De-
partment of State, responded:
there are procedures in each of the protocols for changes in
technical details. These provisions were designed to make pos-
sible rapid technical amendment so that the treaty could keep
up with the real life situation. This procedure for rapid tech-
nical changes would not require advice and consent of the
Senate. 152
Ambassador Maynard Glitman, the chief negotiator of the
treaty, then added:
I think it will depend on the situation. But what we had in
mind here was essentially if it requires a change in the obliga-
"18 Id, Elimination Protocol, Art V, § 2.
11 Id, Elimination Protocol, Art II, § 10.
1 0 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
Message from the President, Treaty Doc 100-11, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 43 (Jan 25, 1988).
Identical language explaining the viability and effectiveness provisions of the Inspections
Protocol appears in id at 58-59.
151 NATO Defense and the INF Treaty, Hearings and Meetings before the Senate Com-




tions, then it requires an amendment obviously subject to rat-
ification procedures. If it is a technical change, if we find a
new kind of measuring device, if we decide to use some kind
of new technology that comes up which will be helpful to the
inspectors, which we had not foreseen, we do not necessarily
want to bother the Senate with whether we can come up with
a different kind of a scale, for example, or weighing device or
something like that.5 5
Later, Senator Wirth (D-Colo) pressed the same point, seeking
a more clearly defined line between the types of technical changes
that could be implemented by the executive alone and the substan-
tive changes that would require Senate participation.6 4 Glitman
again suggested that the "technical" changes were modifications
like the substitution of a new type of weighing device or a new
satellite communications system for those originally contemplated
in the treaty.'55 Glitman then identified the political reality that
would as a practical matter guide the executive in future
characterizations:
We are going to have to work with the Senate, with the Con-
gress to ensure in the future that if there are changes, Con-
gress will know that they are on their way and that they are
either technical or a major obligation change. It is up to us,
and not to us and the Soviets how we carry out our constitu-
tional procedures or how they do theirs. All you have to do is
to assure that it is legally done in your country.156
There were also references to the executive's obligation to pro-
vide to the Congress the full text of any subsequent agreements,
even technical ones not requiring advice and consent. Matheson
and Glitman confirmed that the Case-Zablocki Act would be appli-
cable in all instances.0 7
As a result of these exchanges, the Armed Services Committee
Report recommended that no additional understanding or other
153 Id at 411.
'" Id at 461.
155 Id at 460. He asserted, "That is the sort of thing that the Senate would not want to
go through a whole ratification process on." Id.
15' Id at 461. In response to further questions from Senator John Warner (R-Va),
Glitman also confirmed that agreements reached in the SVC could not be used "to give the
treaty a meaning that is contrary to or inconsistent with the meaning of the treaty as
presented to the Senate" and that the informal process for modifying the protocols could
not be utilized to alter any provisions contained in the basic treaty. Id at 462.
157 Id at 412, 460.
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statement regarding possible future changes in the documents
needed to be inserted into the INF Treaty resolution of ratifica-
tion.15 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee touched upon the
issue more briefly,'5 9 reaching similar conclusions (over the objec-
tion of Senator Helms, who argued that the loose provisions on
treaty modification would undercut the Senate's special preroga-
tives in the treaty process).160
There has already been a substantial body of experience in the
exercise of these modification provisions of the INF Treaty, and
six different documents have so far been negotiated and imple-
mented under that authority. First, within the initial year of the
treaty's life, the United States and the Soviet Union produced
three relatively minor sets of accords, to establish the operating
procedures for the SVC,16 to outline the "portal perimeter" in-
spections at the Soviet missile facility at Votkinsk,'62 and to create
a similar verification regime outside the comparable American fa-
cility at Magna, Utah. 6 3 In each case, the documents provided ad-
ditional details, supplementing those already specified in the
treaty, rather than altering any of those original provisions.
Each of these three accords was then forwarded to Congress.
(The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided timely no-
tification, together with some explanatory details and a recounting
of the negotiating history, pursuant to the Case-Zablocki Act, to
1"8 NATO Defense and the INF Treaty, Report of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, S Rep No 100-312, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 25-26 (Apr 1988).
"I The INF Treaty, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S
Hrg 100-522, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, Part 5 at 685 (Mar 1988) (executive branch responses to
questions posed by Senator Helms). The State Department advised the Committee that
"[any changes which substantively affect U.S. obligations under the Treaty will be submit-
ted to the Senate for its advice and consent." Id.
110 The INF Treaty, Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S Exec Rep
No 100-15, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 253-54 (Apr 14, 1988) (separate views of Senator Helms).
161 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Proce-
dures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission (Dec 20, 1988) (on file with
U Chi L Rev). This agreement implemented the parties' decision to create the SVC within
the structure outlined in Article XIII of the INF Treaty. It was effective immediately upon
signature.
162 Special Verification Commission, Agreed Statement (Dec 8, 1988) (concerning moni-
toring procedures at Votkinsk) (on file with U Chi L Rev). The INF Treaty established a
system of verification inspections to occur at the entrances and exits of selected missile-
related facilities inside the United States and U.S.S.R., to ensure that cargoes leaving the
plant did not contain prohibited missiles. INF Treaty, Art XI, § 6 (cited in note 28).
1 6 Special Verification Commission, Agreed Statement (Jun 9, 1989) (on file with U
Chi L Rev) (concerning monitoring procedures at Magna, Utah). Each of the Agreed State-
ments specified that it "shall be binding," and that it was effective upon signature. Agreed
Statement of Dec 8, 1988 at 11 2, 3; Agreed Statement of Jun 9, 1989 at 1 2, 3.
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the three relevant committees in each house.)"" The executive
branch also offered to brief members of Congress or their staffs on
the details of the accords. But no one from the legislature accepted
the invitation, and there were no public hearings or other record."6 5
On December 21, 1989, however, the United States and the
Soviet Union signed a more important Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), containing the basic implementation measures of the INF
Treaty.166 The result of eighteen months of bargaining, the MOA
and its annexes ran to 137 pages. Some provisions of it were
plainly designed to fill conspicuous gaps intentionally deferred in
the INF Treaty. For example, the treaty had authorized each party
to utilize some form of "non-damaging image producing equip-
ment" to inspect the contents of large cargos exiting specified mis-
sile production facilities. 16 7 The MOA, in turn, specified that the
United States would install and operate the "Cargoscan" imaging
x-ray system at the portals of the Votkinsk missile manufacturing
facility inside the U.S.S.R. as the mechanism for effectuating that
treaty provision.6 " Similarly, other MOA provisions reflect the
"' Interview with Thomas Graham, Jr., General Counsel, United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (Nov 4, 1991) ("Graham Interview").
1'5 Interview with David Abramowitz, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of
State, Office of the Legal Adviser (Sep 6, 1991) ("Abramowitz Interview").
166 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Pro-
visions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles
(Dec 21, 1989) ("MOA") (on file with U Chi L Rev). See American Society of International
Law, Proceedings of the 84th Annual Meeting at 411 (cited in note 145) (remarks by George
Look). Certain procedures of the draft MOA were applied provisionally between the parties,
as a practical device for initiating the verification arrangements, even before the entire doc-
ument was negotiated and signed. Interview with Steven E. Steiner, Representative of the
United States to the Special Verification Commission (Sep 16, 1991) ("Steiner Interview").
See text accompanying notes 243-46.
167 INF Treaty, Protocol on Inspections, Art IX, § 6(d) (cited in note 28). The portal/
perimeter monitoring system had to be designed to ensure that items leaving the manufac-
turing facility did not include prohibited missiles, while still preserving any military or com-
mercial secrets about what the contents actually were.
168 MOA, Annex V (cited in note 166). Cargoscan is a novel x-ray system that permits
inspectors to measure the size of a missile (and thereby determine its type) without opening
the missile's canister and visually examining it. When the United States first attempted to
operate the system, pursuant to the MOA, the Soviet Union objected, contending that the
area x-rayed was several centimeters larger than the agreement had specified and that the
United States was storing the x-ray images on tape, perhaps permitting subsequent elec-
tronic enhancement. Minor adjustments were then made. Cathie M. Lorenz, Controversies
Mar Soviet INF Compliance, 20 Arms Control Today 29 (Apr 1990). The MOA provides
elaborate details about the permitted Cargoscan equipment and its operation, and specifies
that the future substitution of similar equipment shall not be deemed to be an amendment
to the MOA. MOA, Annex V, § L.A (cited in note 166).
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parties' understandings about additional details of the Verification
network.""9
Other sections of the MOA, however, contained actual depar-
tures from the original text of the Protocols on Inspections and
Elimination. 170 Specifically citing the "viability and effectiveness"
language, these modifications involved terms such as substituting
new types of inspection aircraft for those specified in the treaty,'17
altering the titles and structure of the inspecting team,172 and real-
locating the costs of the telephone lines installed at the permanent
inspection installations. 7 3 In addition, the MOA also invoked the
INF Treaty's other provision allowing changes in the elimination
procedures 74 to specify altered procedures for cutting or exploding
certain missile equipment.1 75
Again, the post-signature implementation of the agreement
amounted to informing Congress, but not seeking its approval. The
executive branch provided the MOA documents to the relevant
committees, together with explanatory details, and offered infor-
mational briefings as well. 76 This time, the higher visibility of sev-
eral of the issues prompted somewhat greater legislative curiosity.
Senior congressional staff requested and received several briefing
sessions, although no members of Congress attended. In these
briefings, government officials elaborated the details of the accords
and their projected operations. But as before, Congress convened
no hearings and recorded no votes. 77
In addition, two further modifications in INF Treaty imple-
mentation procedures-stylized as sequentially numbered amend-
169 For example, the MOA clarifies the timing and mechanisms for conducting the data
exchanges and notifications required by the treaty. MOA, Art I (cited in note 166). It also
partially implements the portion of the treaty that permits the inspectors to bring "other
equipment, as agreed by the Parties." Id, Art III, § D.1.
"I The opening phrase of the MOA cites the "viability and effectiveness" language of
the treaty as a general validation of the entire package of agreements. MOA, Preamble
(cited in note 166). The drafters of the MOA then deliberately used varying vocabulary to
denote the different legal authority for selected provisions. That is, "the parties under-
stand" was used in places where the MOA merely interprets the prior provisions; "the par-
ties agree" was used for gap-filling additions to the original accords; and the "viability and
effectiveness" language was used for changes. Look Interview (cited in note 145).
I7 MOA, Art III, § A.8 (cited in note 166).
172 Id, Art III, § D.7.
.73 Id, Art III, § G.2.
174 INF Treaty, Elimination Protocol, Art II (cited in note 28).
15 MOA, Art II.
'7 Graham Interview (cited in note 164).
177 Abramowitz Interview (cited in note 165); Steiner Interview (cited in note 166).
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ments to the MOA, rather than as free-standing agreements 1 7 -_
were negotiated in April, 1991.179 These, too, provide details on se-
lected aspects of the verification arrangements, specifying the sys-
tem for measuring the size of the SS-25 missile,8 0 and permitting
inspection personnel to carry personal safety devices ("dosime-
ters") during the performance of their duties. 81 These two amend-
ments were effectuated in a similar fashion, 82 and once again, the
legislature did not respond to the executive's offer to provide infor-
mational briefings. 8 '
Other similar amendments to the MOA are also being pre-
pared, and the procedures could shortly be invoked again to create
instruments that would further modify the treaty regime regarding
changes in the flight routes that arriving inspectors could use, and
allocating the financial costs of the inspections.8
B. The TTBT/PNET
The second noteworthy occasion where the executive branch
proposed an expedited procedure for treaty modification came in
178 MOA, Art IV, § 3 (cited in note 166).
"' Amendment I to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of
the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and
Shorter-range Missiles (System for Measuring the Length and Diameter of the Second Stage
of the SS-25 Missile) (Apr 4, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Amendment II to the Memo-
randum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (Personal Do-
simeters for Inspectors) (Apr 4, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
8I This amendment specified the equipment and procedures that would be used by the
United States to measure the length and diameter of the second stage of the Soviet SS-25
missile as it leaves the Votkinsk production facility. Details of the operation and storage of
the measuring equipment did effectuate certain departures from the original provisions of
the INF Treaty, so the power to make "viability and effectiveness" changes was explicitly
invoked. Amendment I, Art I, §§ 27, 28 (cited in note 179).
181 Dosimeters are used by an inspector for personal health monitoring. The MOA had
not specifically permitted them (and the accompanying charger units), so this amendment
supplements, rather than alters, the original terms.
The amendment also allows each party to change the type of dosimeter and charging
unit that it will use on future inspections, and provides that such substitution will not be
deemed an amendment to the amendment. Amendment II, Art I, § 14 (cited in note 179).
182 See United States Government, Analysis of Amendments I and II to the Memoran-
dum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (on file with U
Chi L Rev).
183 Steiner Interview (cited in note 166).
184 Id.
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the 1990 Protocols to the TTBT and PNET. There the negotiators
specified with punctilious care all the procedures and standards
that would govern the verification practices, but they also author-
ized the Bilateral Consultative Commission ("BCC") to consider
three types of "technical or administrative changes" in TTBT in-
spection arrangements. Where the BCC reaches agreements on
such revised terms, the new language would not be considered
amendments to the treaty or protocol.""5
The first category of possible revisions concerns the timing of
the requisite advance notification about scheduled nuclear tests: if
the protocol's articulated calendar proves impractical, the BCC
may change it.186 Second, the BCC may, "in the interests of effec-
tive implementation," change the protocol's dictates about trans-
portation, food, lodging, and provision of services for inspecting
personnel. 18 7 Third, more generally, the BCC may develop new
provisions where "the Parties determine that modifications to ver-
ification procedures, including modifications resulting from im-
provements in existing technologies, would enhance effective im-
plementation of the basic aims" of the agreement. 88
This time, however, the Senate was not quite so compliant.
When Ronald Lehman II, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on July 17, 1990,18' he and other witnesses were ques-
tioned about the distinction between formal amendments and in-
formal changes or modifications, 90 and Senator Richard G. Lugar
186 1990 TTBT Protocol, § XI, 11 1(c), 2-4 (cited in note 37). See also Protocols to the
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Message from the President, Treaty Doc 101-19, 101st Cong, 2d Sess
239-40 (Jun 28, 1990) (official State Department section-by-section analysis of the protocol
refers to the § XI provisions as permitting changes in "technical, administrative or opera-
tional matters that may require adjustment in light of practical experience with verification
activities, but that do not implicate the major obligations or policies of the TTBT or the
Protocol").
188 1990 TTBT Protocol, § XI, 1 2 (cited in note 37). Section IV establishes a detailed
calendar for advance notification of nuclear tests, with different types of information to be
exchanged in several rounds, starting as much as 200 days prior to the explosion.
187 Id, § XI, 1 3. Section X specifies in considerable detail the host country's obligation
to provide the inspecting personnel with the necessary logistical support.
188 Id, § XI, T 4.
188 Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties with the U.S.S.R.,
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S Hrg 101-1090, 101st Cong,
2d Sess (1990).
19 Id at 37-38, 111-12. See also id at 94-106 (discussion with members of the Intelli-
gence Committee regarding the informal modifications power).
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(R-Ind) sent a follow-up letter to press the point.191 In reply, Leh-
man wrote for the administration that since the protocols raised "a
multitude of technical and administrative details and procedures
with which we have had little operating experience,"'1 2 there was
an "open question whether each of the logistical arrangements and
operating requirements set forth in the Protocols is adequately de-
scribed or optimally suited to the needs of the Parties."'' 9 3 The
modifications, he affirmed, "would not be changes to the Treaty
intent, only changes in the modality of fulfilling that intent"'' 94 and
they "would not alter substantive rights.' 9 5 Regarding relations
with Congress, Lehman wrote:
In implementing the Protocols, we will include continuing
consultations with the Senate. Briefings should be a matter of
course. Any proposed amendment would be the subject of spe-
cific consultations with the Senate, and following negotiation
would be subject to advice and consent. While any change of
the nature described in paragraphs 2, 3, or 4 of Section XI of
the TTBT Protocol would be a matter of public record, we
would also expect close consultation on modifications or im-
provements. It is the Administration's desire to work closely
with the Senate to ensure that all steps are being taken to
foster confidence in compliance. 9 6
Even these assurances, however, proved unsatisfactory. The
Senate Select Intelligence Committee reported that executive
branch statements had not satisfactorily guaranteed that impor-
tant treaty changes would be subject to the constitutional amend-
ment procedures. It recommended that additional statements be
sought, through which the President would undertake to provide
prior notice about any proposed treaty alterations that might have
an impact on American verification capabilities, "before the issue
becomes moot.' 197 Similarly, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), chair
,,i Letter from Senator Richard G. Lugar to Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (Jul 20, 1990) (on fie with U Chi L Rev).
", Response to Letter from Richard G. Lugar to Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 2 (Jul 20, 1990) (cleared Aug 20, 1990) (on file with
U Chi L Rev).
193 Id at 3.
194 Id.
195 Id at 4.
196 Id.
191 U.S. Capability to Monitor Soviet Compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT) and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNET), Report of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, S Rep No 101-462, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 7-8 (Sep 14, 1990).
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of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Lehman that addi-
tional clarification was needed:
I expect the Committee to recognize that there is a need for
an expedited modification of purely technical matters in the
cases of highly detailed agreements such as the Protocol.
However, the Committee's report will make it clear that the
Committee will allow modification only on a case-by-case ba-
sis. The Committee would expect the Administration to in-
form it of any proposed modification under this procedure.
This will enable the Committee to voice an objection in ap-
propriate cases, before the issue becomes moot.198
Lehman replied with two further letters, reiterating that the
informal modification routine would be used only for changes "of a
technical, administrative or procedural nature as do not affect sub-
stantive rights and obligations,"'19 and that consultations with the
Senate would be a continuing "matter of course."200 He also wrote
that in order to prevent the consultation process from becoming
moot, the Senate would be advised "prior to such modifications or
changes becoming binding on the Parties, '2 0 ' but he added that
this further assurance was offered "because of the unique technical
nature" of the protocol, and that the administration "does not con-
sider this further assurance to be a precedent for other arms con-
trol agreements with similar provisions that may be concluded in
the future."20 2 With that predicate, the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee concluded that no further conditions or statements were neces-
sary, and the members unanimously recommended ratification. 203
To date, there has been no experience with the modification
provisions of these protocols, and no "non-amendments" are im-
mediately in prospect. The Soviet Union and its successor states
have so far suspended all nuclear testing, a moratorium that has
19' Letter from Senator Claiborne Pell to Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (Jul 31, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
19 Letter from Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, to Senator Claiborne Pell 1 (Sep 11, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
200 Id at 2.
200 Letter from Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, to Senator Claiborne Pell (Sep 14, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
202 Id. Lehman also wrote a separate letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, specifically assuring members that they, too, would be informed in advance of any
modifications to the TTBT within their jurisdiction. Letter from Ronald F. Lehman II, Di-
rector, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Senator David L. Boren (Sep 20,
1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
20I Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, S Exec Rep No 101-
31, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 17-18 (Sep 14, 1990).
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deferred many of the operational aspects of the treaties' verifica-
tion system.2 4
C. The CFE Treaty
In late 1991, the Senate addressed these same issues in the
context of the ratification of the CFE Treaty. This time, the au-
thorization for an informal change procedure was written in more
expansive, less constrained terms, and placed in the text of the
treaty itself:
The Joint Consultative Group may propose amendments to
this Treaty for consideration and confirmation in accordance
with Article XX [the article establishing a fairly standard
amendment process]. The Joint Consultative Group may also
agree on improvements to the viability and effectiveness of
this Treaty, consistent with its provisions. Unless such im-
provements relate only to minor matters of an administrative
or technical nature, they shall be subject to consideration and
confirmation in accordance with Article XX before they can
take effect.2" 5
This provision largely escaped attention during the rather
truncated Senate ratification hearings, 06 and the parties have not
yet had occasion to invoke any modification procedures. 2°7 How-
ever, during the ratification process, the Senate did focus consider-
able attention upon a somewhat different type of "modifications"
problem: the question of what would occur within the treaty re-
gime when the unraveling of the Soviet Union accelerated and va-
rious regions (especially the republic of Ukraine, where substantial
conventional and nuclear forces are located) achieved juridical in-
dependence. Ultimately, the Senate attached a condition to the
resolution of ratification. It specified that if those developments
threatened to effect changes in the strategic situation, and if the
new state or states did not become parties to the CFE Treaty, the
President would be required to consult with the Senate, to convene
,04 Graham Interview (cited in note 164).
'0o CFE Treaty, Art XVI, § 5 (cited in note 32).
104 The CFE Treaty, S Exec Rep No 102-22, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 19, 1991); Gra-
ham Interview (cited in note 164).
10 There have already been some modifications in the CFE agreement, as the parties
have reached a solution to the problem of how to take account of certain Soviet or Russian
naval infantry units, concerning which a controversy arose after the treaty was signed.
These modifications, however, were not implemented via the "viability and effectiveness"
provisions under study here. Graham Interview (cited in note 164).
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an extraordinary conference of state parties, and to submit any re-
sulting changes in the treaty regime to the Senate for fresh advice
and consent. 0 8 The resolution explicitly conditioned approval of
the treaty upon a commitment to return to the Senate for fresh
advice and consent, unless the changes in the military circum-
stances and in the corresponding legal obligations were "a minor
matter of an administrative or technical nature.) 20 9
D. START
The most important pending arms control accord, the bilateral
United States-Soviet Union Treaty on the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms ("START"), was signed at the
Moscow summit meeting on July 31, 1991. The Senate began its
consideration of the pact in the spring of 1992, and the inquiry is
likely to be exhaustive, befitting a major milestone of far-reaching
strategic significance. 10
The START agreement embraces a series of related docu-
ments, including no fewer than seven that contain nearly identical
provisions authorizing non-amendment modifications. Typical is
the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities,
specifying the procedures and equipment to be used for selected
verification functions. After elaborating the applicable standards
with punctilious care, the final paragraph of the protocol adds:
[T]he Parties may agree upon such additional measures as
may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of
208 Executive Session on Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 102d Cong,
1st Sess, in 137 Cong Rec 818025 (Nov 25, 1991) (Senator Biden); Eric Schmitt, Arms Pact
Allows for Soviet Breakup, NY Times A3 (Nov 20, 1991); R. Jeffrey Smith, Hill, White
House Clash on Treaties, Wash Post A22 (Nov 11, 1991); Dan Oberdorfer and Helen Dewar,
Senate Votes to Assist Soviet Nuclear Cutbacks, Wash Post A17 (Nov 26, 1991); Pat
Towell, Quick Action Seen for CFE Pact As Senate Panel Sets Vote, 49 Cong Q No 46,
3398 (Nov 16, 1991); CFE Treaty Report at 116-21 (cited in note 206).
2019 United States Senate, Resolution of Advice and Consent to the CFE Treaty, Condi-
tion 5 (Nov 25, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Carroll J. Doherty and Pat Towell, Senate
Panel Endorses Treaty to Cut Forces in Europe, 49 Cong Q, 3471, 3471 (Nov 23, 1991). If
the President decides, despite the changes in the military situation, not to take any action
to amend the treaty regime, he is still required to seek a non-binding Senate resolution of
support for that continued adherence. Id.
210 Senator Helms, for example, has already indicated that he intends to oppose the
START treaty, in contrast to his support for the CFE treaty. Doherty and Towell, 49 Cong
Q at 3471 (cited in note 209). In addition, the Senate's resolution of ratification of the CFE
Treaty expressly noted that in evaluating the START accord, the Senate would take into
account the Soviet Union's actions regarding compliance controversies that had arisen in




the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to
make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive
rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement
on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for mak-
ing amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.211
E. Open Skies
The most recent application of the non-amendment strategy
has come in the Open Skies Treaty negotiations, concluded in Hel-
sinki on March 24, 1992. In this accord, the United States, along
with twenty-three other countries, agreed to open its territory for
relatively unencumbered aerial overflight and reconnaissance. The
treaty does not impose any new substantive disarmament obliga-
tions, but it is intended to serve as a "confidence-building mea-
sure" to enhance the "transparency" of the parties' military estab-
lishments, and to reassure participants that their neighbors and
erstwhile antagonists were not violating the reduction provisions of
other arms control agreements, massing forces for a surprise as-
sault, or otherwise engaging in threatening military activities.212
During the Open Skies negotiations, several key issues
emerged that were resolved only by last-minute compromises
reached through high-level diplomacy. Among these were questions
such as how many overflights each country would be required to
permit (its "passive quota") and how many it would be allowed to
conduct over its neighbors (its "active quota") each year; what
types of sensors (ordinary photography, video cameras, infrared
sensors, particulate samplers, synthetic-aperture radars, and
others) would be permitted; and which participants would have ac-
cess to the data that would be acquired on an overflight.21 3
Remarkably, many of these key questions, once resolved, were
then put back into the hopper for possible future redetermination
"I START Agreement, Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities,
Art XVIII, § 4 (cited in note 40). See also id, Protocol on Procedures Governing Conversion
or Elimination, Art IX; id, Protocol on Notifications, Art X; id, Protocol on ICBM and
SLBM Throw-Weight, Art II; id, Protocol on Telemetric Information, Art IV; id, Protocol
on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, Art VIII; id, Memorandum of Under-
standing on the Establishment of the Data Base, Art IV.
" Gist: Open Skies Treaty (cited in note 108); Amy E. Smithson, Open Skies Ready
for Takeoff, 48 Bull Atomic Scientists 17 (Jan/Feb 1992).
2I Tucker, 20 Arms Control Today at 20 (cited in note 98); Smithson, 48 Bull Atomic
Scientists at 17.
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through the treaty's informal modification procedures. Article X.5
provides:
The Open Skies Consultative Commission may propose
amendments to this Treaty for consideration and approval in
accordance with Article XVI. The Open Skies Consultative
Commission may also agree on improvements to the viability
and effectiveness of this Treaty, consistent with its provisions.
Improvements relating only to modification of the annual dis-
tribution of active quotas pursuant to Article III and Annex
A, to updates and additions to the categories or capabilities of
sensors pursuant to Article IV to revision of the share of costs
pursuant to Annex L, Section I, paragraph 9, to arrangements
for the sharing and availability of data pursuant to Article IX,
Sections III and IV, and to the handling of mission reports
pursuant to Article VI, Section I, paragraph 21, as well as to
minor matters of an administrative or technical nature, shall
be agreed upon within the Open Skies Consultative Commis-
sion and shall not be deemed to be amendments to this
Treaty.2 14
The Open Skies Treaty has not yet been submitted to the
Senate, pending the Consultative Commission's preliminary resolu-
tion of several financial and technical details, 15 and attention has
not yet focused on non-amendment or other issues.
F. Future Applications
Numerous other arms control agreements are now under dis-
cussion or active negotiation, and many of them could include pro-
visions similar to those cited above. The CW Convention, for ex-
ample, will have numerous provisions that could be quickly
overtaken by the advance of industrial technology. The lists of poi-
sonous chemicals and their precursors, for example, may have to
be modified as inventions proceed.216 A future United States-Rus-
sia agreement on nuclear defensive systems, as well as any accord
on various military-related space activities, could incorporate this
type of provision, too.2 17 Indeed, if the mechanism proves viable
"1 Open Skies Treaty, Art X, § 5 (cited in note 105).
215 Gist: Open Skies Treaty at 257 (cited in note 108).
228 See CW Convention Rolling Text, Art XIV (cited in note 35) (expedited amendment
procedure applicable to the treaty's annexes listing the covered chemicals).
21'7 Under the umbrella of the Nuclear and Space Talks, the United States and Soviet
Union have engaged in sixteen rounds of negotiations on space weapons, covering both anti-
satellite and anti-ballistic missile weapons. Space Weapons: US/USSR Negotiations, Arms
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and acceptable to Congress, some formula for expressing the con-
cept might become boilerplate in future disarmament agreements.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
A. Legal Principles
International law imposes few limitations upon parties' abili-
ties to change their treaty obligations. In general, states are free to
alter their commitments to any extent, at any time, and in any
manner, provided that they are reasonably clear about what they
are doing and that they reciprocally agree or at least acquiesce in
the outcome.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for ex-
ample, the process for negotiating, signing, and bringing an amend-
ment into force is essentially the same as for the original treaty.2 18
Pursuant to standard international law practice, many different
types of amendments are regularly proposed to arms control and
other agreements, 219 and many are routinely adopted, with few op-
erational abnormalities. 220 The parties may conclude a small,
perfecting accord to plug an unanticipated gap or to right a minor
wrong, or they may work up a complete novation, undoing and re-
placing the original obligations. 22 The document may be labeled a
protocol, an amendment, a free-standing treaty, or any other
term.
222
Alternatively, parties are free to alter their treaty obligations
through the device of unwritten "subsequent practice,"'2 3 utilizing
Control Rptr 575.A.1 (Jan 1992); Matthew Bunn, U.S. Shifts Stance in Defense and Space
Talks, 21 Arms Control Today 19 (Nov 1991).
218 Vienna Convention, Art 39 (cited in note 128).
218 See, for example, Tom A. Zamora, LTBT Amendment Conference to Continue, But
No Test Ban in Sight, 21 Arms Control Today 14 (Mar 1991) (reporting proposals to amend
the LTBT to transform it into a comprehensive prohibition against all nuclear explosions).
220 Marjorie M. Whiteman, 14 Dig Intl L § 36 at 418 (Department of State Publication
No 8547, Sep 1970).
221 See Vienna Convention, Art 30 (cited in note 128) (when successive treaties deal
with the same subject matter, the newer document will ordinarily govern relations between
states that are parties to both agreements).
22 Restatement at § 301, Comment a (cited in note 47). See also One on One, 38 De-
fense News 14 (Sep 2, 1991) (interview with Michael Moodie, Assistant Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency) (discussing proposals to negotiate a verification protocol
to amend the BWC).
22 Vienna Convention, Art 31, § 3(b) (cited in note 128); Restatement at § 334, Report-
ers' Note 2; § 325, Comment c (cited in note 47). See also Richard D. Kearney and Robert E.
Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 Am J Intl L 495, 525 (1970) (recounting the negotiating
history of the Vienna Convention provisions on modification of treaty language through sub-
sequent state behaviors).
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the opaque process of evolving customary international law to su-
persede the textual obligations. 24 A de facto amendment may be
expressed in an exchange of diplomatic notes, in the minutes of a
joint treaty-implementation body, or in no written form at all. 25
As long as the sovereign states freely agree, international law poses
few formal impediments to their intentionally crafting and remak-
ing their international commitments. 26
The Vienna Convention does incorporate some specialized vo-
cabulary, differentiating "amendment" from "modification" of
multilateral treaties.2 17 That is, technically, an "amendment" is a
proposal that all parties to the treaty are entitled to join; each
state has the right to participate in the negotiation and to become
party to the change . 2 8 A "modification," on the other hand, is an
intramural agreement among some, but not all, of the parties to
alter the obligations only among themselves.2 If a modification
would not compromise the rights of the excluded parties and is not
otherwise prohibited by the underlying document, it is fully law-
ful. 230 This process would create a bifurcated treaty structure, with
different sets of obligations obtaining across different pairs of
treaty parties. While such an arrangement may be factually messy,
it is nonetheless legally coherent. 31
Existing multilateral disarmament agreements have used the
freedom accorded by international law to craft a variety of amend-
224 Customary international law, based upon the repeated public actions of states, is
binding as an expression of consensus within the international community of states. It
evolves from general, continuous, notorious patterns of behaviors, that are based on a sense
of legal obligation, and is susceptible to change in the same fashion. Restatement at § 102
(cited in note 47).
225 Vienna Convention, Art 13 (cited in note 128). The Vienna Convention does not
apply to unwritten agreements, but such agreements may nonetheless be fully binding under
customary international law. Id at Art 3; Restatement at § 301, Comment b.
22 International law does prohibit any treaty that conflicts with a norm of "jus cogens"
or peremptory international law, deemed so fundamental that no derogation' is permitted.
Vienna Convention, Art 53 (cited in note 128); Restatement at § 331, Comment e (cited in
note 47).
227 Vienna Convention, Arts 39-41.
228 Id at Art 40. See also Louis Henkin, et al, International Law: Cases and Materials
457 (West, 2d ed 1987) (noting that this element of the Vienna Convention resolved a point
that had previously been disputed in customary international law).
221 Vienna Convention, Art 41.
220 Id.
232 The Vienna Convention also authorizes the creation of this type of complex array of
overlapping but not identical treaty obligations in its provisions regarding the filing of reser-
vations and objections. Id, Arts 19-23.
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ment procedures. 3 2 Probably the most common system is that
specified by the Outer Space Treaty, which provides that an
amendment enters into force only for those states that accept it,
and only when it is accepted by a majority of treaty parties. 33
Other treaties provide extra perquisites for specified states that
have played a leading role in negotiating or sustaining the agree-
ment. The LTBT, for example, ensures a veto for each of the three
"Original Parties" (the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union): unless all three vote for the amendment and
deposit instruments of ratification of it, it is without force for any
of the parties.24 Remarkably, the LTBT also specifies that once
the amendment has achieved this support from the majority (in-
cluding the three Original Parties), it enters into force for all par-
ties, not merely for those who have accepted it. 23 5
The current multilateral negotiations toward a Chemical
Weapons Convention have not yet settled upon an amendment
22 Bilateral arms control agreements generally provide that the parties may consider
amendments (often within the context of a standing consultative body or process) and that
any amendments will enter into force pursuant to the same domestic constitutional
processes of each state applicable to the treaty itself. See ABM Treaty, Art XIII, § 1(f); Art
XIV (cited in note 1); PNET, Art V, § 1(e); Art VIII, § 3 (cited in note 17); INF Treaty, Art
XVI (cited in note 28).
"I Outer Space Treaty, Art XV (cited in note 12). See also Seabed Arms Control
Treaty, Art VI (cited in note 12); BWC, Art XI (cited in note 12).
214 LTBT, Art II (cited in note 9). The LTBT provides that any state may propose
amendments to the treaty, that the depository governments shall cirdulate to all parties any
proposed amendments, and that an amendment conference shall be convened if requested
by one-third of the parties. Thereafter, an amendment is adopted only pursuant to majority
vote of all parties (which majority must include all three Original Parties), and it enters into
force only when a majority (again, including the key three) deposits instruments of ratifica-
tion. Id. See also Zamora, 21 Arms Control Today 14 (cited in note 219) (describing the
proceedings at the 1991 LTBT Amendment Conference, the only one of its kind ever
convened).
The NPT adopts a comparable amendment procedure, providing similar special protec-
tion for the states that possess nuclear weapons and for the states that are members of the
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. NPT, Art VIII § 2 (cited in
note 10).
' LTBT, Art II, § 2 (cited in note 9). See also Vienna Convention, Art 30, § 4(b), Art
40, § 4 (cited in note 128) (subsequent amendment or new treaty does not bind a party
which does not accept it); Charter of the United Nations, Jun 26, 1945, Art 108, 59 Stat
1031, Treaty Service No 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (amendment enters into force for all parties
when ratified by two-thirds of the members, including ratification by all five permanent
members of the Security Council); NPT, Art VIII, § 2 (cited in note 10) (amendment enters
into force only for those states which deposit instrument of ratification of it); Bernauer,
Chemical Weapons Convention at 198 (cited in note 4) (the procedure for effectuating
amendments, particularly the question of whether an amendment may enter into force for a
party that does not accept it, has become one of the most controversial issues in the negotia-
tions regarding a chemical weapons treaty).
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procedure, but various types of limitations have been suggested
that might provide interesting models for international law prac-
tice.2" Some have proposed that the most critical provisions of the
document (for example, those banning the production of all chemi-
cal weapons) be excluded from the possibility of amendment, at
least for an initial period of ten years.237 Others have called for a
differentiated amendment mechanism through which some of the
basic obligations would be difficult to alter, but that permits easier
modification in the technical annexes, such as those listing the spe-
cific chemical substances to be banned.38
In all of this, the parties recognize that treaties must be free to
evolve over time-arms control agreements, no less than others. 239
As circumstances change, the legal obligations should be adapted
to conform better to the parties' current requirements, and inter-
national law should not pose an artificial barrier to the realization
of the parties' goals.240 One major vehicle for initiating this adapta-
tion process has always been the informal, day-to-day practice of
nations, who-operating chiefly through their respective executive
branches 241-interpret the words of the treaty, operate under it,
and give it life.
Accordingly, international law has also developed a routine
"correction of errors" procedure to provide an efficient and low-key
mechanism for resolving difficulties created when various types of
minor mistakes (typographical errors, translation inconsistencies,
etc.) are discovered after a treaty has been signed. The Vienna
Convention provides alternative diplomatic mechanisms for ob-
'16 CW Convention Rolling Text, Art XIV (cited in note 35).
213 Bernauer, Chemical Weapons Convention at 197-99 (cited in note 4).
238 Id at 198; CW Convention Rolling Text, Art XIV.
"I Richard A. Falk, Inhibiting Reliance on Biological Weaponry: The Role and Rele-
vance of International Law, 17 Am U J Intl L & Pol 17, 18 (1986) (treaty rules must allow
the parties some latitude in interpreting and operating the accord).
2I International law tightly constrains the unilateral use of the doctrine of "changed
circumstances" as a rationale for one party's failure to honor its treaty obligations. The
general rule is that treaty terms must be performed in good faith, and the range of valid
excuses that could justify non-performance is narrow. Vienna Convention, Arts 26, 46-53,
61-62 (cited in note 128); Restatement at §§ 321, 331, 336 (cited in note 47). Where all the
parties consensually agree to modify their treaty obligations, however, international law is
permissive.
2,1 See Restatement at § 326(1) (cited in note 47) (noting the special power of the chief
executive in asserting the nation's interpretation of treaty commitments in the conduct of
international relations). See United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304, 319
(1936) (President is "sole organ" of the United States in its external relations).
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taining signatories' concurrence on the corrections.2 4 2 The practice
of the United States has generally been to implement these correc-
tions via diplomatic notes. Where the error has been discovered
only after the treaty has received Senate approval, the executive
has proceeded to adopt the correction on its own, without notifying
Congress or seeking additional approval.243 In these instances,
however, the scope of the "error" to be rectified is truly de
minimis, confined to obvious small mistakes where the printed
document failed to reflect the parties' clear intentions-not situa-
tions where they later changed their minds about the legal ar-
rangements they would prefer.2 44
Finally, international law provides for "provisional applica-
tion" of treaty terms, allowing an agreement (or a part of an agree-
ment) to be effectuated even while the various domestic ratifica-
tion processes are still pending within the several party states.24 5
This process has become fairly common in recent years, where the
negotiating countries seek to begin partial implementation, even
242 Vienna Convention, Art 79 (cited in note 128) (signatories may correct errors by
initialing alterations in the text, exchanging appropriate diplomatic instruments, or execut-
ing a corrected text of the entire document); Eleanor C. McDowell, Digest of United States
Practice in International Law 1976 217-18 (Department of State Publication No 8908,
1977) (describing the routine United Nations procedure for correcting errors in signed
treaties).
1 Whiteman, 14 Dig Intl L at § 16 (cited in note 220).
144 Id (citing examples such as minor mistranslations in two United States-Greece trea-
ties and in several multilateral conventions, where errors were corrected through exchanges
of diplomatic notes or declarations, not involving congressional participation).
By memorandum of September 29, 1941, State Department Legal Adviser Hackworth
noted:
It is my view that the Department is without authority to alter such documents after
they have received the approval of the Senate and the President. The time to check on
the accuracy of copies of such agreements is before, and not after, they have had the
approval of the Senate. The document printed in the Statutes at Large should conform
to that approved by the Senate and it is not for us to say whether the changes are
important or unimportant, which after all might be a question of judgment and one on
which reasonable minds might disagree. I do not think that we have any greater lati-
tude in correcting treaties after the Senate has acted than we do in correcting obvious
errors in acts of Congress after they have been passed by the Congress. The treaties are
laws to no lesser extent than acts of Congress. They cannot be made except by ap-
proval of the Senate. If we should discover some error or discrepancy in a document
after it has been sent to the Senate, the only way by which a correction may properly
be made is by bringing the matter to the attention of the Senate and obtaining its
consent to the proposed correction.
Id at § 16.
"I Vienna Convention, Art 25 (cited in note 128); Kearney and Dalton, 64 Am J Intl L
at 514-15 (cited in note 223); United Nations Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue III (Sep
1991) (describing extensive and prolonged activities of the Prepatory Commission for the
Law of the Sea, relating to a treaty signed in 1982, but that has not yet entered into force).
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prior to completion of the formalities necessary for entry into
force.2 46 Within the United States, the Senate has generally not
objected to this type of provisional application, allowing a "jump
start" on treaty operations, even while the advice and consent
mechanism is underway.247 The CFE Treaty, for example, provided
that selected portions would be applied by the parties from the
date of signature,2 48 and the Open Skies Treaty explicitly creates
similar procedures. 9
B. Precedents in Analogous Fields
In areas other than disarmament, particularly with a few lit-
tle-noticed multilateral conventions dealing with specific issues in
the fields of environmental protection and maritime safety, there
are already a few modest precedents for the administration's cur-
rent effort to extend a non-amendment authority. For example, the
1972 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, concluded
between the United States and Japan, contains a detailed Annex
listing the particular types of birds that are subject to protection
under it.25 0 Since the parties contemplated that the desired bound-
aries of the regime might need to be changed quite often, the con-
vention provides that the Annex may be altered by diplomatic
246 Interview with Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, United
States Department of State (Nov 27, 1991) ("Dalton Interview"). Agreements resolving mar-
itime boundaries, for example, have been provisionally applied, to implement immediately a
solution that provides necessary guidance to fishery and other vessels, even prior to entry
into force. Id; John C. McNeill, America's Maritime Boundary with the Soviet Union, 44
Naval War College Rev 46, 46 n 2 (Summer 1991).
214 Dalton Interview (cited in note 246). During the negotiations on the INF Treaty
Memorandum of Agreement, see text accompanying notes 166-77, the delegations agreed
upon a somewhat different type of provisional application. There, the treaty mandated that
verification inspections occur pursuant to a rigid, early timetable, and the American and
Soviet inspectors charged with responsibility for conducting those inspections required guid-
ance about the permissible equipment, operations, and functions. The delegations were able
to reach early agreement on at least some of the relevant terms and conditions, and they
agreed to apply those points provisionally, as practical guidance to the inspection teams,
even while the rest of the MOA itself was still under negotiation. Once the MOA was writ-
ten and signed, it entered into force immediately, without Senate consideration. Look Inter-
view (cited in note 145).
248 CFE Treaty, Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the
Treaty (cited in note 32).
2149 Open Skies Treaty, Art XVIII (cited in note 105). The United States has stated that
the treaty will not be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent until the interna-
tional consultation process resolves a series of initial technical and financial details. See
Gist: Open Skies Treaty (cited in note 108).
250 Convention Between the Government of the U.S. and the Government of Japan for
the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environ-
ment, Mar 4, 1972, 25 UST 3329, TIAS No 7990.
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note, without Senate approval, even if the parties were to decide to
add or delete a significant number of species.2 51 This device has
been used at least once. 252 Similarly, the 1985 United States-Ca-
nada agreement on Pacific salmon,253 which regulates fishing in
transborder rivers and in offshore oceans, contains detailed specifi-
cations of each nation's allowable catch.254 It also provides that the
regime may be altered by the expedient exchange of diplomatic
communications. 5
A variation on this practice sometimes lodges the power to ap-
prove changes in existing treaty terms with an international organ-
ization, especially one possessing the technical competence to
render expert, non-political judgments. The 1973 International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,256 for ex-
ample, provides that a party may amend the Convention's techni-
cal annexes if the International Maritime Organization approves
the amendment, and no other party registers a sufficient objection
within a specified period of time.257 The same procedure was later
adopted for a 1978 Protocol; again, it provided for no congressional
role in implementing future changes. 258 Similar rules obtain for the
Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 259 applicable to safe maritime
251 Id, Art II, § 2(c).
1" 25 UST 3373, TIAS No 7990 (September 19, 1974 exchange of diplomatic notes in-
serted an additional species to those previously listed in the treaty's Annex). See also Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar 3,
1973, 27 UST 1087, TIAS No 8249 (similar provisions govern multilateral convention on
protection of rare species; Department of Interior negotiates with other countries to modify
the annexes listing the controlled species, and the changes are not considered amendments
and are not always transmitted to the Senate under the Case Act); Dalton Interview (cited
in note 246).
2"Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan 28, 1985, Sen Treaty Doc No
99-2, 99th Cong, 1st Sess (1985).
2" Id, Annex IV.
"I Id, Art XIII. The State Department's section-by-section analysis stated that "since
Annex IV contains fishery regimes that will be revised routinely and frequently, changes to
these regimes will not be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent." 1991 ASIL Pro-
ceedings at 485 (cited in note 82) (comments of David Abramowitz).
2I International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov 2, 1973,
12 ILM 1319, 1330-33 (not intended to enter into force on its own).
257 Id, Art 16, § (2)(f)(iii).
258 Protocol of 1978 to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, Art VI, Feb 17, 1978, in S Exec Doc No 96-C, 96th Cong, 1st Sess (1979) (entry
into force Oct 2, 1983) (modifying and adding to many of the substantive regulations of the
1973 Convention).
,15 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Art VIII, § (b)(vi), Nov
1, 1974, 32 UST 47, 52 TIAS No 9700.
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construction and operating practices;2 60 for two protocols to the
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims; 261
and for other detailed and technical agreements. 62 Only rarely has
Congress balked at these procedures.63
Finally, the Law of the Sea Convention 2 6 4 -the comprehensive
"constitution for the oceans," which is not yet in force but which
has already crystallized customary international law on many im-
20 Under the treaty, there is a relatively informal mechanism for implementing amend-
ments to certain technical provisions. These amendments may be "adopted" by a super-
majority vote in the expanded Maritime Safety Committee, then circulated to all parties. If
no party objects for a two-year period, the amendment is deemed to have been "accepted"
and it enters into force without additional documentation. This procedure effectively pre-
serves a veto for the United States and other leading maritime nations, but the power is
reserved to the executive-there is no occasion for the Congress to participate in the amend-
ment process. Id, Art VIII, § (b)(vi)(2).
261 Protocol I, Jun 8, 1977, 16 ILM 1391; Protocol II, Jun 8, 1977, 16 ILM 1442 (not in
force for United States). Under the protocols, the International Committee of the Red Cross
is to convene periodic meetings of technical experts to review the treaty's Technical Annex
and prepare draft amendments. A proposed amendment is to be submitted to a conference
of treaty parties, and if adopted by a two-thirds vote, it is considered accepted unless re-
jected within one year by one-third of the parties. Article 18 bis; McDowell, Digest of
United States Practice in International Law 1976 at 235-3,6 (cited in note 242).
262 Arthur W. Rovine, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1974 237-
39 (Department of State Publication No 8809, 1975) (describing "tacit amendment" proce-
dure for 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, permitting rapid
modification of treaty's technical annex); Arthur W. Rovine, Digest of United States Prac-
tice in International Law 1973 183-84 (Department of State Publication No 8756, 1974)
(describing similar process, not requiring congressional participation, for modifying INTEL-
SAT arrangements).
263 Dalton Interview (cited in note 246). The International Navigation Rules Act of
1977, Pub L No 95-75, 91 Stat 308, codified at 33 USC § 1601 (1982), authorizes the Presi-
dent to proclaim as United States law certain future internationally-agreed amendments to
the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. However,
the legislation also requires the executive branch to print the text of any proposed amend-
ment-once approved by the parties under established treaty procedures-in the Federal
Register, and to notify Congress. If Congress passes a resolution of disapproval, the Presi-
dent shall notify the international organization that the United States objects to the amend-
ment, effectively blocking its entry into force. President Carter signed the legislation, but
expressed reservations about its constitutionality. President Ford had vetoed an earlier ver-
sion of the bill, which would have permitted either house of Congress to block any amend-
ment. John A. Boyd, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1977 399-401
(Department of State Publication No 8960, 1979).
Similarly, in considering the 1973 Protocol to the 1949 International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Congress directed that, even where other parties have en-
dorsed a future proposed amendment, the U.S. executive branch must object to it, preclud-
ing its entry into force, until the Senate provides its advice and consent. Rovine, Digest of
United States International Law Practice 1973 at 183-84 (cited in note 262).




portant issues 265-contains some relevant, controversial provisions
on point. Under the convention, amendments may be "adopted" in
any of three ways: (1) via consensus at an Amendment Confer-
ence;266 (2) through unanimous failure to object to a circulated pro-
posal;2 6 7 or (3) pursuant to approval by the convention's governing
bodies. 268 After adoption, an amendment may enter into force in
two ways. For changes on most subjects, ratification by two-thirds
of the parties suffices to bring the amendment into force for those
who ratify it. 2 9 However, any amendment dealing with the mining
of the deep seabed (the most contentious part of the convention)
will enter into force for all parties once it has been ratified by
three-quarters of the parties °.2 7  This last provision-permitting
modification of the crucial financial, technical, and other provi-
sions regulating access to the mineral resources of the deep ocean
floor-was cited by the Reagan Administration as one of the key
reasons why the United States would not sign the convention.271
The United States insisted on a veto, or at least on the ability to
prevent itself from being compelled by the majority to accept unfa-
vorable terms, in an area seen as potentially vital to American se-
curity and economic well-being.2 72
2'1 Restatement at 4-5 (cited in note 47) (Law of the Sea Convention itself is not cur-
rently binding for the United States, but it has been acknowledged as restating or generat-
ing binding customary international law on many points.).
2" LoSC, Art 312 (cited in note 264).
117 Id, Art 313 (if any party objects to a proposed amendment within twelve months of
its circulation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the amendment is consid-
ered rejected).
28 Id, Art 314 (applicable to provisions regarding deep seabed mining; requiring ap-
proval by the Council and by the Assembly, the leading political organs established by the
convention).
289 Id, Art 316, 1.
270 Id, Art 316, 1 5.
271 Recent Development, Law of the Sea-Deep Seabed Mining-United States Posi-
tion in Light of Recent Agreement and Exchange of Notes with Five Countries Involved in
Prepatory Commission of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 Ga J Intl
& Comp L 497, 501-02 (1988); David L. Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Conven-
tion, 14 Ocean Development & Intl L 337, 345, 347 (1985).
'72 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Law of the Deep Seabed Post UNCLOS III, 63 Or L
Rev 19 (1984); Lee Kimball, The Law of the Sea, Environment 14, 41-42 (Nov 1983); Lar-
son, 14 Ocean Development & Intl L at 348 (cited in note 271) (United States' refusal to
join the Law of the Sea Convention was driven by the Reagan administration's conclusion
that the deep sea mining regime would be dominated by third world and communist ideol-
ogy, insufficiently responsive to American commercial and security interests in obtaining
timely, efficient access to the scarce metals to be found undersea).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Unlike international law, domestic United States constitu-
tional standards cast grave doubt on the legality and the wisdom of
the informal process of treaty amendment, and this Section ex-
plores some of the problems. Although a vast literature has now
developed regarding the American jurisprudence on various treaty
questions, such as interpretation,7 3 termination,I74 and breach,75
not much has yet been written about the interstices of the amend-
ment process-probably because until the current issue arose,
there had been little controversy in .the field. Nonetheless, many of
the principles and precedents adduced in the allied fields are rele-
vant here. 6
A. Background
There are two primary categories of international commit-
ments binding upon the United States. The "treaty," approved
pursuant to a two-thirds vote in the Senate, is the only major vehi-
cle mentioned in the Constitution.2" Over the years, however, in-
ternational agreements other than treaties (often generically re-
ferred to as "executive agreements") have come to eclipse the
treaty route, and two centuries of practice have ensconced them as
fully legitimate, notwithstanding the absence of any explicit consti-
tutional reference.2 78 There are three recognized subcategories of
27 See John B. Rhinelander, Arms Control in the Nuclear Age, in John Norton Moore,
Frederick S. Tipson, and Robert F. Turner, eds, National Security Law 551, 598-99 (Caro-
lina Academic, 1990); Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 134-45 (Princeton,
1990); Harold H. Koh, et al, The Treaty Power, 43 U Miami L Rev 101 (1988); Charles J.
Cooper, et al, What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U Miami L Rev 165
(1988).
274 See Robert F. Turner, The Constitutional Framework for the Division of National
Security Powers Between Congress, the President, and the Courts, in Moore, Tipson, and
Turner, eds, National Security Law at 798-807 (cited in note 273); Glennon, Constitutional
Diplomacy at 145 (cited in note 273); Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National
Security Law at 306-34 (cited in note 64).
176 See Restatement at § 335 (cited in note 47); Ralph Earle and John B. Rhinelander,
The Krasnoyarsk Radar-A "Material Breach" of the ABM Treaty?, 18 Arms Control To-
day 9 (Sep 1988).
276 See, for example, Glennon, 77 Am J Intl L 257 (cited in note 122); Henkin, 10 Mich
J Intl L 406 (cited in note 78); Randall, 51 Ohio St L J 1089 (cited in note 67) (exploring
how United States treaty law applies to a range of controversies).
2'l US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2. The Constitution also refers to other types of documents,
such as an "Agreement or Compact" that an individual American state, with the consent of
Congress, may conclude with another country. Id at Art I, § 10, cl 3. These have not proven
to be of operational importance.
178 United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 330-31 (1937) (distinguishing between a
treaty, which requires "participation of the senate," and certain other international agree-
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executive agreements, deriving their lawful authority from diverse
sources: (1) those approved by affirmative congressional legislation
through a majority vote in each House (prior to or after signature
of the agreement);2 7 9 (2) those authorized by an antecedent treaty
that was itself effectuated through a two-thirds vote of advice and
consent by the Senate; 80 and (3) those resting upon the sole con-
stitutional authority of the President as chief executive or com-
mander in chief. 281
The standard mechanism for formally amending or updating a
treaty is through the negotiation and ratification of what amounts
to another treaty, with all the attendant procedural niceties. An
amendment to a treaty (whether it is denominated as such, or as a
protocol, addendum, or any other label) is basically a new treaty.282
In contrast, the "non-amendments" under consideration here are
mostly executive agreements of the second type.83 Whether cast as
ments, such as the executive branch creating a protocol recognizing a foreign government, or
establishing normal relations with a foreign government, which do not require such partici-
pation); Restatement at § 303, Comment a and Reporters' Notes 7-8 (cited in note 47);
Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 Yale L J 345 (1955); Comment, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements
as Congressional-Executive Agreements, 38 UCLA L Rev 1533, 1538-50 (1991).
17 Altman & Co. v United States, 224 US 583, 601 (1912); Restatement at § 303(2)
(cited in note 47). This avenue was used, for example, in the SALT I Interim Agreement
(cited in note 14).
280 Wilson v Girard, 354 US 524, 526-29 (1957); Restatement at § 303(3). See Note,
Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits?, 11 Hofstra L Rev 805, 811-15 (1983)
(executive agreements pursuant to treaty are quite common and diverse; key interpretation
questions have concerned the scope of the treaty's authorization for the subsequent agree-
ment); Role of the Senate at 77-79 (cited in note 64); Randall, 51 Ohio St L J at 1093 (cited
in note 67).
281 United States v Pink, 315 US 203, 229-30 (1942); Restatement at § 303(4) (cited in
note 47). Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 USC § 2573 (1988),
specifies that
no action shall be taken under this chapter or any other law that will obligate the
United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the
United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the
Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of
the United States.
This provision purports to prohibit arms control agreements cast as sole executive agree-
ments, but its constitutionality has never been tested.
282 Some treaties specify that an amendment shall enter into force in the same manner
as the original treaty. See SALT II Treaty, Art XVIII (cited in note 25); INF Treaty, Art
XVI (cited in note 28). The Charter of the United Nations has been amended repeatedly,
each time with the advice and consent of the Senate. See, for example, Amendment
Adopted by the General Assembly, Dec 17, 1963, 16 UST 1134, TIAS No 5857 (entered into
force Aug 31, 1965) (amending the Charter to increase the size of the Security Council from
eleven to fifteen).
283 Despite public preoccupation with the category of executive agreements sustained
solely upon the constitutional authority of the President, most of the executive agreements
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an exchange of diplomatic notes, as an integrated document
opened for signature, or in some other style,284 their legitimacy de-
pends upon the lawfulness and propriety of the original delegation
contained in the underlying treaty-the only document that the
Senate has explicitly endorsed.8 5
Conceptually, treaties and all three types of executive agree-
ments are of equal legal dignity. Under the Supremacy Clause,286
each is "the supreme law of the land" under the Constitution, and
they are largely interchangeable instruments.8 7 The choice about
which form to use in crafting an international obligation is much
more political than legal.2 8 This equivalence is further demon-
strated by invocation of the usual lex posterior hierarchy in the
rules of interpretation: in the event of a conflict between successive
documents, the latest in time will prevail. Therefore, the newest
concluded by the United States are undertaken pursuant to either a prior treaty or another
expression of congressional approval. Turner, Constitutional Framework at 807-08 (cited in
note 274) (citing a 1964 State Department survey concluding that 97% of all executive
agreements were in the category of cases "deriving all or part of their legal authority from a
treaty or statute").
28 International agreements, including the various types of executive agreements, may
be equally valid whether concluded in a single document or many, and whatever their title.
Vienna Convention, Art 2, § 1(a) (cited in note 128); Franck and Glennon, Foreign Rela-
tions and National Security Law at 242 (cited in note 64).
285 Turner, Constitutional Framework at 809 (cited in note 274) (executive agreements
pursuant to treaty are very common; they derive their powers from the Senate's approval of
the original treaty). See Coplin v United States, 6 Cl Ct 115, rev'd on other grounds, 761
F2d 688 (Fed Cir 1985), aff'd as O'Connor v United States, 479 US 27 (1986); Swearingen v
United States, 565 F Supp 1019 (D Colo 1983) (upholding executive agreements imple-
mented subsequent to an authorizing treaty); Role of the Senate at 146-47 (cited in note
64).
288 US Const, Art VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
287 Weinberger v Rossi, 456 US 25, 29-32 (1982); Restatement at § 303, Reporters' Note
8 (cited in note 47); Myres J. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Exec-
utive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54
Yale L J 181 (1945). But see Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Re-
ply, 54 Yale L J 616 (1945).
288 Circular 175 and 11 Foreign Affairs Manual contain the State Department guidance
regarding factors to consider in selecting the form of an agreement. Generally, the weightier,
more important, long-duration accords are supposed to be cast in treaty form, but the prac-
tice has varied substantially. Restatement at § 303, Reporters' Note 8 (cited in note 47). See
also International Agreements Consultation Resolution, S Rep No 95-1171, 95th Cong, 2d
Sess (1978) (expressing Senate preference for use of the treaty form, and the desire for close
consultation regarding the executive's choices). Until very late in the negotiating process,
the United States hesitated about whether to cast the SALT II Treaty'(cited in note 25) as
a treaty or an executive agreement, with the ultimate decision turning on a political reading
of the preferences of the two houses of Congress. Comment, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1582-85
(cited in note 278).
Arms Control Agreements
document-whatever its denomination-will supersede its precur-
sors as the effective rule of domestic law (although American prac-
tice in this regard is somewhat inconsistent,8 9 and many of the
crucial combinations or sequences have never been tested in
practice)2 9 0
B. Legal Analysis
Strict application of the above principles would seem to au-
thorize a very expansive executive power for informal modification
of treaties. That is, if the Senate, in approving an initial treaty,
explicitly authorizes the executive to conclude follow-on accords
that supplement or modify the terms, then a later executive agree-
ment within that delegated scope would appear to be fully war-
ranted.2 91 The delegation of authority could, in principle, proceed
far beyond merely technical, administrative, or procedural points
into real substantive questions. If the Senate were comfortable
with only a more limited delegation of power, then the treaty could
be crafted (or reservations could be entered) to permit only certain
types of modifications, or to require a second legislative review. 22
Moreover, Congress could at any time change the rules through the
enactment of new legislation, which could effectively withdraw or
modify the power to conclude subsequent executive agreements, or
supersede any particular one of them. 93
2" Role of the Senate at 141 (cited in note 64).
2,0 Restatement at § 115 (cited in note 47) (treaty and executive agreement are both
supreme law, but uncertainty persists about whether a sole executive agreement could effec-
tively supersede a contrary statute). See United States v Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F2d 655
(4th Cir 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 US 296 (1955) (declining to enforce sole executive
agreement conflicting with prior statute, where the controversy arose in the area of regula-
tion of foreign commerce, a power committed to the Congress in the Constitution, and
therefore inappropriate for a sole executive agreement). Significantly, this controversy con-
cerns only the power of a sole executive agreement to supersede a prior statute as a matter
of domestic United States law. There is little doubt about the authority of either of the
other types of executive agreement to supersede an earlier contrary statute, nor about the
power of any of the three instruments to create binding international obligations for the
United States.
"I There have been controversies about whether the subsequent executive agreement
was, in fact, within the contemplated scope established by the earlier treaty, but the princi-
ple of authorization seems clearly established. Randall, 51 Ohio St L J at 1093 (cited in note
67).
.2 Restatement at § 303, Comment d (cited in note 47) (Senate may condition its ad-
vice and consent in almost any way).
2I Id at § 115 (act of Congress may supersede contrary international agreement, if in-
tention to do so is clear; doing so would create a new rule for enforcement in United States
courts, but would not relieve the United States of its international obligation in the event of
breach).
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A distinction should be made here between those follow-on
agreements that merely "fill gaps" that have been deliberately or
inadvertently left in the underlying treaty, and those other agree-
ments that depart from the express terms of the original accord.9 4
In arms control as in other areas, the former type of subsequent
accord is less problematic; the President must possess at least
some degree of inherent responsibility for inserting a consensus
meaning into the interstices of a vague or general treaty.9
Thus, even where (as has usually been the case, until recent
years) the treaty is silent regarding procedures for fleshing out a
text, the duty as a practical matter must fall to the executive." 6 It
is the executive branch that operates the treaty for the United
States, interprets its terms, and engages in the "subsequent prac-
tice" that gives the treaty meaning and supplies many of the
needed functional details. 97 Whether this type of operational
agreement between the parties is reduced to written text, or
whether it remains an informal pattern of action and acquiescence,
it would seem to be a logical component of the executive power.298
294 There are also some international agreements, such as the detailed technical ar-
rangements commonly concluded at the working level of American and foreign government
bureaucracies, that slip entirely beneath the coverage of the constitutional system.
Kuchenbecker, 18 Colum J Transnatl L 1 (cited in note 64); Johnson, Making of Interna-
tional Agreements at 127-29 (cited in note 64). In the prototypical example, if a formal
international agreement obligates the United States to sell 1,000 tractors to a particular
country, a subsequent agency-to-agency communication might specify the delivery date and
type of tractor for the first shipment. This secondary arrangement would be fully binding
but would likely not be considered an international agreement for purposes of the Case Act
or other formal proceedings. Arthur W. Rovine, Separation of Powers and International
Executive Agreements, 52 Ind L J 397, 405-06 (1977).
295 See Restatement at § 325 (cited in note 47) (subsequent agreements between treaty
parties, as well as their subsequent practice, are to be taken into account in interpreting a
treaty); 1991 ASIL Proceedings at 497 (cited in note 82) (remarks of Thomas Graham, Jr.)
(executive branch, operating through treaty's implementation bodies, elaborates the neces-
sary details for implementing arms control agreements).
296 See Senate Foreign Relations Committee Memorandum of Law on Choice of Instru-
ments for Sinai Accords, reprinted in Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National
Security Law at 406-09 (cited in note 64) (agreement may be very vague and indefinite,
leaving substantial discretion to executive in later implementation).
297 Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 44-65 (Foundation, 1972) (dis-
cussing the scope of presidential foreign affairs power). See United States v Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 US 304 (1936).
299 See State Department Airgram to All Diplomatic Posts Concerning Criteria for De-
ciding What Constitutes an International Agreement (Mar 9, 1976), reprinted in Franck and
Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law at 389, 393 (cited in note 64) (spec-
ifying types of implementing agreements required to be reported to Congress).
Arms Control Agreements
Presidents have always performed this type of function; now the
mechanism is simply more overt.2 99
Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure
Case30 0 provides the three-part analytical framework that may be
adapted to this context. That is, where the original treaty (as ap-
proved by the Senate) has expressly authorized the creation of
subsequent agreements, indicating that they may be effectuated
without additional legislative scrutiny, the President's power is at
its zenith, for it assumes all the powers of the executive as well as
all that may lawfully be delegated by the Congress. Second, where
the treaty (and any other relevant congressional pronouncements)
is silent about future use of any implementation function, there is
a "zone of twilight," and the President may rely only upon execu-
tive branch inherent constitutional powers. These powers would
often, but not always, be sufficient to sustain a gap-filling accord
cast as a sole executive agreement or an unwritten pattern of be-
havior. Finally, if the original treaty were to specify that no inserts
could be effectuated without legislative approval, the President
would have only the smallest residual power. Even this, however,
might be sufficient to authorize certain types of agreements as be-
ing inherently within the Constitution's grant of powers to the
President.30 1
However, any subsequent agreement that purports to change
the prior treaty terms, instead of simply to supplement them,
presents a more complex puzzle.0 2 In acute form, the question
presented is: How far may the Senate lawfully go in delegating to
the President the authority to re-craft the presented terms in fu-
ture agreements free from additional legislative oversight and
approval?
299 Restatement at § 326 (cited in note 47); W. Michael 1eisman, Necessary and
Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties, 15 Yale J Intl L 316 (1990). But see
Borchard, 54 Yale L J at 650-52 (cited in note 287) (limitations on President's discretion to
modify a treaty through executive agreements).
200 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson
concurring).
301 See Restatement at § 1, Reporters' Note 3 (cited in note 47); Harold Koh, The Na-
tional Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair 142 (Yale, 1990)
(courts seeking to sustain a presidential action or agreement will strive to move a case from
Jackson's second category into his first, and will stretch to interpret even the legislature's
silence and inaction as constituting congressional acceptance or acquiescence). See also Ran-
dall, 51 Ohio St L J 1089 (cited in note 67) (evaluating the scope of sole executive power and
shared executive-legislative power in creating international agreements).
2 As noted in text accompanying notes 337-43, the distinction between "filling the
gaps" and "changing the standards" may be elusive in practice. At some point, the accretion
of inserts may become so substantial as to constitute a new accord.
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American legal and political history is rife with conflict over
issues similar to this, testing the resiliency of the separation of
powers. The Constitution deliberately serrated the foreign affairs
powers, according both the legislature and the executive a partial
role in creating treaties, conducting hostilities, governing interna-
tional trade, etc.303 The Founders consciously fomented inter-
branch tension in this area, refusing to cede either branch a defini-
tive, comprehensive upper hand, but trusting the "inefficiency" of
the checks and balances to safeguard the republic.304
In the context of these "fissured" powers,30 5 each branch has a
role to play in the back-and-forth process of creating international
obligations.30 6 First, the President negotiates a treaty (increasingly,
with participation of congressional observers). 7 Next, the Senate
provides advice and consent (sometimes accompanied by condi-
tions or other types of declarations).30 8 The President "makes" the
treaty by exchanging instruments of ratification. The Congress
may then be called upon to sustain the agreement, by providing
funds or other actions necessary to discharge American responsi-
bilities.309 Finally, the President will enforce the treaty, interpret-
ing its meaning on behalf of the United States310 and engaging in
.03 See Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law at 227-41
(cited in note 64); Turner, Constitutional Framework at 749-806 (cited in note 274) (tracing
the constitutional origins of the treaty power).
304 See especially Federalist 64 (Jay) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers
450-51 (Mentor, 1961) (declaring that the treaty power will "partake more of the legislative
than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition
of either of them"). See also Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and
the President 7-9 (Kansas, 3d ed 1991) (purpose of the separation of powers was not merely
to hamstring potential despots, but to develop a practical method of government).
30I Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 32 (cited in note 297) (foreign af-
fairs powers are not neatly separated between the branches); Elliot L. Richardson, Checks
and Balances in Foreign Relations, 83 Am J Intl L 736 (1989); Eugene V. Rostow, Presi-
dent, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 Am J Intl L 740 (1989).
"I Role of the Senate at 8-14 (cited in note 64) (describing steps in the making of a
treaty).
30W hiteman, 14 Dig Intl L at 53-55 (cited in note 220).
308 Glennon, 77 Am J Intl L at 263-66 (cited in note 122).
10, Some treaties are "self-executing," requiring no further legislative action in order to
become effective, while others rely upon additional statutes or other law to become a rule of
decision for United States courts. Franck and Glennon, Foreign Relations and National
Security Law at 274-96 (cited in note 64).
310 The President exercises the lead responsibility for the United States in engaging in
the types of international conduct that provide meaning to international agreements. The
President undertakes the initiatives, and responds to the actions of other parties, that con-
stitute "state practice" in interpreting treaties and in creating customary international law.
Restatement at § 326 (cited in note 47).
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the types of "subsequent practice" that flesh out its contents."s '
Each step must be meaningful; none can be evaded or delegated
wholesale. The advice and consent function, as with all the others,
must be taken seriously, not reduced to automatically authorizing
some unknown future "pig in a poke."
The balance of effective powers between the two branches has
oscillated according to the personalities and politics of the era,
continuously testing the constitutional scheme.3 12 As the Supreme
Court noted in 1981 in Dames & Moore v Regan,s1 while uphold-
ing the extraordinary assertion of executive powers that resolved
the Iran hostages crisis:
we freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one
more episode in the never-ending tension between the Presi-
dent exercising the executive authority in a world that
presents each day some new challenge with which he must
deal and the Constitution under which we all live and which
no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and
balances.3 14
The landmark decision in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v Chadha,31 5 where the Supreme Court overturned decades
of daily practice by invalidating the "legislative veto" process,31 6
3I Under the Vienna Convention, the subsequent practice of the parties to a treaty,
applying its terms, is an important source to be taken into account in its interpretation.
Vienna Convention, Art 31, § 3(b) (cited in note 128). See also Robert F. Turner, Separa-
tion of Powers in Foreign Policy: The Theoretical Underpinnings, 11 Geo Mason U L Rev
97, 111-13 (1988); Thomas M. Franck, Improving the Performance of Congress in Foreign
Policy, 11 Geo Mason U L Rev 183 (1988) (criticizing Congress for attempts to
"micrqmanage" the conduct of United States foreign policy by excessively constraining the
executive).
312 See Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts at 6-12 (cited in note 304) (sketching history of
the balance of power between the branches); Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Con-
frontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 Geo Wash L Rev 401 (1989); and
Turner, 11 Geo Mason L Rev at 116 (cited in note 311) (controversy over the separation of
powers has increased during the last decade, reflected in increases in the number of consti-
tutional cases in litigation and the number of statutes related to foreign relations). See also
Cooper, et al, 43 U Miami L Rev at 188 (cited in note 273) (comments of Eugene V. Rostow)
(President should initiate and exercise the foreign affairs power, with Congress operating
merely as a check against excesses); Koh, et al, 43 U Miami L Rev at 101 (cited in note 273)
(comments of Abraham D. Sofaer) (Senate attempts to expand its powers whenever it is
politically expedient to do so); id at 106 (comments of Harold H. Koh) (throughout the
1980s, executive branch has asserted increasingly expansive treaty powers).
-1- 453 US 654 (1981).
31 Id at 662.
5 462 US 919 (1983).
3" The legislative veto, in one form or another, had been built into some 200 statutes
since 1932, many of them enactments concerning foreign affairs. Id at 968, 1003 (White
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provides another critical perspective on the inter-branch power re-
lationship. Advocates of the legislative veto had stressed its long
history, its efficiency, and its practical accommodation of the inter-
ests of both Congress and the President. Even if there were no tex-
tual support for the procedure in the Constitution, they argued,
the legislative veto should be sustained as a pragmatic adaptation
to the pressures of the modern era.-17 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, gave short shrift to that line of argument, demanding a more
exacting fealty to the lawmaking processes of the Constitution, in
words that resonate with the current non-amendment controversy:
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitu-
tional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes
that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but
those hard choices were consciously made by men who had
lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary
governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the
Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition
that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in
complying with explicit constitutional standards may be
avoided, either by the Congress or by the President ...
With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential
for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve free-
dom than by making the exercise of power subject to the care-
fully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.3 18
Insisting upon compliance with the formalities of bicamera-
lism and presentment,3 9 the Supreme Court spoke forcefully
against the sentiment that expedited procedures and simplified
standards ought to be applied to usher the republic into its third
dissenting) (Annex listing legislative veto statutes, including twelve under the heading "For-
eign Affairs and National Security"); Turner, Constitutional Framework at 857 (cited in
note 274).
"I Legislative vetoes appended to statutes in the national security area had proven
especially controversial, affecting the alignment of legislative and executive authority in ar-
eas such as the War Powers Resolution, 50 USC § 1544(c) (1988). Turner, Constitutional
Framework at 857-58 (cited in note 274).
318 462 US at 959.
319 The Chadha decision itself concerned only the procedure of "one house veto," where
either house of Congress could invalidate a federal regulation or other executive action
through a simple resolution. Shortly thereafter, in United States Senate v FTC, 463 US
1216 (1983), the Court also struck down the "two house veto," which utilized a concurrent
resolution-requiring approval by both houses, but evading the constitutional step of pre-




century, even where foreign policy was concerned.2 0 Using lan-
guage that would be strikingly apt in responding to the current
lure of an informal process for amending treaties, the Supreme
Court resisted the "hydraulic pressure" of modern government,
where any branch might seek to exceed its constitutional confines
in the pursuit of laudable objectives.3 21 The Court expressly re-
fused to sanction a "political invention" on solely utilitarian
grounds if it was offensive to the Constitution.2 2
Behind this dialogue lie the hoary themes of the "delegation
doctrine," perhaps suddenly ready for reassertion in the current
context.3 23 The principle of non-delegation-prior to Chadha,
mostly honored in the breach-holds that where the Constitution
explicitly assigns a power or responsibility to a particular organ or
officer of government, that power may not ordinarily be delegated
elsewhere. In particular, the uniquely "legislative" powers of Con-
gress under the Constitution are inalienable.32 4 There are limits,
therefore, on the ability of Congress to authorize the President to
perform its legislative task of treaty approval.3 25
Over the years, the delegation doctrine has been progressively
attenuated in successive cases, yielding to the arguments asserting
"I0 Some earlier decisions by lower courts had suggested that the legislative veto pro-
cess might be more viable in the arena of foreign affairs. Consumer Energy Council of
America v FERC, 673 F2d 425, 459 (DC Cir 1982), aff'd, 463 US 1216 (1983); American
Federation of Gcvernment Employees v Pierce, 697 F2d 303, 308 (DC Cir 1982) (statement
of Judges Wald and Mikva supporting rehearing en banc) (arguing that each type of legisla-
tive veto statute should be scrutinized independently for constitutionality). The Supreme
Court, however, hinted at no such distinction. See Stephen Dycus, et al, National Security
Law 116-18 (Little, Brown, 1990); Koh, The National Security Constitution at 141-42 (cited
in note 301).
52, 462 US at 951.
322 Id at 945 (commenting on Justice White's dissent).
M, See generally Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts at 85-99 (cited in note 304); Dycus, et
al, National Security Law at 102-04 (cited in note 320); Peter M. Shane and Harold H.
Bruff, The Law of Presidential Power: Cases and Materials 64-88 (Carolina Academic,
1988); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83
Mich L Rev 1223, 1260-65 (1985).
"I Some congressional lawyers have even argued that since the Constitution expressly
delegates to Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, the President has no inherent
authority even to negotiate international tariff reduction agreements without a specific legis-
lative authorization. Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, International Law 174-75 (Lit-
tle, Brown, 1991). See also Restatement at § 303, Reporters' Note 10 (cited in note 47)
(Congress occasionally delegates authority for negotiating international agreements to offi-
cials other than the President, such as the Postmaster General).
3" Sotiros A. Barber, Delegation of Power, in Leonard Levy, Kenneth Karst, and Den-
nis Mahoney, eds, 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 552-53 (Free Press, 1986).
See also Chadha, 462 US at 952-55 (discussing the definition of "legislative tasks" that may
not be delegated).
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the necessity for adapting the Constitution to the demands of
modern life.326 The current articulation of the doctrine holds that a
congressional delegation to executive branch officials is permissible
where it is accompanied by adequate "legislative standards" or
"intelligible principles" guiding the recipient of the powers and
shaping the executive branch autonomy within congressionally-de-
fined goals or standards.2 7 Even this more modest restriction,
however, has not often been taken seriously by the courts; most
such statutes, even those embracing rather ill-defined and broad-
ranging delegations to administrative agencies, have been
upheld.32 8
Again, the distinction between "filling the gaps" and "chang-
ing the standards" may prove useful.32 9 Even the earliest delega-
tion doctrine cases acknowledged the propriety of permitting the
executive branch to flesh out legislative mandates, especially where
foreign policy was concerned.330 On the other hand, few, if any,
provide a warrant for overtly departing from the starting points
established by legislation.3 3 1
32, The Brig Aurora, 11 US (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (permissible for legislation to author-
ize the President to make certain factual findings as a predicate to the implementation of a
national policy); Wayman v Southard, 23 US (10 Wheat) 1, 43 (1825) (permitting delegation
of power to judges to develop necessary details in legislation); Chadha, 462 US at 985
(White dissenting); Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989) (upholding the broad,
vague delegation of power to the Sentencing Commission).
327 J.W. Hampton & Co. v United States, 276 US 394, 409 (1928); United States v
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific RR Co., 282 US 311, 324 (1931); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v Connally, 337 F Supp 737, 745-47 (D DC 1971).
38 See Lichter v United States, 334 US 742, 774-87 (1948); Federal Radio Commission
v Nelson Brothers Co., 289 US 266, 285 (1933); Yakus v United States, 321 US 414, 423-26
(1944); National Cable Television Ass'n v United States, 415 US 336, 342 (1974). Among
the few exceptions to the general judicial tolerance of vague delegations were the New Deal
cases of Panama Refining Company v Ryan, 293 US 388, 421 (1935) ("The Congress mani-
festly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions
with which it is thus vested [by Article I, § 1 of the Constitution]."); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 US 495, 529-42 (1935), invalidating portions of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act. See also Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474 (1959); Peter L.
Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legisla-
tive Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L J 789, 809-16 (discussing the delegation doctrine in the
context of legislative veto).
329 See Chadha, 462 US at 985 (White dissenting).
330 Youngstown, 343 US at 635-36 n 2 (Jackson concurring) (precedents elaborating ex-
ceptional presidential foreign affairs powers are mostly instances where Congress has added
its own delegation to the President's inherent authority); Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 US 103, 109-10 (1948).
"I Hampton, 276 US at 407-08; Cincinnati, Wilmington, & Zanesville Rail Road Co. v
Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St 77, 88-89 (1852); State v Chicago, Milwaukee,
& St. Paul Railway Co., 38 Minn 281, 298-300 (1888) (differentiating between a delegation
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The conclusion, then, is that the types of delegation contained
in recent arms control agreements would probably be upheld as
constitutional-but only barely. The fact that the arrangement is
efficient and practical-even cozy for the executive and the legisla-
ture-will not count for much if it exceeds constitutional parame-
ters. The Chadha case indicates that the Founders' format can be
stretched only so far, even where the extra-textual structure serves
legitimate social ends.32 There can be no constitutional principle
permitting usurpations of the separation of powers simply on the
assertion that the matters under consideration are merely "techni-
cal, administrative or procedural."333 There is still some life in the
delegation doctrine, and Congress may not cede too much of its
authority to the executive, especially where the anticipated provi-
sions change, rather than merely augment, the original standards
receiving advice and consent.
On the other hand, national security affairs are traditionally
treated differently from most domestic fare, and the courts are
particularly reluctant to upset an accommodation freely reached
by the two political branches when confronting foreign sover-
eigns. 4 Where the Senate has knowingly granted the modification
of legislative power-the ability to state what the substantive rules should be-and a more
permissible allocation of discretion to interpret or enforce legislatively-crafted standards).
Under another common variation, Congress through legislation establishes an intended
chain of actions, but also permits the President to waive implementation if specified criteria
(potential damage to national security) are met. See 50 App USCA § 2410b (1991) (delegat-
ing power to waive otherwise automatic sanctions); Stephen Labaton, Baker Defends
Waiver of Sanctions Against Israel on Missiles, NY Times A12 (Oct 28, 1991) (President
Bush imposed sanctions on South African firm, but not on Israeli firm, for violating interna-
tional agreement on non-proliferation of missile technology).
"' See Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis dissenting) (the pur-
pose of the separation of powers is "not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among the departments, to
save the people from autocracy").
133 Panama Refining, 293 US at 430 ("The question is not of the intrinsic importance
of the particular statute before us, but of the constitutional processes of legislation which
are an essential part of our system of government.").
3' The traditional balance of governmental powers is modified somewhat in foreign
relations cases; the usual constitutional clash between states and the federal government, or
between branches of the federal government, is evaluated differently when the United
States confronts other sovereigns. See Zemel v Rusk, 381 US 1, 17 (1965); Mathews, 64 Yale
L J at 350 (cited in note 278). The precise question of delegation of legislative powers, for
example, may be evaluated differently in international, as opposed to entirely domestic, con-
texts. Allan Ides, Congressional Authority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons, in
Peter Raven-Hansen, ed, First Use of Nuclear Weapons 69, 83-86 (Greenwood, 1987);
Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or Unconstitutional Veto?, in Raven-Han-
sen, ed, First Use of Nuclear Weapons 143, 147-55. But see Harold Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L J
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authority, and confined it in scope to certain types of detailed pro-
visions, courts are unlikely to invalidate the mechanism. 3 5 Delega-
tions of legislative power that might offend the Constitution in the
domestic arena are more tolerable in the foreign affairs milieu.338
In particular, the- practice of executive agreements being author-
ized by an antecedent treaty has been firmly established in Ameri-
can law, even if the extension from "gap filling" to "standards
changing" is novel. The route of informal treaty amendment,
therefore, if not the policy rationales behind it, can probably with-
stand constitutional challenge.
C. Policy Analysis
On the other hand, this new process should not be carried too
far. Even if the informal, non-legislative route to treaty modifica-
tion could withstand constitutional scrutiny, "non-amendments"
should not be used very often or very expansively. Three basic pol-
icy arguments support this conclusion.
First, the crucial distinction between "big" and "small"
changes in a treaty regime, while superficially plausible, is ephem-
eral in practice.33 7 Administration spokespersons have searched for
various verbal formulations to define the scope of the permissible
changes, assuring Congress, in somewhat inconsistent vocabulary,
that only "technical, administrative and procedural" provisions
would prove malleable under these powers. Yet the negotiators
themselves confirm that in arms control, as in other complex bar-
gaining processes, the fine points are typically crucial. Behind an
often facile agreement in principle, "the devil is in the details. ' '3 8s
Every lawyer knows that procedural questions can matter quite a
1255, 1284-85 (1988) (arguing that foreign affairs should not be treated so differently from
domestic matters).
335 Justiciability issues, including standing, ripeness and the political question doctrine,
have sometimes made it impossible to obtain judicial review of intensely political inter-
branch controversies. See Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 (1979); Chadha, 462 US at 940-
44. See also Koh, The National Security Constitution at 146-48 (cited in note 301) (courts
continue to defer to the executive in foreign policy matters).
33 Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 118-20 (cited in note 297); Fisher,
Constitutional Conflicts at 90-93 (cited in note 304). See also Note, 11 Hofstra L Rev at
815-18 (cited in note 280) (courts have upheld congressional-executive agreements against
challenges claiming excessive delegation).
337 Compare with Mathews, 64 Yale L J at 373 (cited in note 278) (in attempting to
distinguish international accords that could be presented as executive agreements from
those which ought to be treaties, it would be impossible to operate any system that focused
on whether the document in question was important or unimportant).
138 Editorial on the Opening of the BWC Conference, Berliner Zeitung (Sep 11, 1991)
(details of operations of the BWC have proven the most problematic); 44 Cong Q Almanac
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bit,33 9 and often the most critical, outcome-determinative variables
are concealed in seemingly innocuous provisions of an arcane or
boilerplate nature.3 40 The tumultuous ABM Treaty reinterpreta-
tion controversy, after all, arose essentially from varying views
about the meaning of three ordinary words in the treaty's defini-
tion-of-terms article.3 4
1
Admittedly, some provisions of a treaty will matter more than
others, and for any particular agreement, there may even be wide-
spread consensus about which points are truly the most central to
national security. But this notion of distinguishing between treaty
clauses based upon their relative importance produces only an im-
precise, shifting allocation. Language that seems trivial to some
may be problematic to others. Points that were overlooked once
may come back to haunt us later. Even the distinction between
"gap filling" and "standards changing" is unreliable, subject to dif-
ferences of view and amenable to evasion by clever wordsmiths.
Moreover, the provisions that are under scrutiny here are
hardly so trivial as to pass serenely among the flotsam of interna-
tional traffic. The 1989 INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement,
for example, was negotiated over a period of eighteen months, by a
delegation of a dozen or more United States officials. Its drafting
engaged the energies of diplomats, technical experts, and lawyers
and it was deemed important enough to sustain the attention of
senior leaders in the SVC, who thought that they were developing
a great many provisions that were necessary to sustain the treaty
as a practical, viable agreement. 42 If the MOA and its counter-
385 (1988) (American INF Treaty negotiator reported that ninety-seven points in the draft
treaty text were resolved in the last few days prior to the signing summit meeting).
"" Guaranty Trust Co. v York, 326 US 99, 107-08 (1945) (distinction between substan-
tive and procedural points is elusive in undertaking an Erie analysis; either type of issue
may be outcome-determinative).
'30 See John Edward Murray, Jr., On Contracts § 97 (Michie, 3d ed 1990); Donald M.
Zupanec, Doctrine of Unconscionability as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 86 ALR3d 862
(1978) (obscure, legalistic language in standard form contracts may unfairly take advantage
of customer, permitting assertion of unconscionability defense).
34 The treaty provides that
For purposes of this Treaty, an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of [ABM interceptor
missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars].
ABM Treaty, Art II (cited in note 1). The Reagan Administration's interpretation would
have read the words "currently consisting of" as if they had been "and which consist of,"
thereby transforming an illustrative definition into a limiting one. Chayes and Chayes, 99
Harv L Rev at 1958 (cited in note 2).
'" Look Interview (cited in note 145); 1990 ASIL Proceedings at 411 (cited in note 145)
(comments of George Look).
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parts are important enough to justify that kind of time and energy
by the foreign affairs and arms control establishments of the
United States and other governments, then surely they are impor-
tant enough to steal a bit of congressional attention, too.
Similarly, in the Open Skies Treaty, many of the issues that
are to be amenable to non-amendment modification-the assign-
ment of national quotas of overflights, the types of sensors to be
carried aboard the inspecting aircraft, and the dissemination of the
acquired data-were among the most controversial issues in the
treaty negotiations. They were the questions that the national dip-
lomats cared a great deal about and devoted considerable negotiat-
ing energies toward resolving; presumably they could be matters of
interest to legislators, too.3 43
Calling a provision technical, administrative or procedural,
therefore, is inadequate to withdraw it from effective legislative
oversight. That slope is too slippery. The treaty's delegation of
power from Congress to the President should be constrained more
tightly.
Second, the non-amendment proposition is unreliable because
it depends too heavily upon the promise (or the illusion) of execu-
tive-legislative harmony and cooperation. Administration spokes-
persons have affirmed that "we are going to have to work with the
Congress" and that this practical imperative of future collabora-
tion will drive the executive, as a prudential matter, to confine the
informal modification process to a narrow range of applications. 3 44
Again, there is some surface plausibility to this argument.
Both the executive and the legislature have a powerful, shared in-
terest in promoting national security and global stability, and we
would certainly hope for a high degree of consensus and coopera-
tion in the development and execution of the most sensitive as-
pects of United States foreign policy. But it is absurd to overlook
the fact that arms control has become immensely controversial in
the modern era, and it is foolhardy to construct a policy edifice
around the wishful hypothesis that the contending factions will
suddenly and permanently close ranks. 45
In fact, when we scrutinize even the first few illustrations of
executive agreement alterations available under these recent trea-
113 Open Skies Treaty, Art X, § 5 (cited in note 105); Amy E. Smithson, Open Skies
Ready for Takeoff, 48 Bull Atomic Scientists 17 (Jan/Feb 1992).
"' See text accompanying note 156 (quoting INF Treaty negotiator Glitman).
'45 Koh, The National Security Constitution at 40-45 (cited in note 301) (summarizing
legislative-executive battles over the treaty power).
1046 [59:981
Arms Control Agreements
ties, we must juxtapose (1) the administration's September 14,
1990 written assurances to the Senate, in the context of the 1990
TTBT/PNET protocols, that the Congress would be advised "prior
to such modifications or changes becoming binding on the Par-
ties";3 46 and (2) the administration's signature, for immediate entry
into force, of two amendments to the INF Treaty MOA on April 4,
1991, where the Senate was neither advised of the documents or
their contents nor offered opportunities for briefings, until after
the accords had already been effectuated.3 47 Certainly the contexts
of the two cases were different, and nothing crucial to arms control
policy has been lost in the shuffle, but the overall effect has un-
doubtedly been to frustrate the legitimate congressional interest in
hearing about, and participating in, nascent changes in disarma-
ment treaties before they become moot. Without accusing anyone
of bad faith or attempting to "slip something past" Congress, this
initial record amply demonstrates the Constitution's wisdom in in-
sisting upon regular, formal procedures rather than casual verbal
assurances.
In this context, the ABM Treaty reinterpretation controversy
is hardly an anomaly. It represents, rather, the predictable tension
between the executive branch, increasingly interested in asserting
the power to "bend" treaties,348 if not to break them, and the legis-
lature, which ought to be sensitive to the maintenance of its insti-
tutional perquisites. The Constitution's separation of powers, how-
ever, relies upon tensions between those two competing units, and
disarmament policy should not attempt, or hope, to squelch it. 349
Finally, the proposition favoring informal treaty modification
is unwise because in the long run, it is in all parties' interests to
confront arms control problems openly and to deal with potential
controversies, even minor ones, prospectively and directly. Dis-
armament continues to be an intensely "hot" political topic; every
aspect has the potential to become a cause celebre. Where nothing
can be truly finessed, it is better to deal with each issue overtly
and to accept the accompanying political lumps.
From the perspective of Congress, staying "in the loop" in for-
eign policy matters is essential. These non-amendment delegations
3,8 See text accompanying note 201.
347 See text accompanying notes 178-83.
", Koh, The National Security Constitution at 43 (cited in note 301).
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 90 (cited in note 297) ("In princi-
ple as in fact, recurrent competition for power has punctuated relations between President
and Congress, throwing up the dominant, least-tractable constitutional issues of American
foreign relations.").
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to the executive may seem to have some immediate value, in con-
serving precious congressional time for more prominent issues, but
no one can accurately predict which currently latent problems will
emerge as critical in the future. A foreign alliance may prove to be
"entangling" in ways we cannot easily foresee, and Congress must
stay current with-or ahead of-the evolving obligations. Arms
control in particular is so important to national life that the Con-
gress must drive itself to stay fully engaged, even in the
minutiae.3 50
From the perspective of the presidency, too, it is better to
have Congress informed and on board at the outset, even at the
price of occasional political perturbations. If an issue is truly in-
consequential, then the process of securing explicit, contemporane-
ous legislative endorsement should not prove an insurmountable
hurdle. Conversely, if, using the asserted non-amendment process,
the executive does succeed in slipping some potentially nettlesome
issue past Congress without the public attention that a more for-
mal process would entail, any executive celebrations might prove
to be short-lived. If controversy ever does erupt over that issue, the
executive will not get much mileage or satisfaction out of the argu-
ment that "the Congress had an implicit opportunity to object long
ago, but failed to do so."'' In short, if there is to be a political
maelstrom, or even a minor tempest, between Congress and the
President over an issue of arms control, the sound practice is to get
it over with sooner rather than later.
V. A RANGE OF SOLUTIONS
If the current non-amendment routine is therefore legally or
politically defective, what other avenues exist, or could be created,
for dealing with the newly salient problems of treaty complexity
and detail? As each new agreement makes arms control an ever
more exacting science, additional mechanisms for effective drafting
and implementation will have to evolve. There really is a problem
generated by overly precise disarmament accords, and some practi-
"I See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controver-
sies, 74 Va L Rev 1253, 1260 (1988) (one of the purposes of the separation of powers is to
ensure political accountability of Congress); Koh, 97 Yale L J at 1323-25 (cited in note 334)
(supporting adversarial review of executive initiatives).
See Comment, Illumination or Elimination of the 'Zone of Twilight'? Congressional
Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U Cin L Rev 95 (1982), and
Koh, The National Security Constitution at 142-43 (cited in note 301) (critiquing judicial
interpretations that construe congressional silence or inaction as constituting legislative ap-
proval of the executive's policies).
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cal accommodation of the competing interests must therefore be
developed.
The current administration has suggested that Congress and
the executive together face an unfortunate but unavoidable Hob-
son's choice: either the Senate, in approving a new treaty, cedes
this essentially unregulated power to the executive to bend the
treaty regime in all sorts of unpredictable ways, or else the Senate,
insisting on traditional maintenance of the formal treaty amend-
ment procedures, bogs the legislative process down in repeated,
picayune examination of multiple implementing accords of interest
to no one. If those were, in fact, the only alternatives-if Congress
had to elect between sacrifice of its constitutional role or burial in
petty details-the separation of powers would fare poorly indeed.
In reality, however, a far broader range of possible recourse is
available, and this section outlines some of the possibilities. No
one of these alternatives, by itself, will suffice for all circumstances,
and there may be some overlap and conflict among them in partic-
ular applications. Nonetheless, together they do provide a spec-
trum of possibilities, expanding the repertoire of replies to the cur-
rent challenges.
A. Reformatting Arms Control
One obvious potential reaction is to cut the center out of the
problem by dramatically changing the style of future disarmament
accords. Instead of trying to pack so much detail and precision into
each arms control treaty, the negotiators could construct simpler,
smaller agreements, affording more frequent occasions for congres-
sional participation in the arms control process. Arms control trea-
ties might again become shorter, more general statements of offi-
cial policy, with the minutiae deferred for resolution in diplomatic
practice. Congress would be kept closely informed through the
mechanism of additional advice and consent votes on subsequent
agreements, whether they be cast as "gap fillers" or changes in the
original substantive standards.
To some extent, the model for this approach could be the an-
nual congressional budgeting process. While the yearly wrangling
over authorizations and appropriations for a typical government
agency is hardly a paradigm of legislative efficiency or aplomb, 352 it
U2 See Lawrence J. Haas, New Rules of the Game, 22 Natl J 2793 (Nov 17, 1990) (an-
nual budgeting process is cumbersome and difficult; Congress sometimes attempts counter-
productive intrusions into the details of executive programs).
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does offer certain relevant advantages. Through this process, Con-
gress is able to insert itself into the details of agency spending,
assuring adequate oversight of administration projections. At the
same time, this process provides a degree of flexibility, so that the
bureaucracy can adapt to unforeseen contingencies during the fis-
cal year. As part of the subsequent year's budget cycle, Congress
reviews the intervening events, inserts into the law any corrections
it insists upon, and again approves the agency's future plans. The
close attention provided by this perpetual review ensures that
there will not be too great a disjunction between executive discre-
tion and congressional approval.5M The process also helps make
any particular year's budget cycle seem less cataclysmic. Everyone
knows that programs approved or rejected this year will again be
up for grabs next year, unlike the traditional "all or nothing" tenor
of current arms control treaties.3 54 Arms control, too, would benefit
if it were converted into more of a routine, ongoing process, less
dependent upon the occasional "spectacular event. '3 55
Packaging arms control into smaller, more frequent units has
other advantages as well. It would help the diplomats catch up
with the weapons designers: traditionally, arms control has too
often been overtaken by events in the laboratories and test ranges,
where the development of new generations of ordnance has out-
stripped the negotiations. More frequent, albeit partial, treaties
may help establish at least a limited control regime before a weap-
361 Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 75-80 (Princeton, 1975) (informal con-
trols on reprogramming authorized funds allow the executive branch some flexibility in
spending, while "keeping faith" with the Congress). One perceived danger of any closer con-
gressional participation in the arms control process would be the tendency for the legisla-
ture to attempt to "micromanage" foreign affairs, unduly constraining the executive branch.
Providing closer oversight, however, would not necessarily exacerbate any such tendencies;
Congress has been increasingly active in international matters in recent years, and many
observers have considered the participation beneficial. Thomas M. Franck, Human Rights
and Constitutional Wrongs: A Case Study of the Origins of Congressional Imperialism, in
Franck, ed, The Tethered Presidency 153 (NYU, 1981).
' The United States's decision about resuming the production of chemical weapons,
for example, was intensely controversial, and was fought out annually in the congressional
authorization and appropriations process throughout the 1980s. Blaine Harden, The Gas-
sing of Washington, The Washingtonian 125 (Feb 1984). However, when the Chemical
Weapons Convention (cited in note 35), is finalized, it will be the subject of a single congres-
sional approval process, initiating or rejecting a commitment that will be binding for years.
In general, it should be easier for Congress and the public to deal with, and to make wise
decisions about, documents containing shorter time frames and reviewable arrangements.
" Einhorn, 32 Survival 497 (cited in note 70); Ken Adelman, Breaking the Arms Con-
trol Mode, Wash Times F1 (Oct 1, 1991). See also Arthur Bestor, "Advice" from the Very
Beginning, "Consent" When the End is Achieved, 83 Am J Intl L 718, 725-27 (1989) (value
of close consultation between legislature and executive throughout the treaty process).
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ons program develops sufficient political momentum to escape
later, more comprehensive, efforts at regulation. 55 Concentrating
on smaller packages might also help arms control escape the ad-
verse effects of "linkage," the political process that has too often
distorted the disarmament process, converting each major treaty
into a virtual referendum on all other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet
relationship or internal Commonwealth or Russian affairs . 7
Some might argue that such partial measures would be inef-
fective, because they serve merely to divert incipient arms races
into other, less-regulated and possibly more dangerous avenues.
(The traditional metaphor likens the arms control process to
squeezing a balloon-if one portion of the subject is crimped, the
unrelieved pressures will simply be diverted, causing another re-
gion to swell up unnaturally.) However, this comprehensiveness ar-
gument has lost much of its appeal recently. Modern arms control
agreements, despite years of painstaking negotiations, cannot hope
to incorporate everything that might be relevant to even a single
issue. For example, limitations on medium-range nuclear systems
have important implications for tactical-range weapons, too, yet
they are not wedded into a single pact. 58 Likewise, agreement on
constraints on offensive arms would also reasonably affect negotia-
tions on defenses, yet they remain separate treaties. 59 The over-
laps between chemical and biological arms are similarly manifest,
yet they have long been the subjects of different negotiations.360 So
"' See Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, Hearings before Subcommit-
tee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of House Committee on International
Relations, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 60-62 (Apr 8 & 10, 1975) (statement of Representative Har-
rington); Nancy-Ann E. Min, Toward More Intelligent National Security Policy Making:
The Case for Reform of Arms Control Impact Statements, 54 Geo Wash L Rev 174, 239-40
(1986) (in creating a system of "arms control impact statements," Congress sought to obtain
better information about nascent weapons systems early in the development process, where
controls might be substantively more important and politically more feasible).
"b Einhorn, 32 Survival 497 (cited in note 70).
" The INF Treaty dealt with weapons of intermediate range (i.e., between 500 and
5,500 kilometers). INF Treaty, Art II, §§ 5, 6 (cited in note 28). Even though many people
were concerned about the omission of the shortest range nuclear arms, that problem was
deferred for subsequent consideration. Short-Range Nuclear Forces, Arms Control Rptr
408.A.1 (Jan 1991).
I" The SALT I talks addressed both offensive and defensive systems within a single
negotiation, although two separate agreements were produced. ACDA Treaty Book at 152-
53 (cited in note 5). Since that time, the SALT II and START negotiations have concerned
exclusively the offenses, uncoupled from further elaboration of defensive questions. Space
Weapons, Arms Control Rptr at 575.A.1 (cited in note 217).
"' The Geneva Protocol applied to both chemical and biological weapons, and most
subsequent efforts to enhance the international regulations also addressed both issues. Be-
ginning in the 1970s, however, the two topics have increasingly been differentiated, with the
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the notion of splitting arms control into more digestible packages
is not such a radical departure from existing practices.
Moreover, even the signing of a major arms control treaty is
hardly the end of the process these days. Experience with the INF,
START, CFE, and Open Skies treaties demonstrates that substan-
tial post-signature negotiations will continue, resolving important
issues prior to ratification." 1 Even after that, the various imple-
mentation bodies are set to work, elaborating the text and provid-
ing essential operational mechanics.3 6 2 We have thus backed into a
situation where arms control is already proceeding in "dribs and
drabs," and formal conclusion of any particular treaty is no longer
the watershed event it used to be. 3 Perhaps the time has now
come to take advantage of this inevitability by recharacterizing
what we expect a treaty to look like. 4
Some of these smaller, less climactic treaties may also be made
explicitly temporary in character.3" 5 The SALT I Interim Agree-
ment looks pretty good these days, as a supposedly partial and
limited five-year measure that was designed merely to "freeze" the
status quo, pending the conclusion of a more powerful, extended-
duration successor. The Interim Agreement, however, survived
BWC addressing only biological arms and the CWC targeting solely the chemicals. ACDA
Treaty Book at 129-32 (cited in note 5).
361 1990 ASIL Proceedings at 411 (cited in note 145) (comments of George Look). See
text accompanying note 154 (extensive U.S.-Soviet post-signature negotiations regarding
INF Treaty); text accompanying note 207 (comparable activity concerning the CFE Treaty);
and note 215 (same for Open Skies Treaty).
362 See text accompanying notes 134-42 (describing the mandates and functioning of
the several implementation bodies under modern arms control treaties).
363 Even before the CFE Treaty was ratified, the parties initiated talks on two follow-on
accords. The "CFE 1A" negotiations are aimed at reducing the number of each side's armed
personnel (complementing CFE I's attention to military equipment), and at instituting a
program of aerial inspection. The "CFE H" talks would work toward deeper reductions in
the permissible weapons levels. Further Conventional Reductions in Europe-CFE IA and
CFE II, Arms Control Rptr 410.A.1 (Jan 1991).
364 One important sub-issue in this respect concerns the structure of the various treaty
documents. To date, the standard practice has been for most or all of the technical annexes,
inspection protocols, and similar documents to be considered "integral" to the treaty. See
SALT II Treaty, Protocol, Art IV (cited in note 25); INF Treaty, Art I (cited in note 28).
This formality entrenches the appendices more deeply, making modification more difficult.
A document that was not "integral" in this way might permit easier revision.
"' The intended duration of an agreement has been a major factor in assessing whether
it should be submitted to the Congress as a treaty or an executive agreement. During SALT
I, partisans in both the Senate and House of Representatives focussed on the distinction
between the ABM Treaty (cited in note 1), which was of unlimited duration, and the SALT
I Interim Agreement (cited in note 14), which had a term of five years. Comment, 38 UCLA
L Rev at 1577-80 (cited in note 278). Conceivably, many of the non-amendments under
consideration in this Article might themselves be "temporary," subject to further modifica-
tion as experience develops.
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much longer, and had a more enduring stabilizing effect, than its
modest origins would have indicated.3 8
Would Congress tolerate this new approach? Would partisans
on both sides of the aisle back away from the preternatural inclina-
tion toward comprehensiveness and over-specificity in treaty lan-
guage? Would the congressional leadership be able to deliver on
any commitments about legislative self-restraint in the evaluation
of a more streamlined treaty? It is difficult to be optimistic about
any proposal calling for less stringency in treaty drafting, but per-
haps the political moment can be seized. No one can be happy with
the current logjam, and neither the executive nor the legislature
can be entirely comfortable with the excessive delegations that re-
cent treaties have adopted. Perhaps, therefore, a more modest ap-
proach may have some appeal, at least on some occasions.
Overall, the strategy here (and relevant to many of the Arti-
cle's subsequent suggestions, as well) is for the executive branch to
look upon Congress more as an ally, not as an antagonist, in the
creation of United States disarmament policy. Too much in the re-
cent exchanges has suggested that the executive branch views the
legislature as only an impediment, a problem to surmount or evade
in order to craft and implement national security programs.3 6 7
Some of this tension may be inevitable so long as opposite political
parties control the two branches, and some of it is inherent in the
separation of powers, but the hostility need not be exacerbated. As
discussed above,"6 8 the constitutional scheme enforces some auto-
matic antagonisms between the branches, but especially in foreign
affairs, the legislature and the executive can do more to close ranks
and collaborate. e Sharing the powers as the Constitution in-
tended,3 70 rather than asking either body to abdicate, will allow
366 ACDA Treaty Book at 167-68 (cited in note 5).
67 Louis Fisher, Understanding the Role of Congress in Foreign Policy, 11 Geo Mason
U L Rev 153, 160-61 (1988); Patsy T. Mink, Institutional Perspective: Misunderstandings,
Myths, and Misperceptions: How Congress and the State Department See Each Other, in
Franck, ed, The Tethered Presidency 64 (cited in note 353).
68 See text accompanying notes 303-14.
56 Bestor, Am J Intl L at 727 (cited in note 355).
370 See Koh, The National Security Constitution at 69 (cited in note 301) (Constitution
requires balanced institutional participation). But see Lawrence J. Block, Lee A. Casey, and
David B. Rivkin, The Senate's Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest
for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U Pa L Rev 1481, 1482-83 (1989) (arguing that the Consti-
tution does not provide for shared or blended powers; rather there are distinct legislative
and executive functions, with the overall treaty power being "mixed").
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proponents on both sides to participate in a more reasoned, more




B. Use of Congressional-Executive Agreements under Section 33
As noted above, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act spec-
ifies that "sole" executive agreements should not be utilized to
construct arms reduction arrangements.372 Although this legislation
is of questionable constitutionality,3 73 it does represent a powerful
statement of congressional concern and a desire to stay intimately
involved in shaping any American "entangling alliances" in the
disarmament field. Section 33 should therefore be read as a perma-
nent limitation on any delegation of powers contained in a treaty;
non-amendment changes cannot be used to create new substantive
obligations requiring the United States "to reduce or to limit" its
armaments. A court construing the two instruments (the earlier
statute and any subsequent treaty) will attempt to apply both,374
confining any authority over unilateral "viability and effective-
ness" changes to a relatively narrow, secondary scope. Especially
where the executive has pledged that the future modifications
would be technical, administrative, and procedural rather than
substantive, the option to rely upon an additional congressional
vote should be implemented in any close cases.
A standard mechanism in the future, therefore, could be the
negotiation of a basic "framework" treaty, to be effectuated pursu-
ant to a two-thirds vote of advice and consent in the Senate, fol-
lowed by a series of smaller implementing accords, each of which
would require a majority vote in each house. That sequence would
be especially appropriate where the new document purported to
vary, rather than merely to supplement, the original terms of the
framework. This procedure would dispense with the formal route
See Ronald A. Lehmann, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A Congressional Fast
Track for Arms Control Treaties, 98 Yale L J 885, 887 (1989) (arguing that excessive ten-
sions between Congress and the President undercut the United States' ability to function
effectively in dealings with other states).
172 See text accompanying notes 65-67.
173 Arguably, the legislation could be construed as not intending to constrain those ex-
ecutive agreements which derive from the President's inherent constitutional powers; these
could therefore still be effectuated as sole executive agreements. Restatement at §303, Re-
porters' Note 7 (cited in note 47).
374 Id at § 114; United States v The Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F Supp
1456 (S D NY 1988).
- -r-r~t. -r~rrZ .. - . . ,
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of treaty amendment, but would still keep Congress as an active
participant.87
The reliance on a majority vote in each house would have salu-
tary effects for arms control. 8 7 Dodging the requirement for re-
peated two-thirds votes in the upper chamber is itself an impor-
tant efficiency-promoting ploy, and it eases somewhat the political
concern about "going to the well too often. '3 77 While there are cer-
tainly burdens associated with keeping both houses, rather than
simply the Senate, informed about arms control details-more
briefings, more hearings, more votes to shepherd-it could be man-
aged and it would likely prove a smaller political burden than the
formal amendment route.78
There is, to be sure, a meaningful concern about the delays
and disruptions inherent in any legislative process. The task of se-
curing congressional approval can take months-even when the
true military significance of a treaty is marginal-postponing entry
into force. Sometimes the delay, and the attendant possibility that
the Congress might effectively insist on changes, can be trouble-
some.s3 7  Yet this problem may be overstated, as the INF Treaty
example illustrates. How big a cost was the additional six months
attributed to the legislative process in that instance, when the
treaty negotiations themselves had consumed seven years? More-
'3" See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 134 (cited in note 297) (Senate
consented to a treaty establishing a generally applicable arbitration procedure, but attached
a condition specifying that a separate Senate consent was necessary prior to the submission
of any particular case in which those procedures would be invoked).
171 See Comment, Approval of SALT Agreements by Joint Resolution of Congress, 21
Harv Intl L J 421 (1980) (arguing that future strategic arms limitation accords should be
cast as executive agreements approved by joint resolution of Congress, rather than as
treaties).
M" Scholars have critiqued the constitutional requirement for a Senate super-majority
in approving treaties, and have called for greater reliance upon executive agreements in
which each house would consider the treaty by simple majority vote. Covey T. Oliver, Get-
ting the Senators to Accept the Reference of Treaties to Both Houses for Approval by
Simple Majority, 74 Am J Intl L 142 (1980); Phillip R. Trimble, Foreign Affairs Law and
Democracy, 89 Mich L Rev 1371 (1991).
37 A plan calling for increased reliance upon executive agreements would also have to
confront severe intra-Congress political squabbling. The Senate has traditionally insisted
that important arms control agreements be submitted in treaty form, underscoring the up-
per chamber's special constitutional role. The House, meanwhile, has favored executive
agreements, where both chambers participate. In the case of the SALT II Treaty, disagree-
ment over this procedural question threatened to derail substantive consideration of the
merits of the document. Comment, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1582-85 (cited in note 278). See also
Rovine, 52 Ind L J at 420-21 (cited in note 294); Note, 11 Hofstra L Rev at 836-37 (cited in
note 280).
'"" Koh, the National Security Constitution at 121-22 (cited in note 301) (occasional
need for President to act precipitously in international affairs).
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over, when the preparation of the subsequent MOA unexpectedly
required some eighteen months after the treatyentered into force,
would it have been unacceptable to defer the process a bit further
to accommodate legislative voting? 8s0 When the executive branch
portion of the arms control process stretches out so far, it is un-
seemly to blame Congress for intolerable delays or to cite the ur-
gency of the documents as a rationale for excluding legislative
oversight altogether.
C. Use Non-binding "Political Commitments"
There is a natural skepticism about arms control negotiations
that do not result in legally-enforceable documents, so-called non-
binding "political commitments." As noted, their reliability and
even their exact contents may be questioned, as well as their law-
fulness under Section 33.as1 Nonetheless, they do have a role to
play in national security deliberations, and arms control history
has demonstrated their utility.38 2
For example, prior to signature, many arms control accords
have benefitted from a "negotiators' pause" in the pace of weapons
programs, as non-binding statements of policy allowed the bargain-
ing process to take place in an environment free from additional
pressures. The Limited Test Ban Treaty provides a conspicuous
example, as that long-sought agreement finally arose only after a
series of unilateral and parallel moratoria on nuclear explosions. 383
Similarly, in the interval between signing and ratifying an arms
181 Congressional delays would have been particularly manageable in the INF Treaty
context, since the key implementing measures were already being applied, on an interim
basis, during the pendency of the MOA negotiations. See note 166. The parties could easily
have agreed to prolong their informal adherence to those measures still further, not losing
any verification rights, while Congress evaluated the signed MOA before allowing it to enter
into force formally.
381 See text accompanying notes 120-32. A period of state transition or trauma, such as
the 1991 coup attempt in the U.S.S.R. or the subsequent secession of republics, is perhaps
the time when "politically binding" agreements are least reliable, and when insistence on
the formalities of legally binding instruments is most important.
382 See Squassoni, Workshop Report: The Future of Arms Control at 15-16 (cited in
note 71) (informal, unilateral arms control may play larger role than treaties in the future);
Glennon, 71 Am J Intl L at 268-72 (cited in note 122) (distinguishing international agree-
ments from non-binding statements of intention as tools of arms control); Adelman, Wash
Times F1 (cited in note 355) (noting that in the 1930s, Winston Churchill advocated infor-
mal non-binding approach, rather than formal negotiations, for pursuing disarmament).
388 The United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom each declared various test-
ing moratoria during 1958-61, prior to the conclusion of the binding treaty. ACDA Treaty
Book at 40-41 (cited in note 5). The Biological Weapons Convention, too, was preceded by
unilateral United States declarations renouncing biological weapons and dismantling the
American inventory. Id at 130-31.
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treaty, mutual (but not legally binding) pledges of a "standstill" in
the relevant weapons programs may be important, as the SALT I
example suggests. 84 Even an administration opposed to a particu-
lar arms control agreement that it has inherited from its predeces-
sor may find advantage in at least temporarily sustaining it,
through revocable verbal undertakings, pending the development
of a more satisfactory substitute.8 5 Most recently, the exchange of
parallel unilateral statements of national intentions has proven an
effective means for the United States and the Soviet Union to
lurch forward with arms control proposals, unencumbered by the
niceties and the delays of the negotiations process.38 6
For all the attendant dangers of vagueness and revocability,
exploitation of non-binding statements such as these can afford the
parties an opportunity to pursue common goals expeditiously, even
where they cannot yet agree on the exact wording of the prohibi-
tions or the precise content of the verification arrangements. They
can escape the interstices of the lawyering process, and cut imme-
diately to the most critical elements, leaving the detail work for
later. Sometimes, these political statements may prove ephemeral,
as the apparent consensus dissolves in dissonance over the de-
tails.3 87 But more often they will permit the parties to align their
"' The United States and the Soviet Union both stated that they would observe the
obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty from the date of signa-
ture, not delaying all application until formal entry into force. ABM Treaty, Common Un-
derstanding E (cited in note 1); SALT I, Interim Agreement, Common Understanding C
(cited in note 14).
'l ACDA Treaty Book at 263 (cited in note 5) (Reagan Administration honored SALT
Agreements).
'" Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. to Give Up Short-Range Nuclear Arms: Bush Seeks Soviet
Cuts and Further Talks, NY Times 1 (Sep 28, 1991). Another related strategy is illustrated
by the September 23, 1989 United States-Soviet Union talks on chemical weapons. During
their meetings at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and For-
eign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed a memorandum of understanding that incorpo-
rated agreement on the conduct of certain cooperative verification experiments and the ex-
change of sensitive data. This document was effective upon signature. It escaped the
operation of § 33 because it was merely a prelude to a chemical weapons dismantling agree-
ment; it did not itself contain any substantive reductions or limitations. Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
Government of the United States of America, Agreement Regarding a Bilateral Verification
Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Sep 23, 1989,
28 ILM 1438-43.
"I See Robert A. Divine, Early Record on Test Moratoriums, 42 Bull Atomic Scientists
24 (May 1986) (non-binding statements by Eisenhower and Khrushchev during the 1950s
contributed to the negotiation of the LTBT, but were themselves a source of uncertainty
and controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union).
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policies satisfactorily over a sustained period of time,8 8 even where
the pettifogging details would escape their management. Moreover,
the process does preserve a type of legislative check: if Congress
disapproves of a particular political statement, or wishes to chal-
lenge the regime created thereby, it could do so directly through
ordinary legislation, overriding the articulated policy. 89
The strategy of "provisional application" of the terms of a new
agreement or a subsequent non-amendment could also routinely
play a role here. That is, negotiators could agree to implement at
least some of the key clauses of an agreement, even prior to formal
entry into force. This process still accords the legislature a full op-
portunity to vote on the document (and may, in fact, further edu-
cate the voters, by providing at least some initial operating experi-
ence with the functioning of the accord). At the same time, it
obviates the worst dangers of delay by providing that the agree-
ment or the modification may be implemented swiftly.
D. Use the "Fast Track" Process
Another intriguing model of expedited treaty implementation
has been provided by certain recent agreements in the field of in-
ternational commerce and trade. There, Congress upon occasion
has accorded the executive extraordinary authority to rely upon a
"fast track" approval procedure. Under this process, each house
commits itself to consider the negotiated agreement on a very
quick timetable, with any potential amendments being ruled out of
order, and with a definitive "up or down" vote on the negotiated
text.3
90
Fast track authority has been extended in the case of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) "Uruguay round" of
negotiations, 91 and for the documents pursuing a "North Ameri-
388 As the TTBT and PNET examples suggest, informal statements of intention to
abide by a signed treaty while its ratification is pending can prove quite durable. American
and Soviet political statements sustained those treaties for sixteen and fourteen years, re-
spectively, prior to their entry into force. See text accompanying notes 37-39.
389 Ordinary legislation supersedes any inconsistent international agreement as a matter
of United States law, provided that the Congress is clear about its intention to create such a
conflict. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F Supp at 1464; Restatement at § 115
(cited in note 47).
'80 See Trade Act of 1974, 19 USC §§ 2191-93 (1982); Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19
USC § 2112(b)(4) (Supp III 1985); 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 19 USC §
2903 (1988). See also War Powers Resolution, 50 USC § 1545 (1992) (establishing priority
procedures for consideration of joint resolution regarding use of force).
391 These negotiations would comprehensively address tariffs and other barriers to
trade around the world on a wide range of commercial products and services. Over 100 coun-
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can free trade zone" incorporating the United States, Canada, and
Mexico,392 as well as in a few other instances 93 Proponents have
asserted that this unusual procedure is warranted in the trade area
due to the complexity of the subject matter, the urgency of secur-
ing quick legislative approval, and, especially, the danger that con-
gressional meddling would upset the delicately-balanced result of a
complex, multi-party bargaining process that incorporated so many
trade-offs and asymmetrical exchanges that a legislature's attempts
to fiddle with any details could cause the entire package to
unravel.3 94
These seem like compelling rationales, and Congress has
grudgingly accommodated them. 95 Many of the same arguments
apply, sometimes with even heightened vigor, in the case of arms
control. The complexity of the subject has readily been admitted,
as well as its urgency. Multilateral arms control, moreover, is at
least as delicate as multilateral trade regulation-in each case
there could be an unacceptable danger of any one country making
post-signature attempts (inspired by its national legislature or
elsewhere) to re-balance the negotiated terms. If one state's legisla-
ture attempts to grab more than its diplomats could wrangle for it,
then others will surely be inspired to duplicate the effort, causing
the text, and the entire project, to fall. There is, in sum, no logical
argument that the fast track authority must be confined to the
trade sector.
The fast track procedure in any context is not free from cost
or controversy. 96 It shortens the time available to the congres-
sional committees and it restricts the range of vehicles available
for Congress to effectuate any policies more subtle than a simple
tries have participated since 1986. International Trade Agreements: Past Track Procedures
(Mar 1, 1991 report to Congress, submitted by President Bush), reprinted in 1 For Pol Bull
59-60 (May/Jun 1991).
"' The free trade agreement would integrate the economies of the three countries to a
much greater degree, encompassing approximately 360 million people and almost $6 trillion
in annual output. Id at 60.
ss Fast track procedures were used with success in the Tokyo GATT round in 1979,
the 1985 free trade agreement with Israel, and the 1988 free trade agreement with Canada.
Id at 59.
31, Id; Jeffrey J. Schott, North American Free Trade and US Economic Interests,
Statement before Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 12 (Mar 22, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
3" See Koh, The National Security Constitution at 176-78 (cited in note 301).
"' David S. Cloud, Bush's 'Action Plan' May Be Key To Approval of Fast Track, Cong
Q 1120 (May 4, 1991) (intense political debate surrounded the proposals to extend fast track
authority).
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"yea"2 or "nay. '11 7 But it does satisfy the demands of bicameralism
and presentment, 9 8 preserving a sufficient role for the legislature
in the treaty-making process,39 9 and it could well be adapted to the
demands of arms control.
In the arms control context, fast track authority could be
tightly defined. 00 Most appropriately, it would apply not to the
original comprehensive treaty, as in the GATT example, but to the
detailed subsequent measures of implementation. The Congress
could commit itself, by statute or by internal rules within each
chamber, to review these later gap-filling or standards-changing
modifications on an expedited, businesslike calendar, declining to
tinker in the interstices that the executive had negotiated.
In contrast to the most recent accords, therefore, future arms
control treaties could in this vein specify that any subsequent
changes, including merely technical "viability and effectiveness"
details, would be deemed to be amendments to the treaty, requir-
ing legislative approval prior to entry into force. At the same time,
however, the original Senate resolution of ratification of the treaty
would also contain a congressional commitment to review any such
implementing details according to a suitable timetable negotiated
between the executive and the legislature. This process could in-
volve both houses, or just the Senate, but in either event it would
be crafted to ensure that the implementing agreements received
the most expeditious treatment.40 ' The other parties to the treaty,
however, would not be involved in the American decisionmaking
I" Schott, North American Free Trade at 13-14 (cited in note 394) (Congress still re-
tains the right to participate fully in evaluating the negotiated treaty).
398 Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Georgetown L J 785, 793-94
(1984) (arguing for a fast track procedure to replace the legislative veto).
3" International Trade Agreements at 59 (cited in note 391) (stressing the extensive
consultations between executive and legislature under fast track procedures, with significant
advance notifications and hearings).
40 See Lehmann, 98 Yale L J at 896-903 (cited in note 371) (proposing an arms control
fast track procedure through which the Congress guarantees expeditious consideration of an
agreement in exchange for heightened executive branch consultation during the negotiation
process).
401 Agreement on fast track procedures is not irrevocable. In the trade context, the Sen-
ate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee typically retain the
power to vote at a critical juncture in the process to deny expedited treatment for a pending
document. International Trade Agreements at 59 (cited in note 391). Of course, the possi-
bility that the Congress might renege on the agreed timetable would make the entire bar-
gain less attractive to the executive.
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process; each country would establish its own internal ratification
procedures. 40 2
E. Use a Modified Legislative Veto Process
The legislative veto has survived its apparent death knell in
the Chadha decision.403 In fact, additional statutes, some of them
in the area of foreign policy, have continued to incorporate new
provisions of that sort in recent years.404 Even more common have
been "report and wait" provisions, requiring the executive branch
to notify Congress prior to the effectuation of some new regulation
or other proposed standard. The sequence then affords the legisla-
ture a period of time to consider ordinary legislation that could
overturn the pending provision.40 5 Arms control might profitably
accommodate similar processes, even if the Supreme Court contin-
ues to disapprove the general concept of the legislative veto in
other contexts.406
A treaty might provide, for example, that selected terms could
be varied by agreement among the parties, and that each party
could determine unilaterally what domestic measures were re-
quired to bring that change into force for itself. In the United
States, legislation could create a presumption that any such imple-
menting technical, administrative or procedural accord was to be
automatically effective unless either house by majority vote passed
a resolution of disapproval within a fixed time limit.40 7 If either
402 See text accompanying note 156 (each country determines for itself what domestic
procedures may be necessary to approve an agreement it has signed).
403 See text accompanying notes 315-22; William N. Eskridge and John Ferejohn, The
Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 Georgetown L J 523 (1992) (supporting the legislative veto
under a separation of powers analysis).
404 Louis Fisher, Legislative Vetoes Enacted After Chadha, Govt Div Rep No 87-389
GOV (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Apr 28, 1987). But see Metro-
politan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 111
S Ct 2298 (1991) (invalidating a novel type of legislative veto statute).
405 Informal consultation procedures have also accomplished similar goals. The legisla-
ture might require, as part of the political tradeoff involved in delegating power to the exec-
utive, that pending matters be submitted to the Congress in some fashion prior to effectua-
tion. Consultation with the relevant committee or with selected leaders could then occur.
Typically, if the legislators strongly object to the administration's proposal, it is modified or
withdrawn. Dalton Interview (cited in note 246); Fisher, Presidential Spending Power at 73-
74 (cited in note 353).
406 See Strauss, 1983 Duke L J at 805-06 (cited in note 328) (judiciary should distin-
guish use of legislative veto in foreign affairs context from other applications).
407 See Johnson, The Making of International Agreements at 138-39 (cited in note 64)
(describing similar proposals in the 1970s for automatic legislative veto review of executive
agreements). The Vienna Convention includes a similar type of "negative option" in the
context of nations' responses to a proffered reservation to a treaty. Silence or inaction for
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house disapproved, the President would be required to notify the
other countries that the United States would not become a party
to the amendment.
As a variant, focusing on the procedural rather than the sub-
stantive standards, the underlying legislation could simply require
the President, in the face of a committee or one-house disapproval,
to submit the negotiated text to the legislature as a treaty or exec-
utive agreement, rather than effectuating it unilaterally. 08 In this
model, the one-house vote is not truly a veto, since the President
might still prevail in the subsequent voting on the approval of the
modification. The process does, however, preserve the option for
Congress to participate in a meaningful way in the assessment of
the text's significance and the determination of the appropriate
legislative vehicle for evaluating it.
As with the traditional legislative veto, this system provides
both branches with some advantages. The executive can count on
inertia as well as political expediency to defeat most resolutions of
disapproval. Unlike in the process of securing advice and consent,
the burden of coming forward here is with those who would defeat
the President's proposal. Congress can count on participating in
the process of shaping and revising international agreements, and
whenever a resolution of disapproval is introduced, the prospect of
a record vote will force attention. All partisans could benefit from
a statutory timetable that would ensure relatively prompt votes,
rather than open-ended delay. This version of the legislative veto
does not tread too far on the President's conduct of foreign policy,
for it cannot force the executive to initiate any practices or terms.
It is merely a brake on the executive departing too quickly from
the status quo that was previously approved by the advice and
consent process.
F. Use a Modified Consultation Process
A final possibility is to preserve the concept of the non-
amendment procedure, but to surround it with sufficient safe-
guards so that it does not escape meaningful congressional over-
one year is ordinarily deemed to constitute "acceptance" of the reservation, with significant
legal consequences. Vienna Convention, Art 20, 5 (cited in note 128). Congress typically
does not participate in the executive branch's decision whether to accept or object to other
countries' reservations.
48 Alternatively, a political arrangement could be reached that dispenses altogether
with formal votes of disapproval. The administration could consult with party leaders in the
Congress and commit itself to honoring their preferences about the form of the agreement.
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sight. This compromise would permit the executive to conclude
and implement necessary changes with dispatch, but still retain
loyalty to the separation of powers.
The first such safeguards measure would be a reporting re-
quirement, similar to that incorporated in the Derwinski amend-
ment. 09 Here, the executive would be required to provide informa-
tion-possibly in the form of annual reports-regarding the
proceedings inside the various treaty implementation bodies, or in
other diplomatic contacts, that might ultimately produce docu-
ments related to treaty modifications. The concept is to keep the
Congress currently informed as the new documents evolve, rather
than (as is now the practice) deferring any consultation and brief-
ings until the non-amendment is drafted, signed, and effectuated.
Congress is to provide its advice, as well as its consent. That re-
quires the submission of timely information, drawing the legisla-
ture into the decisions about what modifications to develop, and
about what form of document should be relied upon to implement
them. 10
A second requirement is that the treaty should limit with
greater precision the types of changes that may be effectuated
through the informal process.411 The document (or its surrounding
context)412 should indicate what particular terms are to be up for
grabs in this way, what types of changes are contemplated, and
what sorts of circumstances or experiences might justify the modi-
fications.413 Ideally, the treaty would indicate, perhaps paragraph
by paragraph, whether the provisions could be altered without for-
meal amendment, whether the contemplated changes would be "gap
fillers" or "standards changes," and what basis the parties would
have for departing from the original agreement. For example, a
treaty might provide that after experience with the first several on-
409 See text accompanying notes 68-69.
410 But see Cooper, et al, U Miami L Rev at 195-96 (cited in note 312) (reporting re-
quirements are sometimes unwise; secrecy in presidential actions is sometimes critical).
411 John B. Rehm, Making Foreign Policy Through International Agreement, in Fran-
cis O. Wilcox and Richard A. Frank, eds, The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign
Policy 134 (Praeger, 1976) (urging Congress to use greater care in delegating foreign affairs
powers to the President, and to grant executive discretion more narrowly).
412 The Vienna Convention establishes that in interpreting an international agreement,
parties shall also consider its "context," including any contemporaneous instruments exe- -
cuted by the parties in association with the underlying treaty. Vienna Convention, Art 31,
§ 2 (cited in note 128).
" Note, 11 Hofstra L Rev at 811-15 (cited in note 280) (controversies have arisen re-
garding the extent to which a prior treaty did contemplate or authorize a particular type of
subsequent executive agreement).
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site inspections, the parties could agree to supplement the types of
measuring equipment that the inspectors could bring, or the tim-
ing of notifications about their intended itinerary. But the parties
could not use the informal modification route if they simply
changed their minds about political calculations, such as the fre-
quency of inspection or the degree of constraint on the inspectors'
ability to go wherever their suspicions might lead them. 14
From this perspective, existing treaties illustrate both ade-
quate precision and unacceptable over-generality in defining the
scope of the changes. The INF Treaty, for example, permits parties
to supplement the Elimination Protocol where they discover addi-
tional or better methods to destroy or dismantle excess arms;415
although this provision does not specify the reasons why a particu-
lar change might have to be validated, it does somewhat confine
the scope of the non-amendment. Similarly, the 1990 TTBT Proto-
col provides a good model in specifying that changes may be made
in the calendar of notifications and the provisions for local logisti-
cal support for inspectors.41e Again, the text could be more precise
in suggesting the types of changes that would be warranted, but
the existing language is not too far off the mark.
On the other hand, both of those treaties also incorporate
other, more generic, language that would permit too much freedom
to implement informal changes. The "viability and effectiveness"
formula of the INF Treaty 17 and the comparably obscure language
of the TTBT Protocol418 are simply too broad and permissive.
They potentially allow the negotiators to change the original terms
in all sorts of uncontemplated ways. Even worse is the language of
the CFE Treaty, which also uses the "viability and effectiveness"
formula, but this time the phrase is completely unconstrained by
reference to any particular types of provisions or standards for
modification. 4 " The CFE Treaty is thus too much of an open invi-
tation. The START agreement is similarly profligate and standar-
'" In July 1991, the Bush Administration altered the United States' posture in the
Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations, moving away from insistence upon unfettered
on-site inspection and toward support of a more constrained verification system. Lionel Bar-
ber, Chemical Arms Ban Proposals Diluted, Fin Times 1 (Jul 24, 1991). As a modification in
negotiating positions, this change was important enough; as a modification in a signed
treaty, it would have required a new law-making process.
"' INF Treaty, Elimination Protocol, Art II, § 10 (cited in note 28).
416 1990 TTBT Protocol, § XI, TV 2, 3 (cited in note 37).
4, INF Treaty, Inspections Protocol, Art XI, § 4 (cited in note 28); Id, Elimination
Protocol, Art V, § 2(e).
418 1990 TTBT Protocol, § XI, 4 (cited in note 37).
419 CFE Treaty, Art XVI, § 5 (cited in note 32).
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dless in the use of the modifications power,4 0 and the Open Skies
Treaty specifically provides that several of the most controversial
and sensitive portions of the treaty will be available for thorough
revision via informal means.42 1
A third type of safeguard would be to specify some of the im-
portant operational details about the consultation process.4 2 The
legislative history of the treaty should define with precision whom
the executive will consult, at what stages in the modification pro-
cess, and at what level of seniority and formality.423 Probably the
right groups to receive this type of briefing would be the six rele-
vant congressional committees, although other members or
caucuses, such as the Congressional Arms Control Observer
Group, 24 should be offered the opportunity to participate, too.
Ideally, there would also be an understanding about what would
happen in the event of disagreement.425 If the congressional staffs
or members did not concur with the executive (or with each other)
about the content or process of a particular modification, how
would the controversy be resolved?42
420 See text accompanying note 211.
42 Open Skies Treaty, Art X, § 5 (cited in note 105).
422 See Koh, The National Security Constitution at 126-28 (cited in note 301) (critiqu-
ing the poor drafting of the War Powers Resolution that permitted evasion of the consulta-
tion provisions of earlier legislation).
423 See Jeremy J. Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, 56 For Pol 94 (Fall 1984)
(arguing that the President is required to consult congressional leaders prior to initiating
use of nuclear weapons). See also International Agreements Consultation Resolution, S Rep
No 95-1171 (cited in note 288) (expressing legislative interest in close consultation regarding
the decision to present an international agreement in the form of a treaty or executive
agreement).
424 The Observer Group lacks the formal status and the staff of a regular committee, so
it should not play the primary role in the consultation process; however, its members have
demonstrated a special interest in national security issues and have developed an expertise
that could be helpful in the process of formulating policy. See Koh, The National Security
Constitution at 167-69 (cited in note 301) (proposing establishment of a small "Core Con-
sultative Group" of legislators whom the President could consult quickly and secretly on
security matters).
425 In any real consultation mechanism, there is always the possibility that the legisla-
tors, after receiving the executive's presentations, will disagree with the proposed course of
action-ascertaining their potentially discrepant views is, after all, a major purpose of the
exercise. However, the "advice" portion of the constitutional requirement for senatorial "ad-
vice and consent" has long been underutilized, following President George Washington's
first unsatisfactory attempts to consult the Senate in a meaningful fashion about a pending
treaty. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 130-32 (cited in note 297).
42' See Carrol J. Doherty, Sanctions Compromise Reached on Chemical Weapons
Makers, 49 Cong Q Weekly Rep 2805 (Sep 28, 1991) (in building a consultation mechanism
into compromise legislation imposing sanctions on companies and countries who facilitate
the proliferation of chemical weapons, Congress was aware that "the president customarily
refrains from taking actions that are strongly opposed by the committee leaders").,
19921 1065
The University of Chicago Law Review
In addition, the relevant information-or at least the portions
that would not unduly frustrate ongoing negotiations inside the
treaty implementation bodies-should be made available to the
public. 427 Appropriate documents should be disseminated and a
public record should be created, through formal hearings, rather
than closed briefings, wherever possible.
Finally, it is important to stress that for the consultation pro-
cess to work, the Congress will have to be more attentive to the
non-amendment process than it has so far been.428 On several occa-
sions, the executive branch has concluded a modification agree-
ment, dispatched it to Capitol Hill with a cover note offering brief-
ings, and then waited patiently while the telephone did not ring.
Members and their staffs will have to demonstrate greater fastidi-
ousness, making it a point to monitor the ongoing negotiations and
to scrutinize the finished products, even when no incendiary crisis
is at hand. The right to conduct a more thorough legislative over-
sight becomes meaningless if Congress does not exercise it
regularly.429
CONCLUSION
It is impossible not to be sympathetic to the plight of modern
arms control negotiators. The treaty-making process is subject to
unprecedented stresses these days, straining the creativity and pa-
tience of those who believe, correctly, that negotiated disarmament
accords can play a vital role in promoting national security and
global stability. Prolix treaty prose is both a symptom and a cause
of national security problems, reflecting the country's now tradi-
tional over-emphasis on the interstices of verification and enshrin-
427 But see Note, Constitutional Limits on the President's Power to Interpret Treaties,
78 Georgetown L J 1983, 2000 (1990) (danger in public release of documents intended as
confidential reports from negotiators to senior executive branch officials).
428 See Rovine, 52 Ind L J at 409 (cited in note 294) (in the vast majority of cases,
Congress does not wish to be consulted about an international agreement, because only a
few treaties each year are important enough to spark interest); Note, 78 Georgetown L J at
2024 n 154 (cited in note 427) (some of the Senators stated their belief that the Senate did
an exceptionally thorough, conscientious job in evaluating the INF Treaty).
42I Rehm, Making Foreign Policy at 134-35 (cited in note 411) (congressional role in
foreign affairs may be best promoted through more frequent and aggressive use of the legis-
lature's current powers); Koh, The National Security Constitution at 123 (cited in note
301) (congressional acquiescence helps explain the loss of legislative powers and the ascen-
sion of the presidency); Krent, 74 Va L Rev at 1260 (cited in note 350) (separation of powers
was designed, in part, to promote accountability of Congress).
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ing those details in a legal text that is too difficult to update and
improve.43 0
Technology lurches ahead-not only providing novel, minia-
turized weapons of unprecedented destructive power, but also
opening new vistas for effective treaty verification. How can the
arms control community possibly predict the next twist of military
inventiveness? Similarly, we have surely not seen the last of the
stunning global political tremors, as revolutionary changes unfold
in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, evok-
ing previously impossible international accommodations. How can
the negotiators craft agreements that could accommodate that un-
known future political milieu? At the same time, treaty drafters
are still impelled to fashion agreements of surpassing detail, inject-
ing a false precision into the obese text, knowing that latent errors
and omissions are inevitable.
In all of this, the domestic political process for creating and
altering the binding arms reduction accords remains exceptionally
turgid. The eighteenth-century institutions, prompted by a world
in which communications were languid and world events proceeded
at a leisurely pace, may seem ill-suited for the environment of in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles and satellite telefax. Clearly, we
have no need for additional artificial barriers in the domestic pro-
cess for effectuating-and modifying-international agreements.
Whether cast as treaty or executive agreement, the documents
should be evaluated and approved or rejected promptly, without
straightjacketing the legislature or the executive in unnecessary at-
tention to minor details. The changes that have been adopted to
date under the non-amendment procedure have uniformly been
appropriate: they have been important enough to be worth pursu-
ing, but small enough that Congress would not be agitated. But the
propriety of the procedure remains questionable.
At the same time, we should also be more attentive to the do-
mestic ratification procedures in other countries. When the major
arms control developments were merely a bilateral phenome-
non-and when Stalinism meant that the internal Soviet legisla-
tive procedures were merely a rubber stamp for the leadership's
decisions-it was plausible for the United States Senate to ponder
the negotiated documents in isolation. The world would wait, al-
4S0 See Rostow, 83 Am J Intl L at 748-49 (cited in note 305) (statutes, as well as trea-
ties, in the foreign affairs area are becoming excessively detailed and unduly constraining).
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beit sometimes impatiently,431 to determine how the negotiated
document would be twisted by our legislative review. Although
most of our negotiating partners never fully understood the Ameri-
can concept of separation of powers, they learned grudgingly to ac-
commodate the inherent delays.
Now, however, the stakes are higher and the complexities have
multiplied. It is not only the American legislature that participates
in, and threatens to micromanage, international agreements. The
spread of democracy has inserted at least a somewhat autonomous
parliamentary check into many other countries, too. Even in the
republics of the former Soviet Union, the legislatures are now more
like genuine deliberative bodies, flexing independent political mus-
cle.432 Other nations have studied American federalism and occa-
sionally borrowed some of its institutions and practices, importing
the delays and inconsistencies along with its other features.433
It is beyond the scope of this Article to opine how any other
states ought to strike the balance between executive and legislative
powers in the'treaty-making and treaty-bending processes. But we
must be aware that ours is not the only potential source of legisla-
tive oversight and disruption. If we insist upon a laborious process
of formal amendment for every little change, and if other states
ape our rigidity, the process of creating and sustaining these im-
portant accords will stultify. Perhaps there is some hope that other
countries might tolerate an asymmetry in treaty modification
processes: in some countries, the chief executive might be able to
approve unilaterally a non-amendment, but in the United States,
the legislature would have to participate in some fashion before
431 The Soviet Union's cataclysmic invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 perhaps
provides a partial illustration of another.state losing patience with the American ratification
process. By that point, the signed SALT II Treaty had been pending before the United
States Senate for six months, with no immediate end in sight, and observers differed over its
eventual ratification prospects. Apparently, the Soviets simply gave up on the treaty ever
entering into force, or they calculated that it was no longer worthwhile compared to their
other security objectives. In any event, the Soviet invasion caused the Carter Administration
to defer the SALT II ratification effort, and the treaty was never taken up by the full Sen-
ate. ACDA Treaty Book at 263 (cited in note 5).
Morrison, Natl J at 2078 (cited in note 82).
4" Other aspects of federalism have also crept into other nations' new constitutions,
further complicating the process of negotiating disarmament agreements. See, for example,
Francis X. Clines, Soviet Republics Back Gorbachev on Nuclear Cuts, NY Times A8 (Oct 9,
1991) (four Soviet republics participated separately in formulating arms reductions propos-
als, preventing the traditional monolithic behavior).
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new terms could be ratified.43 4 In any event, however, we must not
allow the process to become more leaden than it already is.
Looming on the horizon is another, even more complex, ramifi-
cation of the problem. That is, in some international agreements,
the United States has, in effect, transferred a portion of its erst-
while national decisionmaking autonomy to some sort of suprana-
tional institution, committing our nation to accept its decisions as
binding. In so doing, we are ceding to that institution the ability to
interpret laws-and thereby to make laws-without fresh congres-
sional participation. In effect, the process delegates power not
merely to the United States chief executive, but out of the country
altogether, into the hands of judges, policymakers or others not
sworn to uphold the United States Constitution. s5
The Charter of the United Nations provides the first vivid il-
lustration of this practice, since all member states are committed
"to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. 4 36
The permanent members' veto power ensures that, as a practical
matter, the United States cannot be compelled to act against its
will, but the structure of a transfer of sovereign power is clear.437
More directly, in documents submitting to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, parties commit themselves to inter-
national adjudication, accepting the possibility that they may lose
a case on the facts or on the law.38 When that occurs, the state no
43, Many important multilateral arms control agreements do ensure a privileged posi-
tion for the United States or other leading countries. The LTBT, for example, provided that
an amendment could enter into force only when it is approved by a majority of the parties,
and that such majority must include the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.
LTBT, Art II (cited in note 9). In the modern era, however, it may not be so politically
feasible to sustain special privileges for selected states, as the principle of equal sovereignty
has become strengthened. A treaty could, however, simply leave it up to each state to decide
for itself what internal procedures were necessary for it to deposit an instrument accepting a
proposed amendment, and perhaps different states would come to different solutions.
"I See Restatement at § 102, Comment g and Reporters' Note 3 (cited in note 47)
(international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the International
Civil Aviation Organization have authority to promulgate compulsory resolutions, binding
upon the United States and other members); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
at 194-96 (cited in note 297) (exercise of legislative powers by international organizations is
constitutionally valid).
3I UN Charter, Art 25 (cited in note 235).
437 Even the General Assembly, where the United States has no veto power, has some
authority to make binding decisions, possibly adverse to American interests. Id, Art 17
(General Assembly approves the budget of the organization).
,19 Carter and Trimble, International Law at 276-79 (cited in note 324) (reprinting
United States and other declarations of submission to the International Court of Justice).
The United States has withdrawn from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, but still
remains eligible to be a party to litigation there, pursuant to the dispute-resolution provi-
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longer has control of its own destiny: it has granted the ICJ-not
its own chief executive-the power to state authoritatively the con-
tent of the international obligations.43 9
More recently, this trend has accelerated. In the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement,440 for example, the establish-
ment of an independent dispute resolution mechanism was a cen-
tral condition.4 41 This body is authorized to determine the proper
construction of anti-dumping and countervailing duty clauses with
no recourse to United States courts.442 Again, in consenting to the
treaty, the Senate is transferring power not simply to the Presi-
dent, but beyond our shores, as an autonomous international body
will effectuate the agreement.443 This process of construction and
interpretation inevitably changes the treaty as surely as does a de-
liberate modification (at least a "gap-filling" modification, if not a
"standards-changing" one).
The move toward creating that sort of supranational institu-
tion-enshrining the equality of states by requiring each of them
to surrender to an impartial international authority-is likely to
continue. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade already in-
corporates something of this power,444 and other pending agree-
ments might do so as well. 45 In each instance, in ratifying the ac-
cord, the legislature is delegating the power even further afield
than any arms control agreement has yet envisaged.
sions of many other treaties or to the submission of a particular case. Id at 298-300 (state-
ment by Legal Advisor Abraham D. Sofaer to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
The United States-Iran Claims Tribunal provides another illustration of an interna-
tional judicial forum to which the United States has voluntarily ceded some sovereign au-
thority, accepting the risk that a case may be decided adverse to American interests. Sym-
posium on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 16 L & Pol Intl Bus 667 (1984).
,"I See Role of the Senate at 130-39 (cited in note 64) (assessing United States partici-
pation in a variety of judicial dispute-resolution mechanisms).
4'0 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec 22-23, 1987, 27 ILM 281.
"' Carter and Trimble, International Law at 377-78 (cited in note 324) (Canada sought
creation of a binding dispute resolution mechanism, free from the possibility of appeal to
American courts); J.G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes Under the 1988 Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 83 Am J Intl L 118 (1989).
""'-Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Ch 19 (cited in note 440).
"I Senator Robert Byrd questioned the constitutionality of the delegation of power.
Carter and Trimble, International Law at 387-88.
444 See Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar Over a Ruling, Wash Post D1 (Oct 1, 1991)
(GATT expert panel concludes that United States trade sanctions against Mexican tuna
industry constitute a violation of international standards, exposing United States to
liability).
415 See Panel on the Law of Ocean Uses, Statement by Expert Panel: U.S. Policy on
the Settlement of Disputes in the Law of the Sea, 81 Am J Int L 438 (Apr 1987) (recom-
mending United States participation in a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism for the
law of the sea).
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There is no immediate prospect that arms control will imitate
those other agreements. 446 In the sector of national security, coun-
tries are especially jealous about preserving their unfettered auton-
omy.447 But if Congress may delegate power that expansively, au-
thorizing international trading authorities to make business and
commercial law for the United States, why should it not likewise
be free to make the President its agent in formulating future dis-
armament treaty terms with no requirement for subsequent legis-
lative re-approval? How can we fashion standards that will en-
courage and enhance United States participation in these vital
global organizations, committing ourselves to the international rule
of law, without surrendering too much of the Congress's checks
and balances?
In the final analysis, the Administration's new proposed
formula, permitting the executive to modify arms control agree-
ments through expeditious mechanisms other than formal amend-
ment, is a plausible, attractive, and intelligent idea. It is not, how-
ever, quite the idea that the Framers had built into the
Constitution. In our system, the executive is supposed to "bother
the Senate about every little point," and the value of efficiency
takes a back seat to the principle of checks and balances. The Sen-
ate will have to perform its own triage function, assessing how
much time and energy to devote to a proffered modification. It
cannot assign that operation to executive branch negotiators. It is
not for the executive-or, for that matter, for the legislature-to
worry about overburdening the Senate with a raft of relatively mi-
nor modifications to a run of arms control agreements. Congress
will simply have to do its job.
During the 1988 INF Treaty ratification hearings, Senator
Nunn probed how anyone could distinguish, under the Administra-
tion's proposals, between a small, minor perfecting modification
that could be effectuated informally, and a larger, more substantial
alteration that would prompt invocation of the formal amendment
process. 448 "[Wihere [do] we draw the line?" he asked,449 and
446 W.E. Butler, Ensuring Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: Legal Re-
sponses, in Butler, ed, Control over Compliance with International Law 31, 34-36 (Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 1991). See Trimble, 102 Harv L Rev at 897-912 (cited in note 132) (proposing
creation of an international institute to resolve disputes arising under arms control
agreements).
1,7 Falk, 1 Am U J Intl L & Pol 18 (cited in note 239).
48 NATO Defense and the INF Treaty, Hearings and Meetings Before the United
States Senate, S Rep No 100-312, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 411 (1988).
4, Id.
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others have wondered the same thing.5 0 The suggestion here,
based on the experience to date, is to draw the line where the Con-
stitution first drew it two hundred years ago: someplace very close
to Congress.
'50 Id (questions from Senator Wirth); Steiner Interview (cited in note 166).
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